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ABSTRACT
BELL, Graham Douglas, M.Com. University of the Witwatersrand, 1985.
This dissertation studies the development and operation, advantages and 
problems associated with the Eurocurrency market. It also considers the 
parallel emergence of the United States dollar as the primary 
international vehicle currency. A well-developed international money 
market with easy access to a widely accepted international numeraire is 
deemed desirable because it reduces the costs of international financial 
transactions and facilitates international capital mobility. TVo major 
criticisms are that the Eurocurrency market contributes to international 
inflation and that Eurobanks have been imprudent in lending to developing 
countries. The thesis concludes that the conventional credit multiplier 
model is not appropriate in studying the market but that there is, 
however, some inflationary potential. As for imprudent Eurobank lending, 
some blame adheres to the bankers but extensive international controls 
are ruled out. Finally, the advent of floating exchange rates in the 
1970s and uncertainty surrounding United States economic policy has led 
to considerable uncertainty in international financial markets. This has 
been aggravated by volatile short-term international capital flows 
fuelled by the efficient Eurocurrency market. In such an environment 
South Africa has experienced considerable oscillations in the price of 
gold, its major export, and has embarked on a programme to establish a 
flexible foreign exchange market. Much progress has been made but 
important changes, particularly in the forward market, are vital.
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PREFACE
The Butocurte.ttcy market has been a source of fascination to economists 
ever since its inception in the 1950s, Its fortunes have been 
inextricably linked with those of the US dollar - the dominant currency 
in international trade and finance, Ihls dissertation follows the 
parallel course of the Eurocurrency system and the US dollar through the 
period from the mid-1950s to the current day. It is a course fraught 
with problems ; the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement, the oil 
crisis, the adoption of floating exchange rates, accelerating inflation 
in the 1970s, the international debt crisis. Despite these problems both 
the dollar and the market have survived. Indeed, they still flourish.
Although peripheral to most of these events South Africa has been 
affected by them. In particular the substantial movements in the gold 
price and in the major exchange rates have influenced the adoption of 
more market-related financial policies in South Africa.
The seed for t<Us dissertation was originally sown by.Prof. D.J.J. Botha, 
Head of the Department of Economics at the University of the 
Hitwatererand, in 1978. Much of the initial reading was done under the 
auspices of the Office of the Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister in 
1978 and 1979. The author is grateful to Dr. Simon Brand for the 
facilities provided by this institution. During this time Prof, J.C. Van 
Zyl, then of the Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria, 
provided much helpful guidance.
In September 1980 an article was published by the author in the South 
African Journal of Economics entitled i Eurodollars and the Dollar 
Standard : Implications for the Rand Exchange Bate. The author is 
grateful to the editors for assistance at that time which, hopefully, has 
been incorporated in this dissertation.
The thesis was taken up again in 1983 under the supervision of Prof. 
R.M. Gidlow of the Department of Business Economics at the University of
(V)
the Uitwaterarand. His continual assistance has been gratefully 
appreciated throughout.
Much has changed in. the period since 1978 but the basic tenet of the 
thesis still holds: a dominant international vehicle currency supported 
by a viable international money market contributes considerably to 
reducing the cost of international financial transactions.
Controls are usually unsuccessful in financial markets. This point has 
also been accepted in South Africa where an important revolution in 
financial policy is taking place.
The author is grateful to numerous other professional economists who have 
aeen earlier drafts of parts of this dissertation. These include Mr. 
Rudolf Gouws, Mr. Aubrey Bickaan, Mr. Jim Buys and Mr. Gabriel De Kock. 
Further, the author was assisted in discussions with a number of foreign 
exchange dealers in Johannesburg, notably Mr, Stuart Main and Me. Trevor
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Two themes are pursued throughout this thesis. Ihe first Is that the use 
of a single currency for the denomination of international transactions 
is desirable because it reduces the costs involved in such transactions. 
Since World War II the US dollar has become the most widely accepted 
international currency despite periods when it has suffered from a 
decline in confidence.
Ihe second theme is that the development of an efficient international 
money and capital market enhances world economic welfare because it 
enables Che proper allocation of capital from capital-rich to capital- 
hungry economic entities. Despite criticisms, the Eurocurrency 
(popularly known as the Eurodollar) market has flourished over the past 
30 years in response to a world-wide need.
Ihe two themes are, in fact, complementary. The widespread use of a 
single world currency is possible only when transactors have easy and 
rapid access to it for a full range of financial services. The 
Eurodollar market has emerged as a natural consequence of the need for a 
widely acceptable international numeraire. Modern technology has made 
transactions in dollars virtually instantaneous while competition in 
international banking has ensured access from all corners of the globe.
Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on the use of money in an exchange 
economy. Ihe introduction of money to an economy allows the exchange 
process greater fluidity because it enables transactors to express mutual 
agreement (or disagreement) in terms of a unit which has equal validity 
in their eyes.1 In a world lacking in perfect foresight money performs 
both the function of a medium of exchange and a store of value.
In the international context a single world currency reduces the cost of 
transacting because knowledge concerning it is widely shared by 
transactors. Thus in its medium of exchange function a single currency 
becomes more efficient. As for the store of value function, a 
well-developed international banking system enables transactors to choose
the most appropriate combination of liquidity and rate of return to suit 
their various needs.
Chapter 2 also discusses the role of sophisticated financial markets and 
a dominant world currency io improving the allocation of resources 
between present and future consumption; the parallel growth of 
international capital mobility and world trade; and concludes with a 
brief resume of the emerging dominance of the US dollar after World War
■’ .pter 3 concentrates on the origin, size, location and operation of the 
Eurodollar market. The role of the US balance of payments deficits and 
US domestic financial controls in the emergence of the market is 
highlighted. Then rollows a detailed analysis of the different measures 
of its size. The chapter continues with a discussion of the different 
financial centres making up the market and the currencies used; the 
sources of Eurodollar deposits and the users of Eurodollar loans. 
Finally, there io an overview of the operation of the market and the mode 
of determination of Eurocurrency interest rates.
Chapter 4 again takes up the complementary development of the dollar as 
international vehicle currency and the Eurodollar market. In the 1960s a 
dilemma emerged concerning the dollar. The rapid growth in world trade 
necessitated a corresponding increase in international liquidity. The US 
was reluctant to allow an increase in the dollar price of gold leaving 
the brunt of the demand for increased liquidity to fall on the dollar. 
As US Inflation accelerated and its balance of payments deteriorated 
during the 1960s confidence in the dollar declined. The US imposed 
various controls to limit capital outflows which encouraged the 
development of the evolving Eurodollar market. Ultimately the lack of 
confidence in the dollar outweighed the international need for dollar 
liquidity and the Bretton Woods system collapsed.
During the 1970s the Eurodollar market continued to flourish particularly 
after the first oil crisis when it played 3 major role in recycling the 
OPEC current account surplus. The role of the dollar in international 
finance declined somewhat owing to a further acceleration of US 
inflation. However, from 1979 the US monetary authorities adopced a
determined anti-inflationary course which restored confidence in the 
currency considerably.
Arguments concerning the need for controls in the Eurodollar market 
generally focus on two major problem areas - the inflationary potential 
of the market and the lending of Eurobanks to leas developed countries 
(LDCa), The first of these is considered in Chapter 5. Early analysis 
tended to focus on the fractional reserve mu?tlplier model used to 
examine a domestic banking system. Many economists noted the very low
ratio of reserves to deposits held by Eurobanks. This led them to
postulate that the market operated on very high credit multipliers,
created almost unlimited amounts of liquidity and possessed considerable 
inflationary potential.
As the Eurodollar market was subjected to more intense academic scrutiny 
it became increasingly apparent that the credit multiplier model was not 
an appropriate tool of analysis. One of the most important reasons for 
this was that there are no cheque facilities in the market. It became 
apparent that Eurobanks were more akin to non-bank financial
intermediaries such as savings-and-loan associations.
Other theorists perceived that it was precisely because of their 
negligible reserve ratios that Eurobanks did not create credit in the 
conventional way. Without the fulcrum of a required reserve ratio 
Eurodollar deposits and loans were much more sensitive to interest rate 
movements, For example, an exogenous rise in deposits need not 
necessarily result in increased lending by Eurobanks. It could equally 
lead to a fall in deposit rates and a corresponding withdrawal of 
deposits by investors seeking better returns in other markets.
Another issue was the extent to which the market could enhance the 
liquidity of the non-bank sector. Empirical analysis shows that 
Eurobanks do tend to transform short-term deposits into long-term loans.
Overall it is concluded that the Eurodollar market does have some 
inflationary potential particularly through its ability to increase the 
velocity of the given stock of money in a domestic economy. However, 
because the market is an extension of domestic money markets it is within
the scope of domestic monetary authorities to control its inflationary 
potential. Controls, in some international form, are therefore rejected.
Chapter 6 is concerned with international bank lending to LDCs. The 
origins of the so-called 'debt crisis’ in 1982 are discussed, 
particularly with respect to the gtwitig role of Eurobanks in financing 
LDC development. This is followed by a review of the various measures 
adopted by banks to quantify the creditworthiness of debtor countries. 
It is apparent that the commonly used debt ratios were either Inadequate 
or not fully adhered to during the latter half of the 1970s. Data on 
these ratios are included along with numbers on bank lending to various 
major debtors.
Ihe view is held that neither the Eurobanks nor the LDCs can shoulder all 
the blame for the debt crisis. However, numerous misconceptions were 
apparent on the part of the banks. These concerned issues such as the 
potential for a country to go bankrupt and the belief that world central 
banks would automatically support stricken Eurobanks. Bie issue of 
controls ia also covered and this section includes a brief list of 
various organisations of international bank supervisory bodies. It is 
concluded that there should be neither a cessation of private bank 
lending to LDCs nor an overly austere programme of restraint ia LDC 
economies. Rather a careful balance between adjustment and financing 
should be adopted over the remainder of the decade with close 
co-operation between private banks, official lending agencies and the
Chapter 7 returns to the parallel themes of the dollar and the Eurodollar 
market. The chapter commences with a more detailed discussion of the 
failure of the US to revalue the gold price in the 1960a. Apart from the 
dollar only gold was capable of meeting the need for international 
liquidity, us economic policy did not inspire confidence in the dollar 
and the Bretton Woods system ultimately broke down in 1971. Thereafter 
followed a dramatic surge in the gold price. Fuelled by the efficient 
Eurodollar market liquid funds were rapidly channelled from one 
investment outlet to another in various geographical locations. Floating 
exchange rates became the rule for the major currencies.
The movement in the gold price had important consequences for South 
Africa and an analysis of the gold price vie-a-vis four economic 
variables is undertaken. These are: the US inflation rate; the trade- 
weighted US dollar exchange rate; the US business cycle; and the real, 
after-tax US interest rate. The role of the debt crisis in determining 
the movement in the gold price is also covered. Die chapter concludes 
with a brief analysis of the importance of gold for the South African 
balance of payments.
The final chapter. Chapter 0, focusee on developments in the South 
African foreign exchange markets in the light of the gyrations in the 
international monetary system after 1971. Firstly, there is an
historical overview of South African exchange rate policy between 1971 
and 1979. The authorities experimented with various measures according 
to the state of the domestic balance of payments and external currency 
adjustments.
From 1979 the proposals of the interim report of the De Kock Commission 
of Inquiry concerning exchange rate policy were progressively 
implemented.^ The Commission recognised that in a world of floating
exchange rates and volatile capital flows, a more flexible exchange rate 
regime needed to be implemented.
By 1983 a managed float of the spot rand exchange rate was in place. 
Unfortunately this did not prevent a dramatic decline in the rate during 
1984. This was because the authorities were not able to follow a 
sufficiently disciplined combination of monetary and fiscal policy. 
Thia, sadly, went against the proposals of the Commission.
Progress in the forward exchange market was much slower. The Commission 
also recognised that a proper forward market was an essential adjunct to 
a managed spot rate. Not the least of its worries was Che substantial 
losses incurred by the South African Reserve Bank on forward exchange 
transactions. By the time of writing the proposals concerning the
forward market had not been put in place. Particularly necessary is the
need for domestic banks to be able to make much greater use of the
Eurodollar market for hedging forward commitments to clients.
The chapter also includes a discussion of the potential for a Eurorand 
market to develop. Despite South Africa's relative importance as a 
trading nation it is concluded that an offshore rand market la unlikely 
to be significant. More appropriate would be a further easing of 
exchange controls to allow foreigners to hold a wider range of rand- 
denominated financial instruments in South Africa.
CHAPTER 1
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CHAPTER. 2
THE USE OF MONEY
2.1 Introduction
in this chapter the use of money In an exchange economy la 
discussed. It is argued that technological developments have reduced 
the coot of holding money in an uncertain world and have increased 
the efficiency of a commonly-accepted medium of exchange. In the 
international sphere It has also been practical to develop a single, 
acceptable currency unit because it reduces the cost of transacting. 
The C/S dollar adopted this mantle after World War II in response to 
the growing need for international liquidity. The status of the 
dollar as world numeraire was enhanced by the emergence and rapid 
expansion of the Eurocurrency market which has devised a 
sophisticated range of monetary instruments to satisfy the medium of 
exchange (liquidity) and store of value (minimum coat) needs of 
transactors in a widely accepted international currency.
Because it is efficient the Eurocurrency market has also increased 
international welfare by enabling unfettered transfer of financial 
resources from capital-rich to capital-poor nations i.e. from 
countries where the decision to consume is delayed to countries where 
it is not. In addition, it is argued that, far from free trade in 
coaaodltiee being a complete substitute for international capital 
mobility as posited in the Heckacher-Ohlin theorem, the combination 
of the US dollar and the Eurocurrency market enabled spectacular 
growth in world trade after World War II.
2.2 The Use of Money
The modern economic system with its sophisticated monetary mechanism 
has come a long way from the barter process of early economies. The 
use of a commonly accepted medium of exchange by societies has 
permitted the communal organisation of production and trade to 
develop far beyond the primitive exchange process which was based on 
the double coincidence of wants.
Barter trading ia complex, costly, inefficient and slow because it 
restricts the exchange process to those transactors able to match 
divergent needs simultaneously. This hampers division of labour and 
the growth of productivity.
The use of money ss a medium of exchange separates the decision to 
sell from the decision to buy and the divisibility of money enables 
precise satisfaction of different utility needs. Money oils the
transactions process and facilitates rapid exchange.
The function of money as a medium of exchange relates to the specific
point of time at which a transaction is made. Until such time as the
transaction is undertaken the money used for the transaction must 
perform some other function. If it were absolutely certain as to the 
exact moment at which each transaction was to take place, there would 
be no necessity to hold the money required. It could be used to 
purchase some other asset which would yield a return to the
transactor and would mature at the precise time that the transaction 
was due to take place.
As Hicks has pointed out, however, absolute certainty about future 
transactions is an unattainable goal.^ Owing to men's ignorance of 
future events (and still more owing to their ignorance of the 
consequences of changes, whether future, present, or even past) 
perfect equilibrium can never be attained. The absence of perfect 
equilibrium or perfect foresight concerning the timing of
transactions naturally implies that future prices on which economic 
actions are based are also uncertain.
The absence of perfect foresight is well illustrated by the 
discrepancy between disbursements and receipts in the modern
economy. Individuals make purchase decisions continually throughout 
the period between salary or wage payments; firms sell goods
continually throughout the period between salary or wage payments. 
Inevitably the use of money for exchange purposes is sporadic and 
variable. Money is not always spent as soon as it is received and 
this gives rise to its store of value function. 'Because a period of
time will usually elapse between an economic unit receiving its 
income and making its expenditure, a medium of exchange will also act 
as a store of value
In the absence of a perfect world the decision as to how much money 
to hold depends, to start with, on the degree of uncertainty as to 
the time and price of future transactions, i.e. on the expectations 
of the transactor. Secondly, it depends on the alternative cost of 
holding money, i.e. the rate of interest and degree of risk inh--i\mt 
in non-monetary assets (or less liquid monetary assets).
Expectations both as to the timing and the price of transactions tend 
to be guided by past influences. There is usually a lack of 
information available to transactors about the availability of goods 
in alternative markets. The real supply-demand situation may not be 
reflected in price adjustments until quite some time after the 
transactions have been concluded due to variable rates of
information-gathering and processing in different markets.
With respect to the alternative cost of holding money Tobin has 
developed useful theoretical insights.^ Tobin's analysis of money 
demand combined both the means of payment and the store value 
functions of money. Tobin explained that economic unite held both 
transactions balances and investment balances. Transactions balances
were held because an economic unit did not enjoy ’perfect
synchronisation between the seasonal patterns of its flow of receipts 
and its flow of expenditures'.^ While the major proportion of 
these balances were held in cash, a smaller proportion could be held 
in interest-earning assets. What proportion would depend on the
interest rates on alternative aasets, the size of the transactions 
balances, etc. Therefore, this proportion of transactions balances 
would be perform!!.. a temporary store of value function,
Tobin distinguished investment balances from transactions balances as 
those balances which ’survive all the expected seasonal excesses of 
cumulative expenditures over cumulative receipts ...1 Because 
the economic unit io risk averse owing to uncertainties regarding 
interest rate movements, at least a portion of investment balances
would be field in cash. This would depend on the rate of interest and 
the degree of risk of alternative financial assets.
Expectations about futures price movements, Including Interest rates, 
clearly are Important determinants which affect decisions about the 
optimum holding of cash in a financial portfolio.
Hicks has more recently asserted chat one w&y of looking at monetary 
evolution is to regard it as the development of ever more
sophisticated ways of reducing transactions cost.® The trend has
been for the distinction between money and near-money to diminish, 
ttiere are a wide variety of Instruments which are virtually as liquid 
as cash and which can Instantly be called upon for payments purposes 
at negligible cost. In sophisticated money markets Interest-bearing 
assets auch as negotiable certificates of deposit and treasury bills 
can easily be liquidated. The growing variety and exchangeability of 
near-money assets improves the ability of economic units to minimise 
the coat and uncertainty of disparities between receipts and
disbursements.
Variety and exchangeability also enable holders of near-money assets 
to reduce the risk of capital gain or loss which they faca when 
monetising them. Ihus, while assets such as short-term bills and 
bonds do not have a certain nominal capita* value and are subject to 
price changes as the supply or the demand for them change, they are 
a till sufficiently 'ooney-like' to perform the medium of exchange
function of money when needed. Although the stove of value function 
of money still entails a cost measured by the yield on alternative 
financial assets, this cost has been reduced by the growing variety 
of near-money assets which carry an interest return.
In short, technological advances in money markets have improved the 
efficiency of money because they have reduced the cost to transactors 
of holding n.oney simultaneously as a medium of exchange and as a 
store of value. It is also likely that the lower the risk and the 
higher the return attainable on a particular unit of exchange, the 
more widely it is likely to be used by the economic community.
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2.3 Money in an International Setting
The growth of the international money markets has prv ided new 
avenues for the use of money both as a medium of exchange and as a 
store of value. According to Brunner and Meltaer, the Eurodollar 
market suggests the way in which a unit of account begins to acquire 
the properties of a medium of exchange and other attributes o£ money 
through the efforts of private traders.^ Iheir analysis 
incorporates a succinct statement of the role of money In an 
uncertain world. They state: 'For individuals, money is a
substitute for investment and information and labour allocated to 
research. By uaing money, individuals reduce the amount of 
information they oust acquire, process and store and they reduce the 
number of transactions in which they engage to exchange their initial 
endowments for optimal baskets of goods. The use of money increases 
the welfare of each money user by reducing uncertainty, the length of 
transactions chains, and the variance of price ratios and by 
increasing the expected wealth and tiae available for leisure*.8
The rise of the dollar to the role of the world's major currency is 
practical evidence of this theory. Bie dollar has become 
internationally acceptable for the denomination of world trade in 
goods, services and financial assets. The eurodollar market has 
expanded to facilitate the rapid transfer of dollars amongst users; 
the precision of specialised broking techniques has made dollar 
transactions across national borders a highly efficient process.
A strong case can be made out for a single international currency. 
Vaubel asserts that individual information cost (depreciation of 
memory) is smaller the longer a money has been used as a standard of 
value, and the larger the average number of accounts have been 
denominated in it per period of time (learning by doing). Social and 
spatial economies arise in contracts and payments between economic 
agents. They concern short-term exchange rate risk (or the cost of 
hedging against it), convertibility risk, and the transactions cost 
of exchanging moneys or of managing a multi-currency portfolio.9 
Vaubel continues; 'To some extent the choice between currencies is 
comparable to the choice between languages or telephone networks or
Industrial locations: the more economic agents choose the product or
location x, the more attractive It becomes for others so that success 
breeds success la a gradual and cumulative agglomeration process'
The use of the dollar has had a spill-over effect as the benefits are 
passed on from user to user. Market Infornution becomes eaaler to 
attain; traders and brokers create linkages which facilitate the 
development of economies of scale. Working balances can be pooled 
and minimised while cash Inflows can be more rapidly invested.
The Eurodollar market offers the Investor a wide range of maturities 
in which to Invest, from overnight to more than a year. This allows 
the transactor to choose deposit maturities to coincide tilth future 
transactions while unforeseen needs are accommodated by flexible, 
negotiable monetary instruments. Eurodollar deposit facilities 
enable dollars to perform the medium of exchange and store of value 
functions simultaneously because they offer a high degree of 
liquidity and a well-developed and flexible interest rate structure. 
This reduces the cost of holding money or near-money to a minimum. 
It allows the transactor to come closer to an optimal portfolio 
spread.
The expansion of the market has enhanced the process of Information- 
gathering. Opportunities for division of labour have multiplied. 
Professional middlemen and specialised traders exploit the partial 
and incomplete distribution of information about particular 
currencies. Information costs about market conditions art lowered as 
these specialised services expand. Most banks in the Eurocurrency 
market prefer to make use of foreign exchange brokers who tend to 
specialise in particular Eurocurrencies or maturitiet. Some 
Eurobanks specialise in a specific Eurocurrency. Furthermore, rapid 
technological innovations have made the transfer of information a 
very speedy business. The telephone, and more recently, computer 
screens have made monetary transactions virtually instantaneous.
To conclude, the use of the dollar as international numeraire and the 
subsequent development of the Eurodollar market Is a process which 
continually reinforces itself. Both the transactions and the 
precautionary demand for money are satisfied In a world where 
uncertainty about the timing of payments end the alternative coat of 
money exists.
.4 Intertemporal Decision-Making
One major role of financial markets is to allow the producer to 
separate production and consumption decisions.^ This applies as 
Much to external as to domestic financial markets. Traditionally the 
theory of international capital flows starts with an analysis of 
production possibilities In a closed economy where producers have 
perfect foresight. Producers face a trade-off between production for 
current consumption and for future consumption. The marginal rate of 
transformation between present and future consumption Is described by 
the intertemporal opportunity locus AA' in Graph 2.1.1  ^ ihe locus 
is concave to the origin indicating diminishing returns to scale.
By devoting some resources to future consumption total output over 
time can be increased. The slope of the tangent RR* in Graph 2.1 at 
any point along the locus determines the rate of return in terms of 
future output against present output given up. Resources will 
continue to be devoted to future consumption up of the point where 
this rate of return equals the market rate of interest.
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The market rate of interest is determined by the time preference of 
the consumer. If consumers have a positive time preference, they 
prefer current consumption to future consumption and if they have a 
negative time preference, they prefer future consumption to current 
consumption. Ihe market rate of interest is the slope of the line 
where the consumer indifference curve (UU* in Graph 2.1) is tangent 
to the production possibility locus. Thie is at point K.
Ihis unique point signifies the equilibrium in domestic supply and 
demand given perfect foresight. As different economies are likely at 
any point to have different time preferences there are advantages in 
developing International trade and capital flows. A country with a 
positive time preference will have a relatively higher market rate of 
interest than one with a negative time preference. The positive time 
preference country therefore attracts capital from the negative time
preference country, selling claims on its future production in the 
process and enabilng it to purchase more goods for current 
consumption. The negative time preference country lends to the 
positive time preference country and purchases claims on its future 
production in the process.
With the introduction of uncertainty the single market rate of 
interest (rate of return) is no longer realistic. Both borrowing and 
lending countries require a broader range of financial instruments to 
cater for varying perceptions of risk and return in a world with an 
uncertain future. Also, instead of there being just a email number 
of countries participating in world trade, there are, in reality, an 
almost infinite number of production and consumption units in the 
international economy with widely diverging needs and expectations.
In a certain world, free international trade in goods and financial 
assets would produce a constant rate of transformation and, hence, 
market rate of interest. When uncertainty is introduced the 
existence of rink l-:ads to the creation of diversified financial 
assets so that each participant in international markets may choose 
an optimal combination of risk and return.
The use of money also facilitates the intertemporal allocation of 
resources. Deferred payments, borrowing, credit, and the payments 
system expand when a standardised asset with well-known properties 
becomes available. The reason is that transactors become more 
willing to enter into contracts calling for deferred payment.^ 
The Eurocurrency system has developed a wide range of financial 
Instruments to meet this need. Apart from the extensive deposit and 
loan facilities the market is broad and deep and participants also 
have the benefit of sophisticated forward cover mechanisms. With one 
currency dominant and acceptable in the market, participants are able 
to minimise currency transactions and information coats. This leads 
to greater efficiency in the allocation of international savings and 
thereby to improved investment and growth.
2.5 Social veraua Private Returns to Capital
In the previous section It was argued that International capital 
movements separated the decision whether to consume or Invest. This 
led to greater world economic welfare because participants could 
arrive at an optimal trade-off between present and future consumption.
For this to be true It Is also necessary that the social returns to 
capital, i.e. ths returns to society as a whole, coincide with the 
private retumm, i.e. returns to specific groups. Factors such as 
divergent tax systems, Inflation rates end direct controls over 
capital flows tend to drive a wedge between the social and private 
returns to capital. Modigliani has argued that until fiscal and 
capital market structures from country to country have been made 
reasonably uniform, there is uo sound basis for arguing that freedom 
of capital to move in response to differences in private yields 
contributes to an improved allocation of world resources.^
There appears, however, to be considerable support for a classical 
stand as regards capital movements, i.e. that they should be left 
free. It Is generally agreed that the principal benefit of
international financial market integration is increased efficiency in 
the allocation of scarce capital resources throughout the world.^ 
Lending by capital-rich countries generates higher returns in
capital-poor countries than to domestic borrowers while capital-poor 
countries can Invest more without having to sacrifice present 
consumption. The crucial precondition is that such capital movements 
are efficient.1-® It does not seem unreasonable to maintain that 
the Eurocurrency market has satisfied this precondition.
2he argument is more elegantly stated by Klndleberger: 'The main 
justification for international capital movement is that it shifts 
savings from locations where they are abundant and cheap relative to 
investment opportunities to places where they are scarce and
expensive. Where capital is more productive in one country than
another, it should be moved from the country where it is less to a 
country where it is more productive. Total output is increased by
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such movement. Where savers la one country have lesser preference 
for current consumption than those In another, total welfare is 
Increased by shifting the consumption of one into the future and the 
other into the present1
Because the Eurocurrency market has developed free from restrictions 
on capital flows it has facilitated the efficient allocation of
financial resources internationally. In addition, the market has 
promoted the US dollar's role as the world's major currency which has 
reduced the costs of international financial transfers. According to 
Einzig and Quinn*® the market has provided an inducement as well as 
the means for greater co-ordination in international economic 
policies. Furthermore, the recovery of the major industrialised
countries since World War II and the subsequent rapid growth la the 
developing countries specifically and as a group derived in large 
measure from the growing efficiency in the distribution of liquid 
resources on an international basis. Hie role of the US dollar la 
particular should not be understated. The increasingly wide use of 
the dollar as an international working and reserve currency has made 
the dollar money markets the closest approximation to a single world 
money market.
2.6 The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
Two Swedish economists, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, writing in 
the early part of the 20th century, developed a theory for
international trade which concluded that free trade in commodities
could completely substitute for international mobility of capital and 
labour in the sense of driving wages and rents to equality for 
participating countries. If the theory is valid then there would be 
no need for capital to seek the best return, internationally, because 
the free flow of goods across borders would optimise the application 
of capital within domestic economies.
There appears to be a preference for free trade rather than free 
capital movements amongst official economic policy-makers. While 
there is no co-ordinated, official international agreement for 
capital movements, a structure for international agreements related
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to trade does exist in the form of the General Agreements on Tariffs 
& Trade (GATT).
However, neither the Heckechler-Ohlin theorem nor the institutional 
approach have diminished the need for mobile international capital 
and rapid growth of an international structure to facilitate it. 
Indeed, it is argued that the rapid expansion of the Eurocurrency 
markets has been a response to and support for the sharp and 
sustained rise in world trade since World War II.
During the 1950s it was common cause that there was an international 
liquidity-shortage owing mainly to the non-convertibility of European 
currencies and the 'dollar shortage*. The emergence of the 
Eurodollar market was a natural consequence of Che dollar's rise to 
the status of world currency. The market increased the availability 
and velocity of circulation of liquid resources necessary to finance 
the trade boom. From Table 2.1 it can be seen that world trade 
Volume grew at an average rate of over 7 per cent during the period 
1954 to 1970; in other words from just prior to the advent of the 
system until the end of the first full decade of its existence. The 
development of Eurocurrency operations, along with the rapid 
expansion of international trade and investment, has indeed changed 
the basic structure of the world economy. International capital 
flows have transcended political and ideological barriers along with 
international trade as witnessed by the expansion of business 
conducted between the West and Comecon countries.
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TABLE 2.1
GROWTH IN THE VOLUME OF WORLD TRADE
B SE (%) EXP"!
1954 5,5 5,0
1955 10,9 8,4
1956 7,6 8,9
1957 6,5 4,8
1958 0,1 -2,1
1959 9,2 7,0
1960 10,9 10,6
1961 5,5 4,2
1962 7,0 5,1
1963 7,6 8,1
1964 9,6 9,6
1965 7,2 6,8
1966 8,6 7,5
1967 5,2 4,8
1968 12,4 12,4
1969 U,2 11,0
1970 J A _ M
Average 7,9 7,2
Source: International Financial Statistics, Supplement on Trade
Statistics, 1952.
The Hedtscher-Ohlln theorem still probably shows how differences 
between countries in the endowment of broad classes of productive 
factors such as capital and labour will be reflected in differing 
patterns of production and trade.^ However, it is also true to 
say that the Eurodollar was born ' in an era of rampant 
internationalism' and the extent of this could not perhaps have been 
imagined by the two Swedish economists.^
2.7 International Vehicle Currency
The United States emerged from World War II relatively unscathed. By 
the end of the war over half of the world's manufacturing and 
one-third of the total production of all goods was estimated to be 
taking place in the US. The US was the dominant economy in terms of 
national wealth and productive capacity, and it also possessed 
considerable reserves of gold. ,
In the immediate post-war period the US was the only manufacturing 
nation capable of exporting in large volume. However, US imports did 
not match exports and a scarcity of dollars arose in international 
markets. Until 1951 the US authorities applied a number of policy 
measures aimed at reducing this dollar shortage so that the war-torn 
West European economies could afford the purchase of US exports vital 
to their recovery. These measures included stabilisation loans as 
well as a flow of dollars under the European Recovery Programme.
The European economies recovered during the early 1950s and the 
dollar shortage diminished as the US continually ran deficits on an 
official reserve transactions baais. This allowed the reconstructed 
nations of Western Europe to rebuild their depleted international 
reserves. Furthermore, their dollar assets were held with some 
confidence as the US Treasury was prepared to exchange them for gold 
on an official basis,
The dollar therefore assumed the status nf a key international 
currency in that an adequate supply of dollars was available for 
reserves and transactions purposes, and the currency’s official 
convertibility was assured by a seemingly endless supply of gold.
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There were numerous reasons for the US balance of payments deficit. 
2he most notable were growing overseas military expenditure by the 
US; Increasing grant and aid programmes; overseas Investment by US 
multinational companies and, ultimately, the deterioration of the US 
trade balance.
The demand for dollars did not only come from official agencies such 
as central banks and national treasuries to build up their foreign 
exchange reserves. There was also a substantial private demand for 
the dollar related to its growing usefulness as a vehicle currency 
for the denomination of trade and for the international settlement of 
trade debts. The ability of the US to export a large volume of 
long-term investment capital enhanced the role of the US capital 
market as a focal point of international investment; transactions. 
Indeed, the large scale and efficiency of US money and capital 
markets compensated for the shortcomings of financial markets in the 
European economies and boosted the dollar considerably.
In summary, the sheer size and power of the US economy after World 
War II made the dollar the only candidate for replacing sterling as 
the world's vehicle currency. 2he dollar adopted this role in all 
respects: as a medium of exchange for transactions purposes, as the
leading currency for denomination of international capital 
transactions, and as chief reserve medium. The use of the dollar for 
international financial transactions was promoted with the emergence 
of the Eurocurrency markete in which the Eurodollar was predominant. 
The market enabled the world's numeraire to be traded rapidly and 
efficiently. The Eurocurrency system developed in response to a need 
in the international economy for an international money market that 
was broad and dtep and which offered a single currency that was 
acceptable for a wide range of financial transactions.
A
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CHAPTER 3
ORIGIN, SIZE, LOCATION AND OPERATION OF THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
The Eurocurrency market first came into being la the late 1950s 
following the liberalisation of exchange and capital coatrola in 
Europe. The aseYket was given a further boost by US attempts to 
prevent the export of capital in the 1960s. These developments 
coincided with rapid growth in world economic activity and trade 
which created a need for international liquidity. As the predominant 
medium of exchange for International transactions, only the US dollar 
would satisfy this need. The effect of US capital controls was to 
shift business normally conducted domestically by US banks to 
Eurocurrency centres such as London where a growing number of US and 
other banks established branches.
This chapter examinee the origins of the Eurocurrency market and its 
early growth and includes a discussion of the initial role played by 
US balance of payments deficits. Then follows a detailed breakdown 
of the size of the market, .its variety of locations, the source of 
Eurocurrency deposits and the different categories of users. Finally 
attention is given to the operation of the market and the 
determination of the various Eurocurrency interest rates.
3-2 Origin
The Eurocurrency market was originally started by commercial banks in 
Europe which accepted interest-bearing deposits in currencies other 
than their national currencies and re-lent them either in the same 
currency, their national currency or In a third currency. The market 
is ao longer specifically 'Euro’ in that external or offshore banking 
centres have been established in many areas including the Caribbean 
and the Middle and far .East. More generally a Eurocurrency deposit 
may be defined as any short-term bank liability (whether to a 
resident or non-resident) denominated in a currency other than the 
currency of the country in which the bank is located. The OS dollar
is the dominant currency in the market, contributing 80 per cent of 
gross Eurocurrency liabilities at the end of 1983.^ For this 
reason the words 'Eurocurrency' and 'Eurodollar' are often used 
interchangeably by observers of the market, and by the author.
Some precedent exists for the trading of foreign currency deposits. 
At medieval fairs bills drawn in terms of foreign currencies were 
often paid out of or into foreign currency deposits.^ Transactions 
in sterling deposits in foreign countries have been a feature since 
the last century. However, the Eurocurrency system is unprecedented 
to the extent that it is a broad international money market that 
attracts foreign currency deposits from a wide variety of sources and 
puts these deposits to an equally wide variety of uses, be it for 
trade, deficit financing, arbitrage or speculation. The emergence of 
a structure of international interest rates that are distinct from 
national interest rates is something entirely new. It is without 
parallel in modem economic history.^
Numerous factors led to the creation of the market in the j.ate 
1950s. For one thing, after World War II, the USSR sought dollar 
claims that were not subject to US control and Communist-controlled 
banks like the Moscow Narodny Bank in London and the Banque 
Commercials de L1Europe du Nord in Paris redeposited their dollar 
holdings with banks in London and Paris. Reasons cited for this 
include the desire to avoid tho risk of seizure of their dollar 
assets by the US authorities, and the build-up of goodwill with 
Eurobanks who could later become a source of loans.
Secondly, an important boost to the market came in 1957 when a 
sterling crisis caused the Bank of England to raise the Bank rate to 
seven per cent and to ban sterling-financed trade for non-sterling 
countries. After World War II the use of the dollar as vehicle 
currency for International payments had become increasingly 
widespread and, to compensate for the restrictions on sterling 
credit, the Bank encouraged London-based banks to make greater use of 
dollars.
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Thirdly, a major factor behind the original expansion of the market 
related to the deficits on the US balance of payments. The table 
shows the US official reserve transactions balance between 1950 and 
1970. This measure is similar to changes in net gold and foreign 
exchange reserves recorded in the South African Reserve Bank 
Quarterly Bulletin,
TABLE 3.1
UNITED STATES; OFFICIAL RESERVE TRANSACTIONS BALANCE 
($ Billion)
YEAR
1950
1951
1953
1954 Average -1,2
1955
•1956
1957 1,1
1958 -2,7
1959 -2,7
1960 -3,4
1961 -1,4
1962 -2,7
1963 -1,9
1964 -1,5
1965 -1,3
1966 0,2
1967 -3,4
1968 1,6
1969 2,7
1970 -9,8
Source: Yeager, L.B. International Monetary Relations : Theory.
History & Policy, Harper 4 Row, New York, 1976, pp. 570-1.
Friedman pointed out that US balance of payments deficits could not 
be held responsible for the massive growth in the market. US 
deficits amounted to leas than *9 billion (on a liquidity basis) for 
the five years up to 1968 whereas Eurodollar deposits had totalled 
j3Q billion.* However, it ia noted that during the 1950a the US 
ran deficits to finance the reconstruction of Europe. The deficits 
were created not on the US balance of trade which consistently showed 
a surplus until 1971 but on capital account owing to long-term and
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short-term capital outflows. The dollar became widely used in trade 
and international financial transactions. In 1958, other European 
currencies became freely convertible into dollars when the function 
of the European Payments Union lapsed. Convertibility meant that 
private foreigners could freely place their dollar balances where 
they wished. Dollar-holdera started to place their assets outside 
the US money market where interest rates on time deposits were 
subject to ceilings. Eurobanks accepting these deposits offered more 
attractive and unrestricted interest rates. Thus the US dollar 
deficits provided the initial supply of dollars which found their way 
into the Eurocurrency system.
London was the first major centre for Eurocurrency activities. The 
technical expertise and banking specialisation developed since before 
the Cold Standard era equipped the City to take on the rapid 
expansion of the international money markets. Today, London is still 
conducting a third of total Eurocurrency business, despite Che 
flourishing offshore banking activities in other centres.
During its early phase the system received ample support from 
official and financial institutions. Central banks, treasuries and 
international bodies deposited substantial sums in the market in the 
formative years to take advantage of the more attractive yields 
offered. For example, during 1960 and 1961 interest paid on 3-month 
bank deposits in the US was 2,5 per cent against 3,5 per cent or more 
for Eurodollar deposits.
The re-depositing of funds in the Eurocurrency market by official 
institutions was later to become a central element in the controversy 
concerning the inflationary potential of the market. This is covered 
in Qiapter 5.
3.3 Early Growth Phase - the Effect of US Controls
The early development of the Eurocurrency market was treated with 
some suspicion. In the early 1960s Americans regarded Eurodollars as 
’funny money’ and interest outside Europe was only stimulated from 
1966 when US banks became significantly involved. Given the
phenomenal growth of the market over the past two decades, it is hard 
to imagine that the system had small beginnings. Oscar Altman of the 
IMF, one of the early analysts of the Eurodollar market, estimated
that total Eurodollar deposits amounted to $5 000m by the end of 1962
- whereas 20 years later at the end of 1982 total deposits were about 
$1 650 000m.
Dufey 6 Giddy list three minimum prerequisites for the development of 
an external dollar money market.** Firstly, non-resident depositors 
in the US should be free to transfer their deposits out of the US. 
This had been permitted since at least World War II. Secondly, banks 
situated outside the US should be able to offer external deposits and 
loans at competitive rates in a convenient location. As has already 
been noted, this condition was satisfied by the support given by the
Bank of England to Eurobanks based in London from 1957. Thirdly,
there should be demand for external deposits and loans.
While the original emergence of the Eurocurrency market can be 
attributed to the liberalisation of exchange and capital controls in 
Europe in the late 1950s, the US attempt to stop the export of 
capital in the 1960s gave the market a further boost because, in 
effect, it led to the export to Europe of a portion of the US'money 
market instead. These restrictions satisfied the third condition for 
the expansion of the market.
Eurobanks already had a competitive advantage as a result of their 
relative freedom from the coats and impediments of tb» regulatory 
arrangements covering domestic banking in the US. For instance, they 
were not subject to reserve requirements or the pricing agreements 
prevalent in the US banking system. An important regulation that 
stimulated the development of the Eurodollar market waa Regulation Q, 
under which the Federal Reserve fixed maximum interest rates that 
member banks could pay on time deposits. The existence of Regulation 
Q meant that Eurobanks could attract dollar deposits by offering more 
attractive rates. This was to have chaotic consequences in the 
latter half of the 1960s.
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The OS capital controls programme during the 1960s provided further 
'infant industry1 protection for Eurobanks. The Interest 
Equalisation Tax (IET) enacted in 1964 had the effect of restraining 
outflows of long-term capital from the US. The IET was augmented in 
1965 by the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Programme (VFCR), 
under which US banks were obliged to lend abroad only with funds 
borrowed abroad. These measures failed to halt the deteriorating 
dollar situation and in 1968 the Federal Reserve was given the 
authority to make the VFCR mandatory.
These attempts by the US to control capital outflows had the effect 
of putting severe pressure on financial markets throughout the 
world. By the 1960s the US dollar had risen to prominence as the 
world's main vehicle currency for trade both in commercial goods and 
financial assets. As international financial intermediary, the US 
provided capital not only in the form of goods and services, but also 
in the form of liquidity to a European market which required dollars 
to finance capital formation and growth.
Arguing that Europe needed dollars because European capital markets 
were 'narrower and less competitive than that of the US', Desprea and 
others maintained that if access to dollars were cut it would have a 
dampening effect on European growth and a subsequent negative effect 
on US exports, causing the US trade balance to deteriorate.6
Despite this argument there was increasing nervousness surrounding 
the large dollar balances building up outside the US relative to the 
US stock of international reserves. US monetary authorities 
attempted to minimise the dollar 'overhang' by implementing controls 
on dollar outflows. However, because there was still a need for 
dollars internationally this merely led to further stimulation of the 
unrestricted market for dollars - the Eurodollar market.
The effect of these controls was a hift of business normally 
conducted by banks within the US to offshore Eurobanks and many US 
banka established branches in Burobanking centres.
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The Eurodollar market grew considerably faster from 1965 onwards. 
Regulation Q made It unattractive for non-residents to hold US 
dollars la the US when they could get higher rates in the Eurodollar 
market. Furthermore, the restrictions on dollar outflows forced 
non-residents to turn to Eurodollars for dollar funds.
US banks established branches in London, which was the centre of 
Eurodollar activity, at a rapid rate. At the beginning of I960 only 
eight US banks had foreign branches. At the end of 1963 three groups 
of banks together accounted for two-thirda of the currency business 
undertaken in London: these were American (making up around 25 per
cent of the total), British overseas and Commonwealth banks and 
merchant banks.7 tiy the end of the 1969 the relative share of US 
branches had risen to 54 per cent, and by 1973 125 US banks had 
foreign branches.® It is clear that foreign branches of US banks 
played a major role ir the development of the Eurocurrency market. 
Roughly speaking, US foreign branch banks appear to have accounted 
for perhaps aa auch as one-half of the overall growth of Eurocurrency 
activity.9
The ability of commercial banks to circumvent exchange controls was 
an Important feature in the expansion of the market and led to many 
Innovations and techniques. It should also be mentioned that 
foreign-currency banking can be very lucrative for Eurobanks. As 
long as the innovating bank can add more to income than to expenses 
by attracting this additional business, it is adding to its TOTAL 
profits - even if its profit margin is reduced.^® (However, there 
is a point at which capital ratios can restrict Eurocurrency 
business). There have been times when the world's largest banka 
relied to a major extent on international earnings to maintain 
profits - in 1977, 82 per cent of Citicorp's after-tax earnings arose 
outside the US.^
Perhaps it should be said here that, while the activities of the 
Eurobanks appeared to be at odds with the goals of the international 
monetary authorities, particularly in the US, the Eurobanks were 
helping to facilitate the workings of a rapidly developing system of 
international trade. Thia system had been fostered in the first
place by the formulators of Che Bretton Woods system. 
Internationalisation and liberalisation of World economic systems 
were fundamentally .‘eslrable. A necessary adjunct was an efficient 
international money market.
One specific period during Che 1960a serves as an Illustration of the 
conflicting Interests of public and private sector motivations during 
the transltionary period leading up :o the final demise of Bretton 
Woods in 1971.
During the period 1966 and 1969 market Interest rates in the US rose 
above the celling rates on time deposits (ceilings which were set by 
Regulation Q). As domestic NCDa became due onshore banka struggled 
to replace them and turned to the Eurodollar market for funds. In 
particular, they borrowed from their own offshore branches. Iheee 
Eurobanks, in turn, obtained funds largely from short-term investors, 
who in the absence ot Regulation Q, might have placed their funds 
directly with the head office banks in the US. This Is a good 
example of what is meant by the 'export of the US banking system to 
Europe’. Ihe loans by US branch banks to their head offices caused 
interest rates on Eurodollars to be bid up, thereby attracting dollar 
deposits from the US. This 'round-tripping* of dollars effectively 
thwarted attempts to control US domestic banking activities,
Ihie example Illustrated the fact that the implementation of controls 
to prohibit the growth of the external financial markets and thereby 
to preserve this outdated system was self-defeating because it 
ignored the fact that the external markets were necessary to the 
increasingly integrated world economic network.
.4 US Current Account Deficits
On the basis of the US current account alone there was little sign of 
a net flow of dollars to non-US holders. The US current account: 
averaged a deficit of only *2,6 billion annually between 1960 and 
1967. There were considerable deficito between 1968 and 1972 but by 
then the Eurodollar market waa well-established. However, there were 
deficits on the overall balance of payments (the official reserves
transactions balance) between 1950 and 1970 (see Table 3.1). Met 
ehort~ and long-term capital outflows were sufficiently large to 
produce an annual average deficit of Si,3 billion between 1950 and 
1959 and #1,9 billion between 1960 and 1970. Hence, the rest of the 
world built up claims on the US over the period when the Eurodollar 
market was taking shape. By 1959, these claims amounted to just 
under £18 billion and rose steadily for the next 11 years to reach 
$45,6 billion in 1970 (see Table 3.2).
UNITED STATES :
TABLE 3.2 
 EXTERNAL LIABILITIES ($b)
CENTRAL BANKS OTHER BANKS &
& GOVERNMENTS OTHER. FOREIGNERS TOTAL
year
1959 10,1 7,6 17,7
1960 11,1 7,6 18,7
1961 11,8 8,4 20,2
1962 12,9 8,4 21,3
1963 14,4 9,% 23,6
1964 15,8 11,1 26,9
1965 15,8 11,5 27,3
1966 14,9 14,2 29,1
1967 18,2 15,8 34,0
1968 17,3 19,4 36,7
1969 16,0 28,2 44,%
1970 23,8 21,8 45,6
Source: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1982, p. 465.
Ihe question is whether US deficits as recorded on an official 
reserve transactions basis were necessary to underpin the continuing 
growth of the market. Certainly, the deficits were a prerequisite 
£ox the initial development of the market. The dollars had to come 
from the US ifl the first place and once dollar balances had built up
34
in Europe, European currencies became convertible which meant that 
European residents could hold dollars rather than be forced to 
convert their holdings immediately into local currency. However, 
dollar claims by non-reflidents did not have to be held as 
Eurodollars. In particular, assets issued in the US itself could be 
purchased.
However, it was not necessary for US balance of payments deficits to 
continue for the Eurodollar market to grow. The Euromarkets were 
free of controls such as liquidity and reserve requirements, ceilings 
on deposit rates etc. Once exchange and capital controls in Europe 
had been reduced (relative to pre-1958 conditions of non- 
convertibility, for European currencies), the resulting international 
competition for more efficient and cheaper banking operations caused 
the Euromarkets to thrive.
Banks were attracted into the external markets because the absence of 
controls meant that they could operate on narrower borrowing and 
lending margins. Depositors were attracted to Eurobanks because fh-.y 
could receive higher yields on their dollar assets than they could in 
the US and could borrow dollars more cheaply. The markets expanded 
as more and more potential participants became aware of the benefits.
It is possible that the sharp increase in the number of US banks that 
established offshore branches during the 1960s may have occurred even 
without the US capital controls programme. The proximity of the 
Euromarkets to the large and growing European economies and the 
attraction of additional profits may on their own have been a 
sufficient spur. However, the capital controls programme certainly 
added to the incentive,
3.5 Size
Although the Eurocurrency market is very large it is by no means the 
only coaponent of total bank lending in international markets. 
Excluded from the Eurocurrency markets are loans by Eurobanks to 
non-tesldentB in the dooeatic currency of the banks' location. This 
type of lending contributed 32 per cent of gross international bank
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lending in 1982 according to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
estimates.
However, we are concerned with foreign currency lending for which 
there are traditionally two types of estimates of the size - the 
groas size and the net size. Die basic difference between the two is 
that, broadly speaking, interbank Eurocurrency deposits are included 
in the estimates of gross size and excluded in the estimates of net
Before discussing the estimates of the size of the market it should 
also be noted that there can be a considerable discrepancy between 
the total assets and the total liabilities of the Eurocurrency 
markets. For example, in 1982 the BIS estimates of gross 
Eurocurrency assets were $1 150 billion and gross liabilities, $1 249 
billion, a difference of nearly $100 billion or 9 per cent of 
assets. Ihis net debtor position of Eurobanks built up particularly 
after 1978 and was related to the banks* role in financing European 
reporting countries' oil-induced balance of payments deficits.^ 
Conversely over the same period domestic US banks' external claims 
considerably exceeded their external liabilities reflecting the 
worldwide net demand for US dollar financing.
3.5.1 Estimates of Size
Two sources have traditionally been used for estimating the
size of the Eurocurrency markets - the Bank for International
Settlements and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York.
"" BIS estimates of the gross size are taken from the 
reported external positions of banks in the Group of Ten 
countries excluding the US (Belgium, Luxemburg, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK) plus Switzerland plus the branches of US banks in five
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offshore centres: the Bahamas, Che Cayman Islands, Panama,
Hoag Kong, and Singapore. In addition It makes an estimate 
for non-reporting banks in offshore centres.
(b) Net Size
The estimate of the net size excludes Interbank positions 
between reporting banks in the so-called 'inside area', 
i.e. positions between banka within the reporting area.
Positions vis-a-vis banks in the 'outside area', i.e. 
outside the reporting area, are included In the estimate of 
net size. The rationale for Including posltlona vls-a-vle 
the outside area is as follows: ’Business of the reporting
banks with outside area banks and non-banks can be 
amalgamated since the local banks are generally just acting 
as a channel between the reporting area banks and the local 
economies. On the other hand business among Inside area 
banks will be inflated by transactions among banks as they 
Intermediate between the original supplier and the final 
user. The BIS therefore makes an estimate of the net size 
..., in which transactions among banks in the main 
financial and offshore centres are netted out .,.
Double-counting (inside area bank redepoaltlng) la netted 
out because the net size is an attempt to Identify the 
non-bank sources and uses of Eurocurrency funds. 
Redeposltlng within the Eurobanking system is merely a 
process of Intermediation which enables the banks to 
allocate original deposits more efficiently and to increase 
the market's flexibility. In fact, more transactions occur 
between banka within the market than between banka and 
banks or non-banks outside the leetket.
However, apart from Including positions to outside are* 
banks, the BIS net size also includes other interbank 
deposits. Firstly, Eurobanks' foreign currency loans to 
Inside area banks are included If they are switched Into
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domestic currency or are ised for direct foreign currency 
loans to domestic customers. Secondly, foreign currency 
loans to banka in the country of the currency loaned are 
also Included. However, working balances for Eurocurrency 
operations are excluded.
These exceptions to the rule of netting out interbank 
redepoalting occur because It la assumed that the borrowing 
banks 'obtain the funds mainly for domestic purposes and 
not for re-lending to other banks in the reporting 
area'.I*
3.5,3 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company Estimates'^
Wien the BIS first started publishing estimates of the size of 
the Eurocurrency market it omitted all non-European 
Eurocurrency business. This led the Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company (HGT), a New York bank, to publish its own, broader 
estimates. Although the BIS estimates have been extended 
considerably the MGT estimates arc still more broadly baaed 
than, if not as detailed as, the BIS estimates. However, both 
sets of estimates follow the same principle .tn separating the 
gross from the net size of the nark; t.
(a) Gross Size
The MGT gross size consists of the total foreign currency 
liabilities of banks in the 'majo^ market, centres*. In 
addition to the Group of Ten countries and Switzerland, MGT 
includes three other European countries not included in the 
BIS figures - Austria, Denmark, and Ireland. As for 
offshore centres, it includes the five used in the BIS 
estimates and also Bahrain. Furthermore, apart from the 
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands data for '-,n-US branches In 
offshore centres are Included.
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(b) Net Size
Hie MGT estimates of net size are derived by netting out 
interbank redepositing within the entire market area. 
Since the market area in the MGT estimates is greater than 
the inside area in the BIS estimates the absolute value of 
deposits netted out is greater than for the BIS figure for 
double-counting. However, basically the same exceptions 
that apply to netting out interbank redepositing in the BIS 
estimates apply in the MGT estimates. As with the BIS, MGT 
attempts to distinguish the banks' roles as original 
suppliers or end users of Eurocurrency funds from their 
role as intermediaries.
3.5.4 Comparisons with National Money Supplies
The MGT estimate of the net size of the market is not directly 
comparable with national money supply statistics because even 
the net estimate includes a substantial element of bank 
redepositing. National money supply figures normally exclude 
all interbank deposits. MGT notes that a large proportion of 
the net liabilities size of the market has a counterpart 
already counted in domestic monetary totals. This counterpart 
Includes domestic currency funds that banks within the market 
area either switch into foreign currencies or place directly in 
the Eurocurrency marketj also it includes funds supplied by 
banks outside the market area, such as dollars which are placed 
in the Euromarket by banks located in the US. Even some of the 
funds deposited by central banks have a domestic liability 
counterpart which is included in a national money supply 
aggregate. Once this overlap of liablities is eliminated only 
what M3T callc the 'net, net' size of the market remains. The 
net, net size of the market consisting of liabilities to 
non-hanks (defined by MGT as corporations, individuals, and 
non-bank financial institutions) is shown in Table 3.3.
TABLE 3.3
MET, HEX SIZE DF THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET
j m 6 BILLION GROWTH (%)
1970 30 -
1971 30 0
1972 17
1973 57
1974 80 60
1975 90 13
1976 115 28
1977 135 17
1976 174 29
1979 245 41
1980 327 33
1981 428 31
1962 474 11
1983 527 11
Source: World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New
York, various issues.
At the end of 1963 the net, net size of the Eurocurrency market 
was 6527 billion, compared to only 630 billion at the end of 
1970. This represents an average annual compound growth rate 
of 25 per cent.
As the dollar makes up the largest proportion of gross 
Eurocurrency liabilities (80 per cent in 1963) it is useful to 
compare the net, net size of the market with US money supply 
statistics. There have been a number of changes in the SIS 
monetary authorities' definition of the domestic money stock in 
recent years but a reasonably consistent series can be 
derived. As demand deposits are not offered la the 
Eurocurrency markets Ml has been excluded from all the US money 
stock statistics used in the comparison. Up until 1977 US M5 
(minus Ml) is taken to be the relevant money stock statistic
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end thereafter M3 (minus Ml) is used. This la because the new 
M3 series after 1977 bears a strong resemblance to the old M5 
which was discontinued.
While it is clear from Table 3.4 that the Eurocurrency market 
net, n«-t size is still substantially smaller than the 
comparable US money stock, the ratio indicates that it haet 
grown substantially faster than this measure of the US money 
supply during the past decade. It shows that the relative 
competitiveness of Eurocurrency instruments has drawn an 
ever-increasing share of international non-back deposits.
TABLE 3.4
RATIO: NET. NET SIZE TO US MONEY STOCK
Eurocurrency
U.S. MONEY STOCK (unadjusted)(jb) Market
W5 til Difference Net Size
1972 892 - 629 35
1973 986 - 279 707 55
1974 1074 - 292 782
1975 1178 - 304 874
1976 1321 - 323 998
1977 1453 - 348 1105 135 12
1978 - 1638 373 1265 174 14
1979 - 399 1367 245 18
1960 - 1996 415 1571 327 21
1981 - 2243 452 1791 428 24
1982 - 2467 492 1975 474 24
1983 - 2714 538 2176 527 25
Sources: 1) US money stock measures - various issues of Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, D.C.
2) Eurocurrency measure - various Issues of World Tasocial 
Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New York.
It should be noted that a measure o£ the US money stock alone 
is an insufficient comp-iriaon and that similar money stock 
measures in other countries whose currencies are traded in the 
market should be added. This would reduce considerably the 
ratio of Eurocurrencies to comparable domestic money supplies 
but would nos conceal the fact that Burodeposits have grown 
very rapidly.
In conclusion it can be stated that the net, net Eurocurrency 
market is still substantially smaller than the comparable US, 
aud especially a broader international, money stock. 
Nevertheless, it has grown at a markedly more rapid rate than 
either since the early 1970s«
3.6 Location
London ia the most important centre of Eurocurrency business. 
Figures for September 1982 show that London's share of gross 
Eurocurrency leading was 35 per cent, slightly higher than the 32 per 
cent in September 1980 and the 33 per cent in September 1981,^  
Unfortunately the table from which these figures are derived does not 
in all cases separate out from Eurocurrency business the item 
'domestic currency lending to non-residents' which is by definition 
excluded from the market. However, it is apparent that no other 
single centre has obtained more than 10 per cent of the market with 
Japan, France and the Bahamas sharing the next three places after 
London.
These market share statistics appear to be broadly confirmed by 
earlier numbers produced by M3T on gross Eurocurrency liabilities as 
at June 1978.^ London's share wes put at 34 per cent, France's at 
8 per cent, Japan's at 6 per cent, and the Bahamas and the Cayman 
Islands combined at 12 per cent. In other words no single centre had 
significantly more th&n 10 pec cent apart from London.
Yet earlier figures from the Banker magazine showed that at the end 
of 1976, London had a 36 per «ent shore of the gross external foreign
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currency assets of all banks In the European reporting area plus US 
bank branches in the Caribbean and Par Bast.18 Offshore centres In 
the Caribbean and Far Bast had a 20 per cent share, Belgium- 
Luxembourg 13 per cent, and France 12 per cent.
It is clear that London still is the pre-eminent Eurocurrency 
centre. In 1982 there were 379 foreign banks directly represented 
(ie through a representative office, branch, or subsidiary) and 70 
indirectly represented (ie through a stake in a joint venture or 
consortium bank) in London.19 jfois was nearly double the 
representation only 10 years before. The longest-standing and 
largest South African bank represented in London is Nedbank which 
started operations in 1906.
London's emergence as the major centre of the market was partly 
traditional. In the days when sterling was the world's key currency, 
many foreign banks established :ranches in the city for trade 
financing and other foreign exchange purposes. Out of the 
long-standing experience of London-based bankers has developed a 
remarkable communications end brokerage network. A level of 
expertise and technical efficiency has been attained which continues 
to attract a clientele seeking the benefits of rapid, cheap and 
efficient services.
Hie combination of capital and banking controls ia the US and e 
stance of 'benevolent neutrality1 by the Bank of England contributed 
much to Loudon's popularity with Euro,marketeers. Although it has
restricted sterling activity at times the bank plays no active part 
in the market for foreign currency deposits anil has left it to fche 
initiative of private individuals to regelate a;d adapt the system.
The development of offshore banking centres outside Europe has been 
marked during the 1970s. There are two types of offshore centre. 
Firstly, a ’satellite', ouch as Singapore, which is regarded as being 
the birthplace of the 'Aaiadollar market*. This provides a aervice 
to its geographical area. Satellite centres employ highly-trained 
staff, operate an interbank market, and offer reduced transactions 
costs to customers because of their familiarity with the peculiar
requirements of the region. Secondly, 1 shells' have flourished la 
places like the Caymans and the Bahamas as tax havens for 
International banks. A shell is likely to consist: of no more than a 
brass plate and a single office, a telephone and a skeleton staff.
The emergence of Nassau, la the Bahamas, In the early 1960s as an 
international investment centre resulted initially from attempts to 
restrict foreign lending by US banks. Attracted by the favourable 
tax structure, excellent communications, political stability and 
lower operating costs, many of these banks opened Bahamian branches 
to facilitate their Eurocurrency activities. The trend accelerated 
in 1969 when the Federal Reserve Board began approving shell branches 
abroad as a way of giving smaller US banks access to the Eurocurrency 
market,
3.6.1 International ganki vallltiee
Recently a major development has taken place In the US 
financial markets with the establishment of International 
Banking Facilities (IBPs) In New York and seventeen other 
states. By September 1982 - less than a year after the system 
came into being - nearly 400 banking institutions, including US 
banks and US branches of foreign banka, had eetalVlshed IBPo 
with three-quarters of the assets concentrated in Hew York.^
The idea behind the IBF was the desire on the part of the US 
banking system to Increase its International competitiveness 
after more than two decades of losing ground to Eurocurrency 
banking centres. An IBF is no more than a set of asset and 
liability accounts segregated on the books of a (parent) 
banking organization.21 The Federal Reserve Board has 
created a regulatory environoent much that IBPs ate not subject 
to reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings, or the 
Insurance coverage and assessments imposed by the US Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In addition a number of 
states have granted favourable tax treatment for IBF operations.
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IBPs are able to carry on deposit and loan, business with 
foreign residents and the Board imposed a number of limitations 
on IBP activities to prevent them conducting business with US 
residents.
The question arises whether IBF centres are to be included when 
calculating the size of the Eurocurrency markets. Ihe first 
point about IBPs ie that they do not comply with the strict 
definition of a Eurocurrency market for the reason that dollars 
comprise 97 to 98 per cent of IBF business. However, IBF 
business is distinct from domestic US banking activity and 
figures show that a considerable amount of the business 
originally booked by US b A s  through their •shells’ operating 
in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands has been shifted to 
IBFe, Ihus although the IBF system is situated 'onshore' the 
regulatory environment is similar to that in the Eurocurrency 
centres.
IBPs may not lend to domestic US residents as may bank branches 
in other Eurocurrency centres and IBFe may not issue negotiable 
instruments which constitute a major source of funds in some 
offshore centres, particularly London. While the maturity 
structure of IBF deposits ia similar to that in the 
Eurocurrency markets (ie typical maturities are between one and 
three months) the bulk of liabilities consist of interbank and 
intrabank transactions and the non-bank customer base is quite 
small. The interest rates payable on IBF deposits have fitted 
•almost exactly into the ,jeueral worldwide pattern of 
Euromarket activity’
It appears that a strong case can be made out for including IBF 
business in the gross estimates of the site of the Eurocurrency 
market. As of September 1982 total IBF liabilities amounted to 
$136 billion or 7 per cent of the MOT gross size estimate. 
There is, moreover, potential for growth in IBP activity. Hew 
York plays a pivotal role in US finance and banking, and the 
dollar is the dominant currency in the Eurocurrency markets. 
Much of the international lending to non-banks is done by US
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banks because of their sheer alze and the huge funding base 
available to them. While the IBPe have not to date attracted 
ouch ae« business (most IBP business has been shifted from 
established centres) it is true to say that 'in the long-term, 
X&Fs have the potential to become a significant centre in 
Euromarket activity'.^
3.6,2 Currencies
From the start the Eurodollar has been the dominant 
Eurocurrency. There was a period during the late 1970a (see 
table 3.5) when it was thought that the dollar's dominance 
would decline relative to other ’stronger' currencies such as 
the Deutschaark but this has appeared to be unfounded, 
especially dlnce the surge in the value of the dollar which 
followed from tight US monetary policy under Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman, Paul Volcker. Altman's analysis of the market 
in the early 1960s showed that in London and Canada the market 
for foreign currency deposits was almost exclusively made and 
denominated in dollars, As for the foreign currency markets in 
Paris, Germany and Italy, the dollar component was around 
two-thirds or more.2*
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TABLE 3.5
EURODOLLARS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS LIABILITIES 
IN ALL EUROCURRENCIES
*
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 76
1978 74
1979 72
1980 75
1981 78
1982 79
1983 80
Source: World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New
York, various issues.
Table 3.6 shows the recent estimates of the currency breakdown 
of the market by the BIS. The BIS figures are for total 
foreign currency positions of banks in the 12 reporting 
European countries while the MGT figure gives the US dollar 
component in the gross size of the market.
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TABLE 3.6
CURRENCY BREAKDOWN
BIS (%) MGT (%)
—  total liabilities —
i Dm i I 1
1977 70 17 1 76
1978 68 18 5 2 1 74
1979 66 6 2 2 72
1980 69 16 7 3 1 75
1981 , 71 13 2 78
1982 Comparable table not available.
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report,
various issues.
3.7 Sources
Funds placed in the Eurocurrency markets have originated from various 
sources, the four most important of which are central banks, 
commercial banks, non-baoka and international agencies.
3.7,1 Central Banks
During the market's early phase central banks were the most 
important source of funds. It was estimated that two-thirds of 
all the foreign currency funds in Eurocurrency centres in 1962 
were owned by central banks snd monetary authorities.25 The 
proportion of central banks' holdings declined during the 1960s 
but the absolute amount continued to grow. Iheee depositors 
were encouraged by the higher yields and liquidity offered for 
short-term money by the market.
In 1971 the Group of Ten agreed not to increase the volume of 
funds they invested in the market. However, official deposits 
continued especially when the huge surpluses which accumulated
ia the OPEC countries Induced the latter to make large-scale 
new official placements after 1973. Likewise, after the second 
oil crisis OPEC countries sade significant deposits in the 
aarket. For example, in 1980 the most important expansionary 
factor in the international banking sector were identified new 
deposits of OPEC countries amounting to $42 billion. 
Another important source of deposits after the first oil crisis 
were the non-oil developing countries. For example, foreign 
currency deposits of Latin American countries with reporting 
European banks amounted to only $4,8 billion in 1971. By 1982 
deposits by Latin American countries had risen to $37 
billion,27
3.7.2 Commercial Banks
The contribution of commercial banks as 'original source' (ie 
excluding double-counting) suppliers of Eurocurrency funds has 
remained a aignficant proportion of the total since the early 
stages of the aarket. Over the full period of development, 
this has probably been the most important source. Redepoeiting 
of Eurodepoeita between Eurobanks should be excluded from 
estimates, the source being identified as the placement in the 
Eurocurrency market of funds received in domestic markets. Ihe 
geographical sources of commercial flows to the market can vary 
dramatically. For example, in 1983 US banka switched from 
being major net suppliers to being large net takers of new 
funds.28
3.7.3 Non-banks
Insurance companies, mutual fund operations, multi-national 
companies and individuals have been Important contributors of 
funds. Indeed, corporations vied with central banks as the 
predominant source of funds during the 1960s. Ihese groups are 
particularly influenced by interest rate incentives. In the 
past, non-bank sources «ithin the European reporting area have 
been particularly important generators of funds. However, in 
1961 there was a sharp acceleration from $10 to $31 billion in
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new international bank deposits by US noa-banka. Ihis 
reflected the growing role o£ US mutual i'undo ae Eurocurrency 
depositors.^
3.7,4 International Agencies
The BIS and the World Bank as well as other international 
agencies have contributed to Eurodollar sources. Deposits by 
the trustees of Swiss trustee accounts also make up a 
noticeable percentage of total Eurocurrency deposits.
3.8 Users
There are numerous borrowers in the Eurocurrency market and they are 
discussed here under three headings." public sector borrowers, private 
sector (financial) and private sector (non-bank) borrowers.
3.8.1 Public Sector
Included in this category are loans to governments,
corporations receiving government backing, municipalities, 
local authorities and nationalised industries. Official 
borrowers have taken over 70 per cent of Eurocurrency credits
in recent years and a good indication of this tendency can be
gained from scanning the publicised Eurocurrency credit lists 
published in various sources such as Buromoney and MGT's World 
Financial Markets.
Raising loans from foreign sources is an alternative to
taxation and reduces competition with the private sector in the 
domestic capital market. Government-backed borrowers have 
traditionally been in a more favoured risk category than 
private sector borrowers ia the Eurocredit market, although 
their status hao suffered in recent years owing to the 
escalation of developing country debt problems.
Public sector borrowing may be for project finance, to increase 
foreign currency reserves, to finance balance of payments
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deficits, oc for bridging and liquidity finance. Government- 
backed loans to corporations are a major element in project 
financing and many types of loan have beeci developed in this
Certain factors have stimulated demand from developing
countries. Hie relative stagnation in the flow of official 
development assistance in the 1970s has resulted in an 
increased demand for other means of financing.^® In recent
years, moreover, there has been recourse by leas developed 
countries to the markets to finance oil-induced current account 
deficits.
3.8.2 Private Sector (Financial)
Financial Institutions such as insurance companies and special 
credit institutions created to channel finance for economic 
development are users of Eurodollars. However, the most 
important private sector demand for funds comes from commercial
Banks borrow Eurodollars for various reasons. Firstly, they 
can make a quick turn by undoing the transaction again at the 
earliest opportunity at a more favourable rate (the profit
margin is often 1/4 per cent or less). Secondly, they may
borrow for reaaone of prestige - to retain prominence in 
competitive coad'.tions. Thirdly, they may engage in interest 
arbitrage. Fourthly, they finance foreign trade with the aid
of Eurocurrency credits. Fifthly, they may swap Eurocurrency 
•viiia into domestic currency. Sixthly, may use
Eurocurrency funds to finance domestic business cycle 
upswings.31.
It should be noted here that activities such as foreign
exchange transactions are not strictly Eurocurrency 
transactions. They are frequently conducted between banks 
which are not Eurobanks. Also, Eurobank, transactions in the 
interbank market, while crucial for the efficient operation of
the market, are counted differently from transactions where 
Eurocurreaclv• are switched into domestic currencies for 
on-lending.
3.8.3 Private Sector (Non-banks)
Initially Eurodollars were extensively used for trade finance. 
After controls on capital exports from the US were imposed from 
1965, US multi-national corporations in particular were able to 
maintain their rapid development without aggravating US balance 
of payments problems by borrowing in the Euromarkets. Cost has 
been an important factor for corporations as well aa the range 
of borrowing instruments and availability of currencies.
Corporations have not always been free to borrow in the 
market. One prime example of restrictions placed by the 
authorities on borrowing was the German 'bardepdt* of 1971-72 
where domestic borrowers were forced to place 40 per cent of 
Eurocurrency loans into an interest-free account with the 
Bundesbank.
3.9 Operation
As the market has expanded more and better quality information has 
become available, and a considerable division of labour has taken 
place. Ihe market has attracted professional transactors such as 
brokers and specialists in various market segments. Die large and 
varied number of participants has increased the complexity involved 
in matching borrower and lender, and the banks have developed a 
highly sophisticated communications network to speed up the exchange 
process. Transactions are for large amounts and are unencumbered by 
the restrictions and provisoes which accompany transactions in 
domestic markets. For example, Euroloan agreements are characterised 
by a striking absence of restrictive covenants, such as ratio limits, 
dividend restrictions, interest coverages and net worth provisions 
because of the more competitive conditions in the market.
Ihe Eurocurrency market alao differs from domestic credit markets in 
that It offers a broader range of facilities. Ihe International 
money market is simultaneously an Interbank market, a market where 
governments raise funds and a lending and deposit market foe 
corporations.^ Usually in domestic markets these various 
borrowing and lending functions are more compartmentalised.
3.9,1 Ihe Interbank Market
The difference between the groua and net size of the market 
indicates that many of the transactions take place between 
Eurobanks. A large proportion of the balance sheet of a 
typical Eurobank consists of liabilities to and claims on other 
Eurobanks. The core of this Interbank market consists of a 
group of large, well-known and rappected international banking 
corporations with interbank transactions taking place on a 
’name* basis through the medium of unsecured credits. Ihis 
procedure greatly enhances the flexibility with which Eurobanks 
manage their assets and liabilities. Under normal conditions 
the breadth and depth of the Interbank market enable the banks 
to extend credit for the maturities and in the currencies that 
are best suited to their overall portfolios.
This market is, in essence, a money market for short-term 
deposits among banks in which" most of the transactions are in 
US dollars. If a bank does not have an immediate demand from 
an end-user for dollars deposited with it, it will seek to lend 
the deposit to a bank which does have a loan opportunity. In 
practice a relatively small proportion of Eurobanks attracts 
the bulk of original Burodeposits and the balance draws on the 
interbank market to fund loans.
Apart from serving as a source and outlet for funds the market 
also performs a vital information-transmitting role. A 
substantial proportion of Interbank trading occurs because it 
gives participating banks a feel for the market trends relating 
to exchange rate and interest rate movements, liquidity flows 
etc. Interbank margins are very narrow (say 1/32 of one per
cent) and so interbank trading provides a relatively cheap and 
rapid way of picking up information about supply and demand. 
Interbank trading alao satisfies the need of participants to 
appear active in the market. It Is easier for a recognised
name to raise funds at short notice or be invited to
participate in a syndicated credit.
3.9.2 Loans
'The most typical form of Euro-lending is the revolving credit 
at a floating interest rate'Floating rate loans are for 
a commitment period of up to 12 years with a reaewal period of 
six months on average. By negotiating the interest rate on the 
loan regularly the bank can, to a certain extent, protect
itself from interest rate fluctuations.
Credits of fcSOGo and more are not uncommon, and are seldom less
than $10m. the average size of a loan is around $100m.^
Ihe advantage to the borrower of a revolving credit is the
option to use the loan as a line of credit, ie he may delay the
draw down of the loan and may also delay rollovers and
renewals. This stand-by facility is offered against payment of 
a commitment commission (up to 1/2 of one per cent) on the 
unused portion of the loan. Die draw down period ie usually 
limited to 18 months.
Interest rate spreads are baaed on the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) for the currency involved and range from a premium 
of 1/2 to as much as three per cent for both corporate and 
public borrowers, with the median being somewhere between one 
and two per cent, LIBOR is the rate at which a group of London 
Eurobanks offer funds for deposit in the interbank market.
A further facility which benefits the borrower is the 
multicurrency option which gives the borrower the choice of 
drawing funds denominated in one or more atipulated 
currencies. On interest renewal dates the borrower may request 
a change in the currency of denomination of the loan. If the
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facility was originally expressed in dollars and the borrower 
switches to another currency he is required to pay the dollar 
equivalent in the alternative currency on maturity of the loan.
Repayment of loans is either in lump-sum (balloon repayments) 
or may, in the case of longer term' credits, be by way of 
amortisation schedules. Early repayment can be suoject to a 
pecAlty.
Borrowers are usually responsible for additional costa such as 
legal fees, or the Imposition of reserve requirements and 
withholding taxes both in the present and in the future. In 
general, Eurocredits are issued without collateral and 
promissory notes of a maturity coinciding with the renewal 
period are usually sufficient.
In the event of a rollover being impossible owing to particular 
currencies being unavailable, the loan becomes due 
immediately. This also applies when the interest rate becomes 
unacceptable to the borrower. In this case, once the loan has 
been redeemed, the facility can still be held available to the 
borrower against a commitment fee.
Many Eurocredits are publicised by means of 'tombstones' 
indicating the banka involved. However, publicised credits 
certainly understate the total. In particular, the consensus 
appears to be the publicised Eurocredits understate by 50 per 
cent or more the #ctual volume of credit extended by Eurobanks 
to the developing countries.37 With developing countries 
taking up an average of 43 per cent of publicised Eurocurrency 
credit between 1980 end 1983 (see Table 3.7) it is possible 
that the total new publicised credits understate the actual 
total by as much aa 25 per cent.
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TABLE 3.7
PUBLICISED EUROCURRENCY BANK CREDITS ($ MILLION)
Industrial countries 
Developing countries 
Centrally planned countries
1980 1981 1982 1983
39 100 86 022 42 571 38 742
35 054 45 264 41 519 32 937
2 809 1 791 765 1 212
429 302 160 1 321
77 392 133 379 85 015 74 212
Source: Financial Markka, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New
York, various Issues>
The emergence of the Euromarkets stimulated large-scale participation 
by OS banka in the external currency business especially from London 
baaea. Today, US banks lead the field as lead managers for 
Eurocredit syndication which is now the most favoured technique for 
making loana. A syndicate is a highly structured group of financial 
institutions, formed by a manager or a group of co-managers that 
lends funds in common conditions to a borrower.^®
An extension of the syndication concept has been the formation of the 
multi-national consortium bank, neatly described as 'a cross between 
a behemoth aud a centipede footloose in many countries'.^ tfiese 
consortia, the first of which - Midland and International Banks 
Limited - was set up in 1964, also participate in loan syndications 
not as the individual banks constituting tbs consortia, but <ta a 
single banking conglomerate.
Syndication emerged in response to the need of banks to diversify 
owing to the large suras, and hence risks, involved ill international 
lending, and the increasing exposure to specific borrowers. By 
lending in syndicates, individual banka can limit their loan exposure 
to ^articular clients to manageable proportions. This joint lending 
system is based on the relationship between the lead manager bank 
which solicits the underwriting support of participating banks. The
lead bank ia generally In a position by virtue of its experience ttnd 
knowledge of the borrower’s requirements to conclude rapid 
negotiations for the setting up and distribution of the loan. The 
borrower obtains a commitment, against a fee, that the syndicate 
manager will place the paper at the best conditions obtainable or 
increase its share accordingly. The 'front-end' syndication fees 
range from 1/2 to three per cent. Of these fees, certain percentages 
are 'given-up' to participant banks which commit funds.
Ihe lead bank is responsible for correctly processing the mechanics 
of the loan. Syndication may be initiated on a 'broadcast' or 
'straight' basis. The broadcast method involves telexing prospective 
participants with an invitation to join in and is the method usually 
adopted for straight-forward syndications. Ihe straight basis is a 
more discreet method whereby the loan is aade from the outset by a 
group of banks selected by the managing bank. Finally, the agent 
bank which may or may not be the lead bank, is responsible for 
administering interest payments, amortisation, legal matters, default 
and so forth.
Apart from risk-spreading, the syndication offers a blend of 
technical facilities which enhance the information transmitting 
process. Syndication has developed in such a way that the foreign 
desks o£ commercial banks have taken on the role usually reserved for 
investment banks in a domestic setting. An investment bank is 'an 
institution that specialises in buying and selling of large blocks of 
securities (as new issues) and in raising funds for capital 
expansion'.^® Since the .'omroercial banks are the ultimate source 
of the bulk of funds, the merging of investment and commercial skills 
is a development which is characteristic of the market.
3.9.3 Deposirs
Ihe Eurodollar market u • natural deposit base. It has no 
stable levrsl of d*' . as is guaranteed to banks la a
domestic money ma^ mark of good liability management
of a Eurobank is the , • y to attract and retain funds at as
low a cost as possible, and to earn as high as possible a
retuta on assets, including reserve balances. This must be 
done by maintaining interbank lines and facilities and by 
offering deposit liabilities that have a sufficiently 
attractive combination of yield, liquidity, and safety to dti.w 
funds from competing financial institutions and markets.^
The majority of deposits ate time deposits and the maturity 
ranges between seven days and six months. Most deposits have a 
maturity of between one and three months. Cheques are not used 
in the system.
The first Eurodollar Certificates of Deposit were introduced in 
June 1966 by the First National City Bank of New York. These 
deposits are saleable before maturity and a successful 
secondary market has developed, especially in London. The 
additional liquidity of these deposits enables banks to offer 
interest rates slightly below (about 1,8 per cent) those 
offered on regular time deposits.They are issued in 'tap* 
form or in 'tranche* form. Tap CDs are the most common and are 
issued in single amounts (say, $1 million) whenever a bank 
requires a particular quantity of funds for a particular 
maturity. Tranche CDs, unlike tap CDs are managed issues, 
offered for sale to the public in a fashion analogous to a 
securities ierue. They are usually for larger amounts than tap 
CDs but ara denominated in smaller 1 tranches' or slices (say 
610 000). Tf-iA CDs are more marketable than tap CDs, 
because they are taken up on behalf of a variety of fiduciary 
clients in small amounts.
A. further development has been the floating rate CD (FRCD) 
which developed as a combination of the Eurodollar CD and the 
floating rate note (FRN) which wee conceived in 1970. The FRN 
was a 'grey market* instrument enabling corporate borrowers to 
tap non-bank investment sources at times of high interest 
rates, giving the borrower the opportunity to avoid a fixed 
rate. Since 1975 major banks have also tapped the FRN market 
especially for large issues. The advantage is a guaranteed 
interest spread above 1IB0R at a fixed maturity usually at more 
favourable rates than on an equivalent fixed rate deposit.
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2he development of CDs in other Eurocurrencies haa not been 
achieved and until recently has not been encouraged by monetary 
authorities.
3,10 Eurocurrency Interest Rates
Eurobanks are not obliged to hold minimum contingency balances, 
minimum liquid assets or cash reserves, nor are they bound to 
interest rate or credit ceilings. The absence of these controls 
enables the banks to offer more competitive yields on both deposits 
and loans than their domestic counterparts.
Although Eurobanks offer a wide variety of facilities, the most 
important single element behind their sustained growth has been this 
yield differential. Depositors of Eurocurrencies have requited a 
yield premium to compensate them for the greater risk which they 
'regard as attaching to deposits in institutions with which they are 
aa yet relatively unfamiliar'.^ Although familiarity with the 
Euromarkets has grown rapidly since their inception there is still a 
natural reluctance to place funds with offohore centres rather than 
domestic banks without the incentive of a small premium.
Graph 3.1 shows that between 1977 and 1983, 3-month Eurodollar 
deposit races consistently exceeded the rates on 3-month NCDs in the 
US. The maximum premium during this period was 206 basis points and 
the minimum, 6.
GRAPH 3.1
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Determining the differential between Eurocurrency rates and domestic 
rates on loans is not as simple as for deposit rates. 'As regards 
loan rates charged to the end-users for Eurodollar loans, we must 
suppose that in order for the borrower to run to the Eurobank there 
must be an advantage in the form of a lower interest rate than he 
would have to pay to an American bank1 However, US domestic 
lending rates have first to b<$ adjusted to make comparisons with 
Eurodollar lending rates. Dufey and Giddy show that for the 
comparison to be made the US prime rate, for example, should be 
adjusted for the cost to the borrower of maintaining interest-free 
compensating balancesHowever, once the adjustment is made the 
expected differential emerges. In other words, Eurodollar lending 
rates are a ahade below the comparable US domestic lending rates,
It is because Eurobanks are able to operate on narrower margins than 
domestic commercial banka that domestic interest rates, with few 
exceptions, set the upper and lower bounds for Eurocurrency rates.
As Eurodollars make up by far the largest component of total 
Eurocurrency business, non-dollar Eurocurrency interest rates tend 
to adjust to Eurodollar rates after accounting for forward exchange 
exchange premiums or discounts,, A study by Marston*® shows that
each non -dollar Eurocurrency rate is linked Co the Eurodollar rate 
through arbitrage operation undertaken by Eurobanks. Ihe ceeulte of 
the study provide overwhelming evidence that non-dollar Eurocurrency 
rates are determined almost entirely by Interest arbitrage 
operations between the dollar and non-dollar markets. If a 
discrepancy emerges, the depth and breadth of the interbank market 
ensures that arbitrage will rapidly bring the rates back into line. 
Further support for the interest parity between Eurocurrencies is 
provided by a survey of empirical studies in Dufey and Giddy
However, empirical studies have also shown that movements in 
Eurodollar interest rates are determined largely independently of 
the forward exchange market and interest rates on other currencies. 
A study by Johnson shows, rather, chat there is a very close 
relationship between the effective cost of loanable funds to banks 
in the Eurodollar and domestic US markets/®
Kreicher shows that between 1970 and 1982 arbitrage operations 
maintained a close link between Eurodollar and domestic OS deposit 
rates, Ihe study found a high degree of integration between the two 
markets despite occasional deviations,^
Ihese studies suggest that the large volume ■£ short-term capital 
flows which pass through the Eurocurrency market are not a result of 
covered arbitrage flows between Eurocurrencies within the market 
(because very small flows would bring the market into equilibrium)^ 
Rather they are a consequence of flows between domestic markets and 
the Eurocurrency markets (In particular, the US market and the 
Eurodollar market). These flows are generated by distortions which 
arise within the domestic money markets themselves. Such 
distortions can arise from factors such as the misalignment of 
domestic interest rates, reserve requirements, domestic capital 
controls and exchange rate expectations.50 The implication is 
that the Eurocurrency market is not Independent of domestic monetary 
policies - changes in domestic interest rates and reserve 
requirements will directly influence the level of Eurocurrency 
interest rates and heoce the amouv.t of credit extended by the 
Eurocurrency and domestic banking systems combined. Because of the 
dominance of the Eurodollar it follows that US monetary policy plays 
a crucial role in the performance of the Eurocurrency market.
61
CHAPTER 3 
INFERENCES
1. World Fiaaaclal Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New York, July 
l98i, p. 15".
2. Blnzlg, P. & Quinn, B.S. Itae Eurodollar System : Practice and 
Theory of International Interest Rates, 6th Ed., MacMillan, London^ , 
1 § 7 V  pV 2.
3. Blnzlg, P. & Quinn, B.S. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Friedman, M. The Eurodollar Markets Some First Principles. Morgan 
Guaranty Survey, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New York, October 1969,
5. Dufey, G. & Giddy, I.H. The International Money Market, Prentice 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1976, p. 111.
6. Despree, B., Kindleberger, C.P. and Salant, U.S. The Dollar and 
World Liquidity. The Economist, 5 Februar-,, 1966, p. 527-
7. Bell, The Eurodollar Market and the International Financial
System, Halstead Press, New York, 1974, p. 29.
8. Little, J.S. Eurodollars : Ifte Money Market Gypslea > Harper and 
Row, Hew York, T9757"p7"lt^
9. MeClam, W.D. Credit Substitution and the Eurocurrency Market. Banca 
Naglonale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, December 1972, p. 350.
10. Little, J.S., op.cit., p.49.
11. International Banking-Annual Review. The Banker, August 1978, p.77.
12. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1980-1981. Basle,
1981, p.116.
13. The International Banking Markets in 1982. Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, March 1983, p. 52.
14. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1981-1982, 'Basle,
1982, footnote to table, p.116.
15. World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Hew York, 
January 1979, pp.9-15.
16. The International Banking Markets in 1982. op.cit., p.56.
17. World Financial Markets, January 1979, op.cit.. p.10.
18. Foreign Banks in London. The Banker, November 1977, p.83.
19. Blanden, M. New Names Drawn to the City. Ihe Banker. November 1982. 
p.79.
20. Key, S .,J. international Banking Facilities. Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Board of Governors of che Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, D.C., October 1982, p.565.
21. Walmsley, J. A Tough Year for US Bankers. Hie Banker, February
1983, p. 85.
22. Walmsley, J. ibid., p.85.
23. Key, S.J. op.cit., p.576.
24. Altman, O.L. Recent Developments in Foreign Markets for Dollars and 
Other Currencies. IMF Staff Papers, March 1963, p.51.
25. Altman, O.L. ibid., p.57.
26. Bank for International Settlements, , .ual Report 1980-1981,
op.cit., p.101.
27. See Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1972-1973, 
Basle, 1973, p.165 and Bank for International Settlements, Annual 
Report 1982-1983, op.cit., p. 116. Note, however, that the number 
of reporting banks expanded considerably over the decade and also 
that the figures for 1982 do not separate out domestic currency 
deposits.
28. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1983-1984, Baale,
1984, p.105.
29. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1981-1982,
op.cit., p. 127.
30. Mohammed, A.F. fi Saccomanni, F. Short-Term Banking and Eurocurrency 
Credits to Developing Countries. IMF Staff Papers, November, 1973,
31. Einzig, P. 4 Quinn, B.S. op.cit., p.36.
32. Dufey, G, & Giddy, I.H. op.cit., p.232.
33. Dufey, G. & Giddy, I.H. ibid., p.213.
34. Dufey, G. & Giddy, I.H. ibid., p.226.
35. Mohammed, A.F. & Saccomanni, F. op.cit., p.618.
36. Market Commentary. Euromoney, March 1983, pp.159-172.
37. Mohammed, A.F. 6 Saccomanni, F. op.cit., p.625.
38. Dufey, G. & Giddy, I.H. op.cit., p.245.
39. Little, J.S., op.cit., p.88.
40. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Encyclopaedia 
Brittanica Inc., Chicago, 1976.
63
41. Dufey, G. & Giddy, I.H. op.cit., p.218.
42. Dufeyj G. & Giddy, I.H. ibid., p.229.
43. Lutz, P.A. The Eurocurrency System. Dacca Nazlonal del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, September 1974, p.195.
44. Lutz, F.A. ibid., p.195.
45. Dufey, G. & Giddy, I.H. op.cit., p.49.
46. Marston, R.C. Interest Arbitrage in the Eurocurrency Markets.
European Economic Review. January 1976, pp. 1-13.
47. Dufey, 0. & Giddy, I.H. op.cit.. p.86-97.
48. Johnston, R.0. Some Aspects of the Determination of Eurocurrency 
Interest Bates. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, March 1979, 
pp. 35-46.
49. Kreicher, L.L. Eurodollar Arbitrage. Federal Reserve Bank of Hew
York Quarterly Review. Summer 1982, pp.1(5-22.
50. Johnston, 8.B. ibid., p.43.
CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
4.1 Introduction,
By the late 1960s It vtae clear that the destinies of the Eurodollar 
market and the US dollar were closely Interlinked. The rapid growth 
in world trade necessitated a corresponding increase in International 
liquidity. Itie US had been reluctant to allow an increase in the 
dollar price of gold during the 1960s. This meant that the brunt of 
the demand for increased world liquidity fell upon the dollar. la 
theory, this was desirable, for the dollar was aptly suited to the 
role of world vehicle currency because of the strength of the U.S. 
economy. Furthermore, the expansion of the Eurocurrency market, in 
which the dollar was the dominant currency, provided the perfect 
medium for users tn all parts of the globe. However, in practice, ic 
was required that econo- policy backing the dollar be sound.
During the 1960s accel- y.lr; 'S inflation and growing balance of
payments deficits caused .log lack of confidence in the dollar
despite the need for dollar liquidity. This culminated in the demise 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. During the 
1970s the Eurodollar market continued to grow aat’ entered a new era 
with the onset of the first oil crisis in 1973* However, for most of 
the 1970s concern about the dollar continued and its role in 
international reserves and transactions declined. This was only 
reversed after 1979 when the US monetary authorities set about
reducing inflation with very tight monetary policies. This has had 
an electrifying effect on the dollar. It has regained the status of 
the world's most important currency while the Eurodollar market, 
despite some setbacks, is larger than ever.
4.2 Dollar Overhang
As the 1950s drew to a close exchange controls in Europe were scaled 
down and non-resident convertibility for most European currencies was 
restored. Most of the increase in central bank holdings of foreign 
currencies was in dollars and the dollar shortage had ceased to be a 
problem. Indeed, by 1960 the dollar shortage had become a dollar
'overhang*, i.e. the ratio of US external liquid liabilities to US 
holdings of international reserves fell below 1 after declining 
steadily throughout the 1950s (see Table 4.1).*
TABLE 4.1
(IS RESERVES : LIABILITY RATIO
END Or YEAR RATIO
1950 2,73
1951 2,73
1952 2,38
1953 2,06
1954 1,84
1955 1,69
1956 1,59
195? 1,57
1958 1,34
1959 1,11
1960 0,92
1961 0,82
1962 0,71
1963 0,64
1964 0,58
1965 0,53
1966 0,50
1967 0,45
Sources Grubel, H.O., The International Monetary System. Penguin, 
1972, p.138
The decline was to continue throughout the 1960s giving rise to fears 
of a gold shortage should foreign holders of US short-term 
liabilities attempt to convert dollars for gold.
The r&fid flow of funds across iaternatioaal borders that led up to, 
and ultimately brought about, the end of the Bretton Woods system, 
had its roots la this imbalance between the US balance of payments 
deficits and the US'dollar price of gold. The rapid growth of world 
trade In the post-war period required a similar growth in the means 
of external payments. The relatively modest inflow of monetary gold 
to world reserves was inadequate and was supplemented by the build up 
of foreign held dollars created by US balance of payments deficits.
Initially, after World War II, the huge gold reserves of the US were 
more than adequate backing for the rise in foreign dollar holdings. 
However, in the 1960s the US was increasingly faced with a dilemma 
between the continuous rise of Ita forelgn-held dollar liabilities 
and the shortage of new gold available for reserves. At the time 
gold was still valued at $35 per ounce, unchanged since the 1930s. 
At that price the US stood to lose its entire gold stock. Yet the US 
authorities shied away from the devaluation of the dollar vls-a-vis 
gold.^ This is discussed in acre detail In Chapter 7.
Die uncertainty that this policy generated resulted in frequent 
bursts of destabilising international capital flows and, ultimately, 
the end of the Bretton Woods system.
Thus, in spite of its role as the world's most important currency 
unit, confidence in the dollar became more end more suspect during 
the 1960s as US inflation and balance of payments deficits steadily 
grew more serious. The inflexible international exchange rate system 
and the Imposition of capital controls in the US merely magnified the 
impending criais. The official reserves transactions balance of the 
US balance of payments (which Is the net value of trade, transfers 
and capital flows between the US and private non-raaideate during a 
year) was consistently in deficit during the 1960s wich three 
exceptions. The exceptions occurred In 1966 and 1968/9 - during 
periods of tight monetary policy in the US when head offices of US 
banks borrowed in the Eurodollar market to compensate for funds lost 
owing to Interest rate ceilings on domestic deposits. A massive 
flwback of these funds occurred In 1570-71 as expectations of 
recession in the US coincided with rising inflation and interest 
rates In Europe.
In Chapter 3 the role of the US balance of payments deficits In 
creating Eurodollars Is discussed in more detail, itie point here is 
that the increasing volume of foreign-held dollars was to a certain 
extent involuntary and, hence, entailed a declining measure of 
confidence and acceptability in the dollar as the world's numeraire.
4.3 Pie End of Bretton Woods
Owing to exceptionally tight domestic credit conditions between the 
end of 1968 and mld-1970, outstanding borrowings of US banks through 
their foreign branches rose from under t7 billion to a peak of just 
under $18 billion in August 1970. Interest rates rose by as much as 
5 per cent in 1969 and differentials between US domestic and 
Eurodollar rates rose to as much as 3 per cent and more. The severe 
pressures on the liquidity positions of US banks induced by the 
Federal Reserve had forced them to turn to the Eurodollar market for 
additional funds, US monetary policy had a powerful effect on all 
European money markets via the Eurocurrency system. In response to 
monetary outflows from domestic markets, European monetary
authorities raised discount rates and market interest rates rose 
accordingly.
The Federal Reserve responded to the Eurodollar demand by imposing a 
10 per cent reserve requirement on borrowings in the market by US 
banks over and above a certain base. This had some effect in 
reducing additional borrowing but it was only when monetary
conditions eased that US banks actually began to repay their debts.
A reversal of US monetary policy released maaslve sums into the 
international system. The repayment of Eurodollars coincided with 
'_.va first US merchandise trade deficit since 1935 - the culmination 
of years of dollar overvaluation - and precipitated a run on the
dollar. The resulting disruption to the International system
compounded earlier problems. Not only did the return flow play havoc 
with foreign exchange rates but the abrupt change in interest rates 
left national authorities hard-pressed to protect their money markets 
from being swamped with funds. The result was a major international
crisis. The extent of the change In market sentiment Is Illustrated 
in Graph 4.1 which shows the ratio of external dollar holdings In 
private hands to holdings of public institutions. From a peak of 
1,77 in 1969 this ratio had fallen to only 0,30 by 1971 Indicating 
both the sale of dollars by private holders and central bank 
purchases which were necessary to protect fixed exchange rate 
parities.
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Central banks found it impossible to centralise the dollar inflow. 
Some even placed dollars in the Eurodollar market which depressed 
Eurodollar interest rates making it cheap for speculators to borrow 
Eurodollars and buy European domestic currency. However, the 
speculative element was not to blame. It was the sharp acceleration 
in credit expansion In the US itself that led to the movement out of 
dollars. Total net credit growth soared by 55 per cent in 1971.  ^
The Federal Reserve also raised the Regulation Q ceilings in 1970 
making it easier for banks to attract domestic deposits in the US, 
giving added incentive for the repayment of Eurodollar loans.
$10 billion in Eurodollars was repayed over 1970-71. The Federal 
Reserve attempted to reduce this rate of repayment by increasing the 
required reserves on US banks' Eurodollar borrowings to 20 per cent 
as against borrowings in excess of the reserve-free base of 1969.
The idea was that US banks would reduce repayments because, should 
they wish to return to the market for future loans, these loans would 
"_e more expensive. However, falling US domestic interest rates aade 
vhe retention of Eurodollar borrowings too expensive and this policy 
was unsuccessful.
Ihe response of the Group of 10 countries as recipients of this 
dollar inflow was to seek conversion n£ dollars into gold. Ihe US 
authorities were faced with the choice either of ending 
convertibility of the US dollar into gold or of allowing an increase 
in the dollar price of gold.
In short, a massive financial shock to the Bretton Woods system, 
implicit in poorly co-ordinated monetary policies and rapid 
intermediation through the Eurocurrency markets, and US efforts to 
obtain some ability to adjust the dollar exchange rate combined to 
produce a breakdown of the system in 1971.*
Ihe Euromarket, far from being the culprit, was merely the catalyst 
in a changing world. Ihe real culprit was disharmony in national 
monetary policies. Such disharmony was untenable in a fixed exchange 
rate system for it merely offered a 'one-way option' on exchange 
rates to currency speculators.
4.4 Ihe First Oil Crisis
Recurring currency crises over the period 1971-73 culminated in 
generalised floating for the world's major currencies from early 
1973, Attempts to peg currencies within margins over this time 
encouraged speculative activity which put severe pressures on 
parities. Ihe Euromarkets grew rapidly and in late 1973 the massive 
oil price hike by the OPEC cartel gave the Euromarket a boost which 
caused it to develop in a new direction.
'Ihe period since (the oil crisis) has demonstrated in a particularly 
dramatic way the manner in which private capital markets have been 
able to deal wi»-k the situation with which the intern; tional agencies 
and central banks are still unable to deal appropriately’
Ihe petrodollar problea caused the market to addpt the- role of 
international financial shock-absorber, The process of recycling 
petrodollars was baaed on the Issue of financial claims by 
oil-importing countries to OPEC to pay for oil. A secondary, 
multilateral exchange of financial claims between oil importers also 
occurred, resulting in a net transfer of such claims to OPEC. This 
secondary mechanism enabled those importers whose financial assets 
were not attractive to OPEC to receive assistance from other 
Importers whose assets were purchased by OPEC.
The OPEC surplus in 1974 amounted to around $55 billion of which $23 
billion was put into the Eurodollar market.* By the end of 1977 
approximately $112 billion of reserves were held in the market by 
official institutions and OPEC placements are estimated to account 
for over two-thirds of the increase from 1973 to 1977.^
For OPEC itself the market offered something of a hedge against the 
declining value of the dollar because it provided it with the means 
to achievs an optimum investment portfolio. To a certain extent, 
however, the OPEC funds were locked into Eurodollars because mass 
withdrawals would have depressed their value to much. This allayed 
the reservations of many economists concerning the mismatching of 
maturities in the balance sheets of Eurobanks.
the industrialised countries made substantial use of Eurocurrency 
credit. Hie market offered an immediate palliative to the
quadrupling of the oil price. Ihe low absorptive capacity of OPEC
restricted the volume of exports to OPEC to pay for oil. ’Neither 
France, nor the UK, or previously Italy, could have imported capital 
in the amounts they did without the existence of the Eurocurrency 
market'
The intermediary role of the Euromarkets was especially helpful in 
providing a bridge between risk-averae lenders and pressurised 
borrowers - especially leas developed countries. OPEC tended only to 
accept low-risk ft .ncial claims and a substantial proportion of 
oil-importing LDC debt tended to be insufficiently secure. Ihe
Eurobanks bought the high-risk LDC debt and financed it by selling
7L
low-riak debt to OPEC. By 1977 the external debt of non-OPEC LDCs 
had risen to $180 billion of which nearly half had come from 
commercial banka, M b function has become an Increasing feature of 
the market and has aade a considerable contribution to replacing 
diminished grants of official foreign aid to LDCs, However, the
problem of LDC debt default has risen to alarming proportions in 
recent years and will be discussed in Chapter 6. It may aeem
surprising that the Eurocurrency market was so prominent in the 
petrodollar recycling process. As the bulk of the international oil 
trade is denominated in dollars it would have been reasonable to 
expect the US domestic financial markets to have been more favoured 
by OPEC depositors. However, it appears that political 
considerations, particularly fears of blocking or confiscation, 
deterred OPEC depositors from making greater use of the US 
markets.* Similarly, LDC borrowers have found it easier to borrow 
in the Euromarkets than in national capital markets. Although the 
Eurocurrency markets are not frees of such risks (as was shown when 
the Federal Reserve Board ordered the freezing of Iranian deposits 
with US bank branches in London during the US hostage crisis la 1980) 
they are able to offer more attractive interest rates to depositors 
because they are not subjected to cash reserve requirements.^®
Several economists predicted that the growth of the market would 
taper off after 1973. It was thought that the termination of 
controls over capital flows from the US at the beginning of 1974 
would reduce the demand for offshore dollars. Also, the failure of 
the Herstatt Bank in 1974 due to foreign exchange dealing 
mismanagement led some to believe that the number of participants in 
the interbank market would decline owing to greater caution by the 
larger Eurobanks,
Although there was a decline in the gross size of the market during 
the third quarter of 1974, it followed a massive increase in activity 
in the first two quarters. Interbank activity did, in fact, decline 
briefly owing to nervousness following the Herstatt affair but this 
was merely a hiccup as banks sought to restructure their loan 
activity and internal control mechanisms. Interbank business revived 
strongly in 1975 and lending to LDCs increased substantially. As it
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turned out, the need for recycling predominated and served to 
underline the fact that the Eurodollar market was Inextricably linked 
with the future of the world economy.
In fact, the US move to drop capital controls In 1974 opened up aew 
scope for arbitrage between the US and Eurodollar deposit and loan 
markets for banks located in the US, while the Heretatt affair merely 
served ao a cautionary warning to Eurobanks to increase their market 
efficiency.
Other moves supported the perpetuation of the market. At a meeting 
in Basle in September 1974 it was agreed that the central banka of 
the countries comprising the Group of Ten were able and willing to 
act as lenders of last resort should banks operating in the 
Eurocurrency system experience liquidity problems.11 Furthermore, 
the extensive vedepOBlting o£ funds In the market by OPEC monetary 
authorities gave a considerable boost to the growth of Eurodollar 
deposits.
In any event, predictions of a contraction In the growth of the 
market were unfounded. Ihe oil crisis elevated the system to the 
statue of a household word. The market displayed an Ability to 
accommodate a wide variety of needs in a flexible and competitive 
fashion throughout a succession of chaotic dietorbaocp.e.
As was the case during the Gold Standard era, when the resilience and 
adaptiblllty of monetary banking institutions made possible Che 
development of national credit money and smoothed out fluctuations 
due to gold rushes, the Eurobanking system performed remarkably well 
during the convolutions resulting from the unwinding of the Bretton 
Woods agreement of which ihe first oil crisis was the primary example.
4.5 Dollar Diversification
The period immediately after the oil crisis until the end of 1979 was 
a testing time for the US dollar. After peaking in 1974 US inflation 
measured by the consumer price index declined in 1975 and 1976.
73
However, from 1977 both money supply growth and inflation began to 
accelerate. Further pressure was put on the dollar by the very large 
trade deficits which occurred in the second half of the 1970s as 
shown in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2
YEAR US MONETARY 
GROWTH
US TRADE 
BALANCE
m .
9 L g l INDEX OF 
EFFECTIVi 
US $
1974 9,1 -5,3 10,9 101,1
1975 6,6 9,1 9,2 100,0
1976 6,5 -9,3 5,8 105,2
1977 9,0 -30,9 6,5 104,7
1978 9,6 -33,8 7,5 95,7
1979 9,5 -27,4 11,3 93,7
9,2 -25,3 13,5 93,9
Source: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1983.
The result was that the effective exchange rate of the dollar 
declined by 11 per cent between 1976 and 1979 giving rise to
widespread speculation that the dollar 'may be in a long-term
decline, as distinct from the sort of decline that one might expect
tp apcospany a sharp rise in US inflation and a widening US trade 
Bap’.12
It was anticipated that central banks of many countries vrouJd
diversify future accumulations of foreign exchange ia order to scale 
down, the dollar component. There was a danger that such official 
diversification could become a distinct long-term trend which would 
have ripple effects on the entire international monetary system.
Attention was focused on other international currency units - notably 
the Deutschmark, It was reported that the Bundesbank had adopted a 
more accommodating stance to the increasing reserve currency role of
the Deutschmark.^ There was also a softening of attitude on the 
part of Japan and Switzerland with respect to their national 
currencies. At a meeting of the Interim Committee of the IMF in 
Hamburg in April 1980 an arrangement was sanctioned under which the 
dollar, tihile remaining the pre-enlnent reserve asset, would share 
Its International role more widely with other■ currencies, especially 
the Deutschmark, the Swiss franc, and the yen. Subsequently the 
Swiss and Japanese authorities eased up on exchange controls giving 
both foreign central banks and private investors greater access to 
their domestic markets.
The role of the dollar in the Eurocurrency markets was also affected 
by the problems besetting the US economy. Ihe proportion of 
Eurodollars to total Eurocurrency liabilities declined from 80 to 72 
per cent between 1976 and 1979.^
In their analysis of the use of money Brunner 6 Meltzer have 
explained the motivation behind currency diversification. 
'Transactors concentrate their search on those transactions chains 
that offer at least the same expected gain in wealth as existing 
mediums of exchange. The assets that replace existing money may have 
higher marginal costs of acquiring information and transacting. If 
so, they must have lower marginal holding costs than the existing 
money'.^ During this period of international currency 
diversification the value of the dollar as a means to reducing the 
costs Inherent in the exchange process was being eroded by Its 
increased holding cost owing to inflation and oversupply.
4.6 Monetarist Practice
towards the end of 1979 an important ahift occurred in US monetary 
policy. On 6 October, under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker the 
Federal Reserve Board abandoned the traditional policy of stabilising 
interest rates in favour of & policy of stabilising money supply 
growth rates. At that time US interest rates had already been rising 
for some two-and-a half years, the prime overdraft rate having 
reached a record level o£ 13,5 per cent. Inflation had also been 
rising since ghe end of 1976 and had reached record levels.
She decision to abandon the Interest rate target led to a further 
dramatic surge in interest rates. For example, between the end of 
September 1979 and the end of March 1980 the 3-month Eurodollar 
deposit rate rose from 12,75 to 19,69 per cent (see Table 4.3).
TABLE 4,3
3-M0CTH EURODOLLAR RATE (%)
January 10,31 1980 January 14,37
February 10,50 February 16,94
March 10,50 March 19,69
April 10,75 April 14,37
May 10,44 May 10,12
June 10,50 June 9,75
July 11,31 July 9,81
August 12,12 August 12,25
September 12,75 September 13,81
October 15,69 October 15,37
November 14,00 November 18,06
December 14,44 December 17,62
Source: World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New
York, various issues.
For the 12 months from November 1979 to October 1980 the Federal 
Reserve set a target range for narrowly-defined money supply (MIA) 
growth of 3,5 to 6 per cent (which constituted a severe contraction 
in real terms with inflation well above 10 per cent during that 
time). Although there was considerable volatility - including a 
sharp fall in money supply during the second quartet of 1980 - the 
target was met.
The target range for the next 12 months was reduced to 3 to 5,5 per 
cent. Thla was subsequently adjusted to minus 2 to minus 4,5 per 
cent to account for the shift to Negotiable Order of Withdrawal 
accounts and the focus shifted to MlB where the target range had been
set for 6 to 8,5 per cent. By the end of October 1981 u.-.s growth In 
M1B was only around 3,5 per cent, well below the lower limit of the
The Fed then set a target of only 2,5 to 5,5 per cent for the next 12 
months for Ml, having scrapped the M1A-M1B definitions. Although 
there was some overshooting (the growth rate to October 1982 was 7,3 
per cent) this nevertheless meant that for the 3 years from the start 
of the new monetary growth targeting policy the Federal Reserve had 
succeeded in limiting Ml growth to about 6 per cent annual compound 
growth. Over the same period the annual compound growth rate in US 
inflation waa over 9 per cent meaning a considerable contraction in 
real monetary growth over the 36 months. The real monetary 
contraction was more severe in the earlier stages of the Fed policy. 
The consumer price inflation rate peaked at 14,5 per cent in the 
second quarter of 1980 whereas it had declined sharply to only 5 per 
cent by October 1982.
The result of this tight monetary stance was exceptionally high 
interest rates In the US throughout the period. Nominal interest 
rates followed a roller-coaster pattern with the prime overdraft rate
rising to and falling from the 20 per cent level twice in 1980 and
1981 and declining to a low of only 10,5 pet cent by mid-1983. More 
importantly, real US interest rates reached their highest levels in 
50 years.
The combination of tight money and high US interest rates produced a 
considerable contraction in US economic activity over the period. 
Industrial production dropped by 9,1 per cent between the end of 1979 
and the end of 1982.
More interesting is that from the end of 1982 the US economy 
commenced a period of exceptionally strong growth despite a 
continuation of this tight monetary stance. OS real GNP growth was
3,7 per cent in 1983 and around 7 per cent in 1984. In 1983 real Ml 
growth accelerated to 5,6 per cent but was cut back to below 4 per
cent in 1984. By late 1984 Ml growth was at the lower end of the
target range set by the Federal Reserve Board.
The Fed's policy has had a remarkable effect on the US dollar. At 
the tiee the Fed implemented its policy - November 1979 - the 
dollar's effective exchange rate was 92,7 (Index 1980 - 8 2 =  100). 
Initially, there was little change in the rate and It had actually 
declined to 88,7 by September 1980. However, It recovered strongly 
over the next two years - rising by 26 per cent to 115,0 by November
1 9 8 2 At thla level the dollar waa actually higher than the
level It recorded in the early 1970s before the era of floating 
exchange rates commenced, since the recovery in US economic activity 
in late 1982 the dollar has continued to strengthen with the 
effective exchange rate index reaching 124 by mid-1984.
Ihe tight US monetary policy had the effect of reversing the tendency 
towards diversificaton away from the dollar discuseed In the previous 
section. After reaching a low point of 72 per cent in 1979, the 
proportion of Eurodollars to total Eurocurrency liabilities recovered 
strongly to reach 79 per cent by 1982 which was only a shade below
the highest level reached (80 per cent in 1976) since the onset of
floating exchange rates. Since then it has stayed around the 78 - 80 
per cent level.*7
Another measure of the diversification away from the dollar is the 
share of US dollars in the SDR value of foreign exchange reserves 
held by central banks. Table 4.4 shows the decline in the dollar 
component of international foreign exchange holdings from 79 per cent 
in 1975 to 36 per cent in 1980. This tendency appears to have been 
reversed in 1981 when public concern over stability came to be more 
evenly spread among major currencies and interest rate developments 
favoured holdings of assets denominated in US dollars.**
TABLE 4.4
SHARE OF THE US DOLLAR IN SDR VALUE OP TOTAL 
IDENTIFIED OFFICIAL HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
TEAR ( R
1975 75
1976 80
1977 79
1978 77
1979
1980
1981
1982
Sources lutenxational Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1982, p.65.
1982 Figures IMF, Annual Report, 1983, p.72.
There Is still considerable debate as to the success of the policy of 
the Federal Reserve. Measured in terms of a strong dollar and the
reversal In the secular rising trend of US Inflation, the policy has
indeed beta successful. Measured in terms of declining levels of 
output and rising unemployment the policy was not without substantial
Furthermore, the subsequent recovery in economic activity and job 
creation has been to a considerable extent a result of record US 
Federal budget deficits. This appears to be an intractable, 
structural problem which is, in itself, potentially destabilising for
the dollar. For example, there is still the chance that such deficit
spending could be financed with more accommodative monetary policy. 
Alternatively, rapid US growth has resulted in a mounting US trade 
deficit (around 6120 billion) in 1984 which could, ultimately, lead 
to the perception that there is an excess supply of dollars in the 
hands of holders outside the US. In this context it is Interesting 
to note that in 1983 the ratio of private to official holdings of 
dollars outside the US had risen back to the peak last achieved in 
1969 - just prior to the flight from dollars which occurred in 1970
and 1971 (see Graph 4.2). So far in 1984 this ratio has continued to 
rise. Clearly, any large-scale loss of confidence by private 
transactors in dollars could mean a significant decline in the value 
,o£ the currency.
GRAPH 4.2
U.S. FOREIGN LIABILITY RATIO
PRIVATE: OFFICIAL 1971-1933
Source: International Financial Stats.
As far as the Eurocurrency market is concerned, the strong dollar and 
lower inflation have brought considerable problems. In particular, 
the rising level of debt in less developed countries over the 1970s 
was financed cheaply because of the erosion of the dollar's value 
internationally. The new monetary policy changed that. The dollar 
has become expensive for debtors, especially when it is borne in mind 
that the low level of international economic activity between 1980 
and 1982 devastated their export volumes and prices. Perhaps the 
best measure of the coat of borrowing has been the historically high 
real Eurodollar interest rates (see Table 4.5). Even in early 1983 
after three years of low economic growth, Inventory decumulation and 
sharp cutbacks on capital spending internationally, real Eurodollar 
rates remained stubbornly high, preventing a decline in the effective 
value of the dollar, and prolonging the dire financial situation of 
the LDC debtor countries.
TABLE 4.5
REAL 3-MONTH EURODOLLAR INTEREST RAIS (SO*
Month 1980 1981 1982
Jan 0,5 0,5 1,0 0,5 5,6 6,1
Feb -0,7 0,8 0,6 2,8 5,3 7,2
Mar -1,1 1,0 0,3 5,0 4,0 8,6
Apr -1,6 1,0 0,4 -0,3 6,9 8,3
May -0,9 1,0 -0,4 -4,3 6,0 7,7
Jun -1,4 1,3 -4,4 -4,5 8,2 8,7
Jul -0,7 0,8 0,0 -3,4 6,0 6,6
Aug 0,5 1,0 0,3 -0,5 7,5 6,0
Sep 0,2 1,1 0,7 1,1 6,8 6,4
Oct 0,8 2,5 3,5 2,6 5,5 4,9
Nov 0,4 2,6 1,4 5,5 2,4 5,3
0,9 2,7 1,1 5,2 4,9 5,3
* 3-ooath Eurodollar interest rate minus US year-oa-year CPI 
Inflation rate,
Sourcea: 1) Eurodollar interest rate: World Financial Markets >
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co,, New York, various ieaueo.
Z) tiS Conaumer Price Index: Econoatat Consumer Database
System, Roaebank, Johannesburg,
Despite the strong dollar and high real Eurodollar interest rates the 
Eurocurrency market has continued to expand in recent years, although 
at a slower rate. Table 4.6 below shows that growth in non-bank 
Eurocurrency deposit:; declined so 11 per cent in 1982 and 1983. 
Indications are that there was a further deceleration in 1984,
TABLE 4.6
GROWTH IK NON-BANK EUROCURRBHCT DEPOSITS
YEAR
IF '8 29
41
33
31
11
1' 9
1980
1981
1983
Source: World Financial Markece, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New
4.7 Conclusion
It aeemo for the time being that the process of a long-term move away 
from the dollar as key currency has been halted. While the continued 
dominance of the dollar in international finance has entailed costs 
for many because of the uncertainty regarding Its future value, it is 
a cost that transactors appear ready to pays 'The high coats that 
individuals are willing to pay before beginning to search for new or 
supplementary arrangements suggests the size of the benefits received 
from a dominant medium of exchange’
York, July 1984, p.15,
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CHAPTER 5
INFLATION AND CONTROLS
5.1 Introduction
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the Eurocurrency markets 
as they have grown in size. Most important among these have been 
that the markets contribute significantly to excess monetary growth 
and thereby to inflation; and also that Eurobanks have acted, 
imprudently in making loans on a very large scale to less developed 
countries uBCs) for balance of payments financing purposes. For 
these two broad reasons critics of the markets have suggested that 
they be subjected to varying degrees of direct or indirwzt control.
This chapter will focus primarily on the question of the inflationary 
potential of the markets and the feasibility of controls. Jhe 
following chapter will be concerned with the question of involvement 
of the Eurocurrency markets in the so-called 'international debt
5.2 Pie Eurocurrency Markets and Inflation
The acceleration of international inflation during the lace 1960s and 
the 1970s occurred simultaneously with rapid growth in the 
Eurocurrency markets. It appeared to many economists that owing to 
their unregulated nature, the Eurocurrency markets were capable of 
creating additional credit on the basis of the fixed coefficient 
moaey multiplier model along the same lines as within a domestic 
banking system. In fact it was thought by some that the Eurocurrency 
system could create almost 'jnlimlted amounts of liquidity in this 
fashion because of the very small ratio of reserves that Eurobanks 
(voluntarily) held against deposits. From this it was concluded that 
the markets were an important cause of world inflation and that they 
should be subjected to control.
Proponents of the fractional reserve process in the Eurocurrency 
markets included Friedman1, Fratianni and Savonna2» carli3 and
'5. as. - i.— -
Ossola*. Friedman stated the proposition boldly: 'The correct
answer for both Eurodollars and liabilities of US banks is that their 
major source Is a bookkeeper’s p e n ' H e  stated that the ultimate 
increase in the amount of Eurodollars from an initial transfer of 
deposits from other banks to Eurodollar banks depended on the amount 
of dollars Eurobanks chose to hold as precautionary cash reserves in 
the US and the leakages' from the system, i.e. the extent to which 
Eurodollar loans were not redeposited in the Eurocurrency market. 
Friedman’s view was that the Eurodollar market raised the world's 
nominal money supply and thus made the world price level higher than 
it would otherwise have been.
Carli outlined carefully the process of credit creation and control 
in a domestic economy whereby the volume of credit that ultimately is 
created is a multiple of the monetary base. The monetary base in 
turn is determined by the monetary authorities, the k.nks and the 
public. The authorities lay down the proportion of cash reserves to 
deposits which the banks must hold, the banks decide on the amount of 
excess reserves they wish to hold and the public decides on how ouch 
of the monetary base it needs to keep on hand as means of payment. 
That part of the monetary base not in the hands of the public or held 
as compulsory reserves may be lent out as credit. The stream of 
credit lent out flowed back, either wholly or in part, to one or more 
banks in the system.
Carli's view was that the same process of credit creation operated in 
the Eurocurrency markets. However, a domestic banking system was 
subject to the restraint of compulsory reserves and to control 
exercised by the authorities over the volume of monetary base
instruments. The Eurocurrency markets were not subjected to such
restraints or controls except the voluntary cash reserves which
Eurobanks felt it necessary to I ..d. Carli feared that the amount of
credit that could be created on this base could reach inflationary 
dimensions and advocated various controls to inhibit it.
For Ossola, the Eurocurrency market was a system where a market 
mechanism could legally create unlimited monetary means. The 
Eurobanking system's potential for expansion was greater than that of
domestic systems because its liquid reserves were proportionately 
lower and its monetary base not controlled by any monetary 
authority. He also advocated a series of controls for regulating the 
markets.
Fratianni and Savonna followed the same line of reasoning concerning 
the 'multiplicative power' of the Eurobanking system and claimed to 
have empirically identified a Eurodollar multiplier equal to between
In a survey of empirical estimates of the Eurodollar multiplier, 
Dufey and Giddy discovered a range of 0,4 to 18,45 depending on which 
data was used to approximate the Eurodollar monetary base and over 
which time period the study was carried out.®
Virtually all the theoretical work which attempted to identify the 
fixed coefficient money multiplier took care to explain that 
'leakages' from the system reduced the size of the multiplier. 
Ossola called leakages the 'loss coefficient', the size of which 
depended on the extent to which a beneficiary of a Eurocurrency loan 
redepoeited the funds in the Eurocurrency market.
Hie traditional analysis of the money multiplier can be simply stated 
in the formula:
1 - (1-r) (1 - e)
where e refers to the holdings of economic transactors in the form of 
notea or cash, and r to the reserve requirement rate.7 Applying 
the formula to the Eurocurrency system would assume that Eurobanks 
held a determinable proportion of deposits to reserves (i.e. deposits 
with head office banks) and that there was a determinable redepoait 
rate by beneficiaries of Eurocurrency loans. The proponents of the 
fixed coefficient money multiplier model conceded the existence of 
leakages, particularly by loan recipients who frequently deposited 
the funds borrowed in the markets with banks located in the country 
of origin of the currency concerned. However, because the reserve
ratio was known to be small and the redeposit ratio significant, most 
studies found a multiplier of at least more than unity.
5.3 Central Bank Redepoaltlng
After the upheaval in the International monetary system in 1970 and 
1971 the phenomenon of depositing by central banks in the 
Eurocurrency market attracted considerable attention. Tight monetary 
policy in the US during 1969 encouraged US banks to borrow
extensively in the Eurocurrency market at relatively low cates of 
interest. A recession in the US and rr-every in Europe In 1970 
reversed the tight credit conditions in the US and US interest rates 
declined. In contrast, Japan and moat Western European economies 
persisted with anti-inflationary policies. This caused a
considerable return flow of dollars from the US to the Eurocurrency 
market in search of higher interest rates.
The subsequent run oa the dollar forced European central banks to 
purchase dollars in order to maintain ezchange rate parity under the 
existing system of fixed exchange rates. On one particularly hectic 
day, 5 May 1971, the German authorities acquired $1 billion in 40
minutes of trading to maintain their exchange rate.®
A substantial portion of the dollars so acquired found their way into 
the Eurodollar market. Such redepositing was thought to 
substantially reduce the loss coefficient in the market and increase 
its credit creating potential. The problem of central bank 
redepositing was temporarily alleviated in June 1971 when the central 
banks belonging to the Group of Ten agreed among themselves not to 
increase their official reserve holdings in the Eurocurrency 
markets. However, the problem re-emerged la the mid-1970s after the 
quadrupling of the oil price which generated large foreign exchange 
reserves for OPEC economies, a significant proportion of which was 
placed by OPEC monetary authorities in the market.
5.4 Shift of Ownership
Even with the problem of central bank depositing it became 
increasingly clear that the fixed coefficient money multiplier model 
was not an adequate theoretical tool for studying the effect of the 
Eurocurrency markets on world money supply growth and inflation. One 
simple difference between the Eurocurrency markets and domestic 
credit markets is that the deposit liabilities of domestic banks are 
used as a means of payment (ie cheques) whereas Eurobank deposit 
liabilities are not. With a few minor exceptions no cheques can be 
drawn on Eurodollar deposits. Before such deposits can be used fox 
payments purposes they first have to be converted into a demand 
deposit with a bank located in the US. Eurobanks are more similar to 
'savings banks' than 'commercial banks' in that their liabilities 
answer an investment need and not a payments need.9 Loans to
customers of Eurodollar banks ate generally made in the form of 
actual US dollars rather than by the creation of a Eurodollar deposit 
against which a customer draws, as is the case with a loan by a 
domestic US bank.*® In much the same way that a demand deposit 
with a domestic bank is withdrawn and placed with a savings-and-loan 
association, which constitutes a transfer of ownership of the demand 
deposit to the latter, a shift of a demand deposit from a local US 
bank to a Eurobank transfers ownership of the demand deposit to the 
latter. The Eurobank receiving the deposit can subsequently extend 
dollar loans based on the demand deposit it holds at a US bank
(maintaining some small portion of the deposit with the US bank as a 
•precautionary reserve').*1 The beneficiary of the loan, in turn, 
has ownership of the original demand deposit transferred to it. Jhe 
total level of demand deposit liabilities held by the US banking
system is not changed.
There is nothing in the payments mechanism which obliges the supplier 
of goods to the borrower of a Eurocurrency loan to pay the cheque
drawn on the US demand deposit into any Eurobank. This decision will
rest purely on the supplier's preference. Ihua there is no causally 
connected succession of deposits in the Eutobanking system comparable 
to the chain found at the level of a national banking system.3^
5.5 Savlage-and-Loan Associations
An example of the analogy with a aavitYga-and-loan aaaoctatVon would 
work aa follows: the owner of a commercial bank demand deposit 
transfers It to a savings bank. The latter draws on the demand
deposit to make a loan to a tioee construction company. The company, 
out of net income from its business, savee a certain amount which It 
deposits with the savings association. Ihe latter makes another loan 
with this deposit and. so on. Thua multiple loans can be made against 
the original and unchanged demand deposit with the commercial bank. 
Ihe savings association is acting less as a creator of credit than as 
aa Intermediator of existing deposits. In this analysis it is clear 
that the intermediary role played by the savlngs-and-loan association 
increases the velocity of circulation of the original deposit.
Crockett has pointed out that commercial banks are not unique In 
their ability to create credit. When attention is shifted to the 
balance sheets of financial institutions and their customers, it can 
be seen that the circumstances of banks and other financial 
intermediaries are quite comparable.2^  while savings banks* 
liabilities are not regarded aa means of exchange they are still able, 
to extend credit up to a point where the marginal return on lending 
is equal to the marginal cost of attracting deposits. Similarly, 
commercial banks are constrained in their lending activities by the 
relatlv« attractiveness of their liabilities le they compete with 
other financial intermediaries for deposits. Eurobanks have 
developed a range of liabilities that satisfy a wide spectrum of 
liquidity needs. While their liabilities are not actually used as a 
means of payment they are nonetheless close substitutes for money.
The second interim report of the De Kock Commission of Inquiry Into 
the monetary system and monetary policy in South Africa has recently 
explicitly recognised the credit creating potential of building 
societies, non-bank financial intermediaries similar to US 
savlngs-and-loan associations and, for that matter, Eurobanks. In 
recent years the liabilities of these Institutions have increasingly 
taken pn (he character of money or close money substitutes and they 
are capable to some extent of creating their own liabilities.1*
All that la necessary is that the building societies quote 
competitive interest rates for funds and that investors find their 
liabilities attractive to hold as money or money substitutes.
5.6 Supply and Demand Approach
In addition to showing that other financial intermediaries are also 
capable of expanding their balance sheets, Crockett asserts that 
there is little use for the money multiplier model in studying 
Eurobank extension of credit. Because domestic commercial banks are 
conetrained by cash reserve requirements they face a ’discontinuity 
in the implicit yield on reserves' Below the requiiad minimum,
i.e. between points 0 and A in Graph 5.1, the implicit marginal yield 
on reserves is extremely high; above the prescribed minimum, i.e. 
between points A and C, it is zero.
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In other words, the penalty for failing to meet the reserve 
requirements la prohibitive whereas the return on exceaa cash 
reserves is negligible (except for a very small margin over the 
minimum). Thus, movements in the yield on alternative assets will 
have no influence on the ratio of reserves that an individual bank 
will wish to hold. Banks will always respond to a release of
reserves by the central bank by expanding loans. An increase in the 
volume of reserves provided by the central bank causes a discrepancy 
between the return on marginal loans and the return on reserves 
(which, being in excess of requirements, will fall to the 
zero-yielding portion of the discontinuous yield curve) Banks
will lower their loan rates, increase loans and run down excess 
reserves, until reserves reach the required minimum again. The 
minimum reserve requirement acts as a fulcrum upon which national 
monetary authorities* open-market operations are applied to affect 
commercial bank credit creation.
However, Eurobanks do not face a discontinuous yield curve for their 
reserves. Because they are not subjected to legal minimum reserve 
requirements the utility derived from holding reserves is a 
continuous function, i.e. line AB in Graph 5.2, of both the interest 
rate oo other assets and the amount of reserves held.
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Burobinks hold a very small proportion of total assets as reserves 
and rely on the well-developed Interbank market to meet unforeseen 
withdrawals. Ihe expansion of the market depends on the demand for 
Eurocurrency deposits and Eurocurrency loans. Since its inception 
and for various reasons mentioned In Chapter 3 the relative
attractiveness of Eurocurrency Instruments has generated a continuous 
flow of new funds into the system enabling its balance sheet to 
expand. Crockett concludes that it is not the mechanical nature of 
credit creation by banks that makes reserve requirements essential, 
but rather the existence of reserve requirements that makes credit 
creation conform to a multiplier framework. in the Eurocurrency 
market the simple mechanism of supply and demand equated by price can 
explain the expansion of the market perfectly well.^
Dufey and Giddy also find the supply and demand approach appropriate 
for analysing the growth of the Eurocurrency market.18 The demand 
for Eurocurrency deposits by Eurobanks is a function of the demand 
for Eurocurrency loans by borrowers. The lower the Eurocurrency loan 
rate the greater the demand. For example, as the Eurodollar rate 
rises loan demand declines and becomes zero at the point at which the 
Eurodollar loan rate equals the equivalent domestic US loan rate.
Similarly, depositors in the Eurocurrency market increase their 
deposits in response to the rising Eurodeposlt rate and reduce their 
deposits as it falls. In the Eurodollar market, the supply of 
Eurodollar deposits becomes perfectly elastic when the Eurodollar 
deposit rate is equal to the equivalent domestic US deposit rate.
On the basis of this analysis an exogenous rise in Eurocurrency 
deposits would not produce the same effect as an exogenous rise in 
deposits in a domestic banking system. According to the multiplier 
analysis the domestic bank retains the required reserve against the
deposit and loans out the balance at a lower interest rate. Ihe
loans create new deposits in the banking system and, in turn, new 
reserves and loans. Ihe process continues until all of the original 
inflow has been taken up by reserves or has leaked out of the
system. To calculate the multiplier all that is required is the loss
coefficient.
In the Eurocurrency market Eurobanks aim merely to equate deposits 
and loans at the most profitable interest rate. An exogenous 
increase in deposits could result in on increased extension of credit
but it could also produce lower deposit rates such that part of the
original inflow is counterbalanced by an outflow of deposits.
Depending on the interest rate elasticity of the supply and demand
curves for Eurobank facilities some combination of both is likely to
Two factors are responsible for the continued growth of the markets. 
Firstly, the rate of credit expansion in national markets and
secondly, the increasing awareness of the attractiveness .of the 
markets amongst borrowers, banks and depositors. On its own, the 
extent of credit creation over time in domestic markets determines 
the potential flow of deposits to Eurobanks. This potential has been 
steadily enhanced over the past two decades as greater awareness of 
the market has spread internationally, and the learning curves of 
participants in the markets have flattened out.
Die supply and demand approach to the growth of the Eurocurrency 
markets gives a different perspective to the problem of central 
banking redepositing which, under the multiplier approach, was held 
responsible for a great deal of the Inflationary impact of the market.
For example, the shift of funds by a central bank out of a domestic 
US deposit to a Eurodollar deposit would have the effect of 
depressing rates in the offshore market or raising rates in the 
domestic market or some combination of both. At the margin ' some 
depositors would shift deposits from the offshore back to the 
domestic market. Whether or not the initial shift is wholly offset 
by the reflow depends on the interest elasticities of the two 
markets. Because of the high degree of Integration between the 
Eurodollar market and the domestic US money market, these 
elasticities are assumed to be very high.^
5.7 Credit is Expanded
Although the supply and demand approach to the flow of funds through 
the Eurobanking system appears more realistic than the conventional 
multiplier analysis it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a 
transfer of deposits to the Eurocurrency system is likely to produce
an extension of credit upon an unchaaged base of domestic deposit 
liabilities. Thus while the domestic stock of money remains
unchanged an expansion of lending and spending has occurred - in 
other words an Increase in the velocity of the given money stock haa 
taken place. 3he simplified balance sheet analysis below shows how 
this occurs.
US BANK_______   EUROBANK
ABC 100 ABC 100 US BANK 100
-ABC 100 -US BANK 98
E/BANK 100
-E/BANK 100
Initially a shift of a time deposit of $100 occurs from a US bank to 
an offshore bank. Hie depositor, ABC, now owns a Eurodeposit and the 
Eurobank owns a US deposit upon which it can extend credit of $98 to 
XYZ (keeping a small reserve against the original deposit). XY2 tiven 
acquires ownership of a $96 deposit with the US batik. At this stage 
there is an unchanged deposit liability for the US bank and aq
expanded balance sheet f.or the Eurobank. However, in a dyaamiq 
ayafcea this is unlikely to be the end of the process. ABC's original 
shift io likely to produce at the oargin a small decline in the
Eurodeposit rate, inducing other depositors to withdraw their 
Eurobank deposits. This would create a contraction in the Eurobank's 
balance sheet. However, as Graph 5.3 shows, even with very flat
(interest-elastic) Eurobank supply and demand curves some expansion 
of the balance sheet an the basis of an original deposit must occur. 
An autonomous shift in thee Eurodeposit curve AB to A'B' such that 
deposits rose from OM to ON would have the effect of reducing the 
Eurodeposit interest rate from OH to 0G where a new equilibrium level 
of deposits would be established at OP (less than ON but greater than
OM). Only if AB was perfectly horizontal would there be no increase
In the equilibrium level of Eurodeposita. This is unlikely in such 
efficient markets.
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It appears, therefore, that using the money multiplier approach 
(deemed inappropriate by the author), the conclusion ifl reached that 
the Eurocurrency markets create credit and money, while using the 
supply and demand approach the markets augment the velocity of 
money. Under neither analysis is it possible to quantify accurately 
the extent to which these effects occur.
5.8 Liquidity Transformation
Another approach to the Inflationary potential of the Eurocurrency 
market is to establish the extent to which it enhances the liquidity 
of the non-bank sector. In particular, net liquidity creation is 
positive if a financial intermediary borrows short and lends long. 
Bie nature of commercial bank activities is certainly to borrow short 
and lend long. However, many non-bank financial intermediaries also 
perform this function. Evidence that Eurobanks maintained a fairly 
close maturity balance would indicate that the system functions 
primarily as a distribution mechanism for existing liquidity rather 
than as one that creates new liquidity.
Die only detailed data available for analysis of the maturity 
structure of Eurobanks are compiled and published by the Bank of 
England in its Quarterly Bulletin. They are restricted to BK-based
Eurobanks which do, however, make up a relatively large proportion of 
total Eurobank activity (see Oiapter 3) and are therefore taken to be 
fairly repreaentative of the market as a whole.
Hewson has constructed 'mismatch curves' to analyse the degree of 
maturity transformation performed by Eurobanks. Ihe mismatch curve 
involves expressing the percentages of assets and liabilities in each 
maturity class as a percentage of aggregate assets and liabilities 
respectively, cucoulatiaa these percentages for both assets and 
liabilities and then plotting these cumulative percentages.^ "*" Ihe 
larger the area between the mismatch curve and the diagonal, the 
further from equal is the distribution of claims relative to the 
distribution of liabilities.
Using data for September 1973 Hewson found that the degree of 
maturity transformation in the UK-based Eurobanking system was 
noticeably lees than la the domestic American banking system and not 
significantly differently from that ia the domestic Japanese and 
German banking systems.
Unfortunately Hewson'a analysis was not consistent with his initial 
statement that 'the economic significance of the Eurobanking system 
should not be determined by whether it c.reatea money per ae, but 
whether liquidity transformation represents a significant aspect of 
its operations vis-a-vis the non-Eurobank sector. That ta, it 
depends on whether, in dealing with the non-bank sector, Eurobanks 
(on average) tend to match the liquidity of their deposits from this 
sector to the liquidity of their clslms on this sector.
In compiling mismatch curves Hewson ignored the specific breakdown of 
Eurobank assets and liabilities with respecl: to the non-bank sector 
preferring to concentrste on overall assets and liabilities. Ihe 
resultant mismatch curves show quite a small area between the curves 
and the diagonal allowing the conclusion that maturity transformation, 
is not significant.
However, using Hewson's same data (in which the figures for assets 
and liabilities in respect of non-banks are presented but not used 
for compiling the curves) a ouch greater area ie found between the 
curve and the diagonal (see Graph 5.4).
97
GRAPH 5.4
MISMATCH CURVES
IOOt
90 1007030
% OF LIABILITIES
In a later study by (Jrabbe23 it can be seen (Graph 5.4) that by
1978 there had been a considerable Increaae in maturity 
transformation vis-a-vis non-banks compared with 1973. Grabbe points 
out that the question of the impact of maturity transformation on the 
inflationary process has particular ralevance to Eurobank lending to 
LPCs (which will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6). Grabbe 
shows that there was a one-time maturity adjustment during the year 
1974, following the October 1973 oil-price rise, accounted for by the 
sharp rise in short-term deposits by OPEC countries and an equivalent 
rise in long-term borrowing by oil-importing countries. Thereafter, 
the structure of bank liabilities did not change over the period 
March 1974 to November 1978.
Data for November 1982 shos?a that since November 1978 there has 
actually been a small contraction in the area under the mismatch 
curve, although the area is still significantly larger ttun in 
1973.24 Thus there is still considerable maturity transformation 
occurring within the Eurobanking system, tirabbe seems to imply that 
as long as the degree of maturity transformation is not increasing, 
it does not aggravate the inflation process. However, it seems more 
logical to say that at a constant rate of maturity transformation 
what is more important is the rate at which funds are transferred 
from domestic to Eurobank deposits by non-banks. If the rate of 
transferal is large then maturity transformation must have a 
significant effect on the net liquidity of non-banks and hence some 
inflationary potential.
This last point is supported by a recent paper by Folkerte- 
Landau.25 He finds that the magnitude of the flow of domestic 
deposits to external locations Is the most important factor for 
determining the money and credit creating potential of the external 
financial markets. Innovations in the technology of external 
financial transactions have contributed to a reduction in transaction 
costs, while extended lender-of-last-reaort facilities and a better 
definition of the legal responsibilities of domestic banks toward 
theiz external subsidiaries have reduced the risk of externally 
issued deposit liabilities. Iheae developments have resulted in a 
sustained secular growth of external financial markets. It is
impossible to determine the outer Limit of the rate at which deposits 
move toward external intermediaries because it depends on factors 
such as the rate of technological innovation in financial
transactions, and the reduction in the perceived risk of external 
liabilities which by their nature are difficult to quantify.
Another way of putting this is to revert to Machlup's concept of a 
'primary' deposit which ie one that 'increases at the same time the 
total deposit liabilities and the total cash reserves of the group of 
banks under question' For example, if the holder of a time
deposit with a domestic US bank withdraws it and deposits it with a
Eurobank both the dollar deposit liablities and the dollar cash 
reserves at the Eurobank are increased. Thus, as was shown above, an 
increased extension of credit is made possible without changing total 
domestic dollar liabilities. The velocity of the original time 
deposit has been increased thereby increasing inflationary pressure. 
Even with some compensatory adjustment in domestic US and Eurodollar 
interest rates there is likely to be some rise in total dollar credit.
In conclusion, it seems clear that the Eurocurrency system, because 
of its efficiency and growing popularity, does have inflationary 
potential because it enhances the velocity of a given domestic money 
stock. This is unlikely to be due to a money multiplier effect, 
which appears to be an Inappropriate method of examining the 
phenomenon. Instead it arises out of shifts of deposits from 
domestic to external banks which enable increased credit extension on
an unchanged money stock, ihere Is also a considerable degree of 
maturity transformation for non-banka by Eurobanks, This adds to the 
sarl'Qt'a Inflationary potential.
If the isc-e of the inflationary potential of the Eu-odollar markets 
were to be left at this point there would appear to be good grounds 
for concluding that the system has had a detrimental impact on the 
international economy. There are, however, other considerations.
5.9 Inflationary Potential in perspective
A number of points need to be made to put the potentially harmful 
impact of the market in perspective. Firstly, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, the size of the Eurocurrency market, despite its 
phenomenal growth, is still quite small relative to comparable 
national monetary aggregates. Its Inflationary impact, therefore, 
oust be considerably smaller than that of such aggregates, 
Folkerte-landau shows that the potential direct contribution by the 
external financial markets to the US rnte of Inflation was between 
0,06 and 0,4 percentage points per annum during the period 1975 to 
I960.27 The average annual consumer price inflation rate for the 
US over the period was 9 per cent.
Secondly i. a number o® writers have pointed out that it is false to 
say that if the Euromarkets did not exist the international flow of 
credit channelled through them would not occur at all. International 
credit did not originate with the Euromarkets, nor is it monopolised 
by them. The Euromarkets are more correctly an alternative channel 
for credit flows that would occur in some form or another in any 
event. McClam has shown that in times of a reduction in commercial 
bank lending in the US disintermediation has not been concentrated 
solely In the Eurocurrency markets.28 Because domestic financial 
markets in the US are highly developed the impact of monetary 
restraint can be significantly reduced by disintermediation through 
domestic US non-bank financial intermediation.
As far as destablishing short-term 'hot-money' capital flows are 
concerned ic is clear that they occurred long before the advent of
the Euromarkets, such as during the spate of competitive devaluations 
In the 1930s.29
Thirdly, It is likely that the blame tor excessive credit creation 
rests not on the Eurocurrency markets but on domestic monetary 
authorities who have exercised Inadequate control over their own 
money supplies. Hie recent performance of Inflation in industrial 
countries in response to more disciplined monetary policies is 
evidence that Inflation can be controlled despite the existence of 
the Euromarkets. Indeed, monetary policy can and does affect the 
extension of credit by Eurobanks In the same way as it affects the 
extension of credit by other domestic non-bank financial
Intermediaries. For one thing, because of the close linkages between 
domestic and Eurocurrency Interest rates, the authorities can 
directly affect the cost of Eurocurrency credit by exerting pressure 
on domestic money supplies.
TABLE 5.1
EUROCURRENCY MARKET:
CHANGE IN NET CLAIMS ON HQN-BAKKS
Source; World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Ncv 
York, various issues.
Table 5,1 shows the sharp contraction in the growth of net credit 
extension to non-banka by Eurobanks la 1982. While some of this 
contraction, was due to a deliberate policy of more selective lending 
by Eurobanks rather than a slowdown in credit demand it is clear 
that the ultimate reason is the concerted policy of monetary 
constraint followed by the US and other industrialised countries 
since 1960. This has produced a severe economic recession, high 
Interest rates, a strong dollar and falling commodity prices all of 
which have contributed to more cautious leading policies by 
Eurobanks. In short, the Eurocurrency system is not the main 
generator of excessive credit creation nor is it beyond the scope of 
domestic monetary policy to control.
5.10 Con,ttola
Much has been written on the desirability and practicability of 
controls over Eurobanks. The most common direct controls suggested 
are twofold. One approach would incorporate compulsory reserve 
requirements against foreign currency deposits. Monetary 
authorities could require Eurobanks coining under their respective 
jurisdictions to Maintain reserves against their foreign currency 
deposits. For example, the Eurodollar system would then be 
subjected to the same contractive end expansive influences emanating 
from changes in the US monetary base such as would be caused by US 
open-market operations. An Important prerequisite for the success 
of such measures would be comprehensive international agreement, 
otherwise Eurobank business would merely shift to other centres. It 
is unlikely that all nations and government entities throughout the 
world would agree to impose uniform legal reserve requirements la 
such a way as not to cause foreign currency business to move to the 
most advantageous locations.
Another approach would emphasize open-market operations. Central 
hanks could agree to increase or decrease availability of 
Eurodollars by borrowing or redepositing funds directly or via the 
Bank for International Settlements, ftiey could even create some 
sort of special security to do so. A sale of such a security to 
Surobanks would have the effect of driving up Eurocurrency interest 
rates relative to domestic interest rates. However, this would have
the impact of attracting domestic deposits offshore, tantamount 'to 
bailing out a boat with a hole in its bottom'. Apart from the 
problems of identifying the base toward which ouch apen-earket 
operations should be directed, and the lack of an identifiable 
multiplier, there would also be the problems o£ which type of 
security to use and of how such operations should be co-ordinated.
Other controls have been suggested, such as credit ceilings and 
controls over the US balance of payments. Oae fora of control, the 
German 'BardepOt1, was tried extensively in the early 1970s. This 
was a cash deposit requirement on all loans and other credits from 
non-residents to German non-banks. The bardepflt was initially set 
at 40 per ccmt and later raised to 100 pec cent and was inatTvroental 
in reducing non-bank inflows of short-term capital. However, most 
of these suggestions appear to Ignore the fact that the Eurocurrency 
markets to a certain extent emerged as more efficient alternatives 
to heavily controlled domestic financial markets, particularly in 
the US. It might even be suggested that instead of imposing 
controls over the Eurocurrency sarkete and thereby compounding the 
agony of controls already imposed in domestic markets, that 
regulation over domestic banking activity should be scaled down. 
This would Increase the relative competitiveness of domestic banks 
and reduce the incentive to utilise offshore banking facilities.
Recent events in the international economy, in particular the 
accelerating problem of the debt and liquidity problems of Third 
World countries, have resulted in calls for more specific controls 
over Eurobank credit extension. In this respect, the argument for 
controls focuses specifically on the question of the adequacy of 
bank earnings and capital vis-a-vis their outstanding loans to these 
countries. The question of insufficient attention to country risk 
appraisal has arisen and the problem has reached such serious 
proportions that aoae economists and analysts have been led eo fear 
for the whole fabric of international banking. This problem will be 
diacuesed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTKB. 6
BANK LENDING TQ LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
6.1 Introduction
Recent developments concerning the debt ot Less Developed CounCrlee 
(LDCs) have, for the second time since the oil crisis In 1974, 
brought the stability of the International banking system Into 
question. Since Friday, 13th August, 1962, when Mexico shut its 
foreign exchange markets because It could not afford repayments on 
its huge foreign debt commitments, the international money market has 
undergone severe gyrations. In the year that followed Mexico's 
fateful move some 25 LDCs attempted to renegotiate the terms of about 
4100 billion of external debt owed to the international banking 
system - about 20 times the amount of cross-border debt to the 
markets renegotiated in any previous year.*
Table 6.1 below shows the breakdown of the external debt owed by the 
21 major LDCs as classified by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 
(MGT). Of the total external debt of these countries - some 4517 
billion at the end of 1982 - about 60 per cent, mors than 4300 
billion, was owed to banks.^ The total external debt of all LDCs 
waa somewhat larger, being equal to around 4655 billion at the end of 
1982.
TABLE 6.1
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT OF 21 MAJOR LDCe
j Billions - 1982
86,3
Mexico 84,6
37,2
Argentina 36,5
Venezuela 32,6
28,0
Indonesia 25,5
Turkey 22,6
22,2
Philippines 20,8
Chile 17,2
Algeria 14,9
Thailand U,7
11,6
Nigeria 11,5
Morocco 10,8
Colombia 10,5
Malaysia 9,5
Taiwan 8,2
Ivory Coast 8,0
Ecuador 6,7
Source: Da Vrlea, R. Morgan internatloaaJ. Tables & Charta, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co., New York, November, 1983, p.4.
The table shows an amorphous group, representing four continents, and 
includes manufactured goods exporters such as Korea and Taiwan; oil- 
exporting countries such as Mexico and Indonesia; and countries 
richly endowed in other raw materials such as Brazil and Argentina.
Because this outstanding foreign debt lias assumed such large 
proportions accusations of irresponsibility in their leading 
practices have been levelled at Eurobanks and renewed calls for 
control over international bank lending have been widely heard.
It should be noted that not all of the lending to LDCs is in
Eurocurrencies. Eurocurrei <• lending is defined as lending in a 
currency foreign to the territory in which the bank office through 
which the loan is booked is situated. In recent years the most
rapidly expanding sector of the international money market has been 
lending in domestic currency to foreign borrowers - for example, the 
International Banking Facilities (IBFs) in the US. In 1982, over 26 
per cent of the identifiable total external credit extended by banks 
was in doasstic currencyHowever, It is clear that Eurobank 
lending, as defined, has played the major role in international bank 
credit to LDCs.
Of total external LK, debt at the end of 1982 amounting to 4655 
billion, £367 billion was owed to banks. Of this amount of 4367 
billion, 36 per cent or 4133 billion, was owed to US banks (including 
offshore branches of US banks).4 Clearly, US banks are heavily 
involved in lending to LDCs but they are by no means alone Is their
exposure to these countries.
6.2 Origins of the LDC Debt Problems
The substantial growth in the foreign debt of the LDCs has only 
occurred ever the past decade. In particular, the lending of 
commercial banks to LDCs during the 1960s was not common, being 
restricted mainly to short-term trade finance, project finance, and 
tern loans in conjunction with IMP stabilisation programmes. As of 
1971, two-thirds of the LDCs' external debt was owed to official 
sources and the remaining third to suppliers and banka.5
One of the major initial reasons behind the flow of bank credit to 
LDCo was the increasing attention given to some of the highet-income 
LDCs by multi-national companies - particularly fcom the end of the 
1960s. A number of newly-industrialised countries (NICs) such as 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore implemented forward-looking development 
programmes which concentrated on developing manufactured goods 
exports industries with the aid of multi-nationals. Similarly, 
countries in the Western heeiephete well-endowed with natural
lesources such as Brazil and Mexico esbsrked on expansion programmes 
which actraeced multl-natioaal participation. It was natural for the 
aulti-nationsls to turn to international banks to raise finance for 
their operations in LDCs. Eurobanks could provide US dollar loans - 
the dominant currency for world trade - which were not available in 
the US credit market because of US capital controls.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s the Eurocurrency system had 
experienced rapid growth and was well placed to participate in the 
expansion of the LDC economies. Economic growth for .ne non-OPEC LDC 
group, defined as 'non-oil' LDCs to distinguish them from OPEC 
countries, averaged 5,6 per cmt per annum between 1961 and 1970, and
5,5 per cent per annum during the followiug decade - considerably 
higher than growth m  OECD economies - and they offered excellent 
investment opportunities. At about this time Industrial countries 
and official agencies were making changee in their official aid 
programmes. For example, the US tended to concentrate aid more on 
lower-iacome economies while the World Bank adjusted Its interest 
rates to market-related levels. Furthermore, lending by the IMF was 
always accompanied by conditions concerning economic performance 
which most higher-income LDCs preferred to avoid. Under these 
conditions the capital-hungry LDCs turned to th" Eurobanks where they 
found credit relatively easy to obtain, cheap end condition-free.
Commercial bank lending to LDCs was also boosted by the expansion of 
world trade. Table 6.2 ahwa the rapid acceleration of non-oil 
developing countries1 exports and imports from the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Many of this group of countries are primary goods 
rather than manufactured goods exporters and their exports benefltted 
considerably from the commodity price boom between 1972 and 1974 and 
again from 1976 to 1980. Between 1968 and 1974 non-oil developing 
countries' exportu -oee more than 3 times. Over the same period the 
IMP commodltieB prices index more than doubled. Thus not all the 
rise in exports was due to Inflation - world trade wan booming end 
there was strong demand . for commodities from the reconstructed 
economies of Europe and Japan.
TABLE 6.2
ANNUAL % GROWTH
NON-OIL DEVELOPING 001*,$1%: IMF COMMODITIES
IMPORTS EXPv-’y  PRICE INDEX
5,9 6,8 -2,1
9,6 8,1 3,4
2,4 0,3 -6,0
6,7 6,4 -1,0
9,3 11,6 7,7
15,1 9,3 3,3
13,0 5,8 -4,9
6,8 20,3 13,3
38,4 45,9 53,5
57,5 41,0 27,9
Sourcess International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1963.
International Financial Statistics, Supplement on Trade
Statistics, 1981.
In the aftermath of the commodities price boon of the early 1970s the 
international economy entered a severe recession. This was induced 
mainly by the effect on the industrialised economies of the 
quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC. She combined effect of the 
recession and high oil prices was a drastic deterioration of the 
trade balances of the non-oil developing country group, ttiis led to 
another surge in bank lending to LDCs, this time for balance of 
payments purposes. Table 6.3 shows that from 1973 to 1975 the 
combined trade deficit of the non-oil developing countries 
deteriorated froa $17 to $54 billion per annum. At the time 
governments in the industrialised countries encouraged such bank 
lending because of fears that the trade surpluses of the OPEC 
countries would remain high indefinitely. It was thought that the 
richest OPEC economies had low ’absorptive capacity* i.e. limited 
ability to suck ia Imports because of their relatively small 
populations. The banks were encouraged to 'recycle* the excess
dollars to the LDCa to dampen the Impact on them of the high oil 
price. For US banks auch lending was facilitated by the removal of 
controls on capital outflows in 1974.
TABLE 6.3
MOW-OII. DEVELOPING COUNT SUES 
TRADE DEFICIT
j BILLIONS
7,4
8,5
9,4
10,2
10,3
14,0
19,4
16,3
17,3
40,1
54,1
Source: International Financial StaCistics, Yearbook, 1983.
IMF resources were boosted in 1974 and 1975 through the first and 
second oil facilities vhic.li totalled 49 billion and later through the 
Supplementary Financing Facility which added another $10 billion.
Many LECs were tardy in implementing policies of economic adjustment 
following the oil crisis. A number had embarked on ambitious 
deve.'v, •Gi't programmes in the early 1970s and preferred, often for 
polit.-• ,U teaeons, to attempt to ride out the recession and borrow in 
the Eurocurrency markets.
It is estimated that in the three years following the first oil 
crisis non-oil LDCa obtained $60 billion in commercial bank credits. 
Of this total neatly $30 billion was publicly announced borrowing 
from the Eurocurrency markets,6 The rapid growth in lending to the 
LDCs was highly successful in moderating the effect of higher oil 
prices on international economic growth. After a slight dip in 1975
LOG exports recovered sharply as demand picked up In the OECD 
economies and their combined trade deficit also Improved 
substantially. This permitted a resumption of strong import growth 
from 1977 further aiding the recovery of the industrial countries 
(see Table 6.4).
TABLE 6.4
FOREIGN TRADE OP NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
ANNUAL % CHANGE IN TRADE DEFICIT
IMPORTS EXPORTS () Billions)
1975 6,6 -1,3 54,1
1976 1,8 15,7 38,1
1977 14,6 17,6 38,2
1978 18,5 13,7 52,7
Source: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1983.
The second oil price shock in 1979, and the events which followed, 
severely aggravated the external debt position of the LBCs. Whereas 
the industrial economies had followed relatively lax monetary 
policies following the first oil crisis, anti-inflationary policies 
were stringently Implemented from 1979, particularly in the UK and 
the US. Inflation declined sharply in most OECD economies and 
interest rates rose to record levels in real and nominal terms. 
There followed a recession of similar intensity and longer duration 
than in late 1974 and early 1975. For example, from its peak in 
January 1980 US industrial production had declined by 8 per cent only 
elx months later. Then followed a sharp recovery - 9,7 per cent - 
only to be followed by a further 12,3 per cent fall between July 1981 
and November 1982.
The non-oil LDCfl were faced with a desperate situation - a sharp rise 
in interest z;ates, much higher oil prices, a strong rise in the US 
dollar in which 70 per cent of their foreign debt was denominated, 
falling demand in their major export markets and, after 1980,
declining commodity prices. Table 6.5 shows the decline in the IMF 
commodity price index over this period and the simultaneous 
deterioration in the non-oil LDCa' terms of trade. It also shows the 
sharp rise in this group's combined trade deficit.
TABLE 6.5
ANNUAL % CHANCE
IMF COMMODITY NON-OIL LDC NON-OIL LDC
PRICE INDEX TERMS OF TRADE TRADE DEFICIT
1976 4,1 -5,2 40,4
1979 16,3 -1,9 9,3
I960 6,0 -5,3 47,2
1981 -14,6 -6,4 20,1
1962 -12,1 -1,7 -28,9
1983 6,7 n.a. -36,2
Source: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1984.
However, from 1982 the non-oil LDCs were able to effect a drastic 
decline in their trade deficit owing to an 11,5 per cent cutback in 
imports - the only time that imports have declined in any year since 
1960. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 6.1, LDC debt had assumed 
alarming proportions by the end of 1982. Furthermore, it was not 
only the non-oil developing countries that were affected. A number 
of OPEC countries, notably Venezuela, as well as non-OPEC oil 
producing nations, notably Mexico, featured prominently among the 21 
most Indebted LDCs. These countries had been among the most 
creditworthy during the sharp run-up in the oil price in 1979 and 
198Q. However, the subsequent decline in oil prices and the cutback 
in world oil demand during the recession placed a question mark over 
the ability of these countries to service their foreign debt.
6.3 Quantifying the Debt Crisis
It has been pointed out that the accumulation of a large quantity of 
external debt and the running of sizeable current account deficits 
need not, in itself, be undesirable.7 it is natural for a country
In its development phase Co be a net borrower because .tntemelly- 
geaerated savings are unlikely to be sufficient to provide the funds 
needed fot extensive development projects. For example, for many 
years between 1870 and 1890, the US ran large current account 
deficits and accumulated a large external debt averaging over 300 per 
cent of exports during the last five years of this period. Interest 
payments on these debts amounted to between 10 and 15 per cent" of 
exports. Such ratios were well above chose recorded by most LDCs 
during the past two decades.
There is no simple answer to the question ; how much should a country 
borrow and how much should banks lend to a particular country? 
However, it ia crucial for the lender to know whether the borrowing 
country will be able to rep»y the debt, or will be able to refinance 
it on terms agreeable to both lender and borrower. More 
specifically, some standardised means should be available to the 
lender to gauge whether the borrowing country is a high risk. 
'Country risk' may be defined as the possibility that sovereign 
borrowers of a particular country may be unable or unwilling to 
fulfill their foreign obligations for reasons beyond the usual risks 
which arise ia relation to all lending.® Ihe idea behind this 
definition is that there may br no legal redress against a foreign 
borrower that chooses to renege on its external obligations and that, 
whereas private secror borrowers are subject to legal process, they 
may be prevented from obtaining the necessary foreign exchange fo 
service their foreign debt.
Various measures of country risk have been compiled and have received 
particular attention since the spate of LOG debt rescheduling 
recently. For example, the Swiss Bank Corporation's (SBC) approach 
to country risk assessment ia baaed on both qualitative and 
quantitative characteristics.9 ihe qualitative assessment consists 
of a standard form which examines political, economic, external debt 
and trade statistics in report form. The quantitative assessment 
considers a variety of indicators - 20 in all of which eight are 
ratios - each observed for a period of five years. Forecasts are 
also made. Each of the eight ratios - such as debt-to-exporcs and 
international reserves-to-imports - is accompanied by a 'critical 
level' which, if exceeded, indicates that a potentially serious debt 
problem may be building up.
Novnsad believes that economic considerations applicable to foreign 
debt should be divided into three categories:
1. Factors that are fairly well, known or can be predicted with some
accuracy.
2. Factors that are more difficult to project accurately but on 
which acceptable assumptions may be possible,
3. Factors that are most resistant to accurate measurement and 
projection.10
The first group would include amortisation and interest payments on 
outstanding debt. The second would include factors such as the 
’compressibility’ of imports i.e. the ability to reduce imports in 
response to a foreign exchange crisis. The third group would include 
sudden fluctuations in export receipts owing to, say, a xorld 
recession of unexpected intensity.
Such distinctions are useful because they identify the inherent 
inability to pin down exactly the point at which a 'debt crieia’ 
should be triggered. The markets frequently respond in a way that
cannot be anticipated by any specific set of variables, either
qualitative or quantitative.
Roberts distinguishes between the 'economic' aspects of the LHC debt 
burden and the ’financial' aspects.11 The economic burden results 
from reduction of goods available for domestic use when interest and 
■amortisation payments are made. So long as borrowers receive more in 
n.sw loans than they pay out for debt servicing, the economic burden 
should not present problems. Ideally, the loan should be directed 
into productive sources so as to generate sufficient proceeds to 
service it. Thus one important measure of the state of the economic 
burden for a country is the ratio of external debt to GDP.
The financial burden refera to the need to acquire and maintain 
sufficient foreign exchange to make the debt service payments. If 
foreign exchange earnings and reserves are inadejuste, a liquidity
crisis can develop, forcing sharp reductions of imports, output, and 
conauaptloa even though the longer run economic burden may be low. 
Ihe most commonly used iudicater of longer-run financial 
vulnerability is the debt~servi.ee ratio i.e. the ratio of the 
country's debt service to exports.
6.4 Current Measures of the Debt Crisis
Recent work published by Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. (MST) makes use of 
a number of variables for quantifying the magnitude of iebt crisis. 
She most Important of these are:
(i> the ratio of external debt to exports;
(ii) the ratio of debt service to exports.
As can be seen in the case of aach ratio MST uaea exports as the 
denominator. While some analysts assert chav external debt should be 
measured relative to GMP, MST contends that exports should be used on. 
the grounds that external debt oust be serviced in foreign exchange, 
rather than local currency. Hence, exports are more relevant for 
measuring debt servicing capacity and vulnerability to liquidity
problems, especially in LDCs prone to inappropriate exchange rate 
policies and restrictions on trade and capital flows.^
For each of these ratios M3T has compiled a threshold level based on 
historical precedent as a guide to the potential for the LDC, tc 
which the ratio is applied, to reschedule foreign debt. For example, 
in the case of the ratio of external debt to exports, known as the 
debt-export ratio, virtually every country whose ratio climbed above 
200 per cent at one time or another has been forced to reschedule 
portions of its debt. As a means to recei-lsx an early warning for 
potential rescheduling MGT sets the threshold level for the debt
export ratio at 160 per cent.^
It appears that the debt-export ratio can be substituted for the 
debt-ONP ratio used by Roberts as an Indicator of the economic burden 
of LDC debt. For the 21 major 1DC borrowers as a group, the ratio of 
debt to exports rose from 125 per cent in 1980 to nearly 160 per cent 
in 1982 - well above the threshold level (see Table 6.6),
nxu 6.6
21 MAJOR BORROWERS - DEBT-EXPORT RATIO - 1982
Ladn America 270
Argentina 375
Brazil 345
Chile 295
Colombia 188
Ecuador 232
Mexico 268
Peru 258
Venezuela 157
Asia 99
Indonesia 114
Korea 121
Malaysia 61
Philippines 233
Taiwan 33
Thailand 119
Middle Eaet & Africa 172
Algeria 106
Egypt 241
If>roel 235
Ivory Coast 252
Morocco 264
Nigeria 65
Turkey 238
Source: De VSies, R. Morgan International Tables & Charts, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co., 'nrk, November, 1983, p.6.
For Latin American couu e even higher - to 270 per cent -
and in the specific caset. ..sntina and Brazil - to 375 and 345
per cent respectively. Over the same psriod there was a sharp
reversal of the economic fortunes of Latin American economies. In 
the case of Argentina real GDP growth contracted from an annual 
average of 4,3 per cent in 1979/60 to minus 6 per cent 1961/Z. For 
Brazil the comparable GDP growth figures were 7,3 and minus 1,7 pec 
cent. Clearly the economic burden of external debt became too great 
for these countries once the debt-export ratio rose significantly 
above the threshold level, and severe economic contraction was the
In terms of measuring the financial burden of debt MAT have set the 
threshold level for the debt service-export ratio at 65 per cent. 
(Debt service in this case is defined as the interest on gross debt 
plus all maturing debt including amortisation of medium- and 
long-term debt and all short-term debt). For the 21 major LDC 
borrowers this ratio also rose above its threshold level over the 
period I960 to 1964 (see Table 6.7) In the case of the Latin 
American group it had reached 138 per cent by 1962 - more than double 
the threshold level. Once again, the countries with the highest debt 
service ratios were Argentina (203 per cent) and Brazil (155 per 
cent) at the end of 1982. The lukewarm response of international 
banka to requests from theae countries for more foreign credit 
signifies that the financial burden of their external debt became too
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TABLE 6.7
21 MAJOR BORROWERS - DEBT SERVICE RATIO - 1982
Latin America 
Argentina
Colombia
Ecuador
Mexico
Venezuela
Asia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
22
Thailand 63
'ddle East & Africa JZ
Algeria
133
Ivory coast 81
Morocco 56
Nigerifl
Turkey
Sourcet Be Vries, R, Morp a^ International Tables & Charts. Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Co., y# Volk, November, 1983, p.6.
1
m
155
120
91
J l
119
6.5 Early Warning System
?or all their usefulness in examining the extent of the debt crisis 
the ratios, threshold levels, vulnerability Indicators etc. developed 
by banks and economists i ive failed In recent years to generate 
adequate alarm among both borrowers and lenders as to the 
serviceability of LDC debt.
Data from Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. indicate that the debt-export and 
debt service ratios began to exceed their threshold levels in 1975 
and that, despite a slight correction between 1978 and 1980, have 
remained above these levels ever since.*5 Indeed, from 1976 the 
external debt of the major Latin American borrowers continued to rise 
at a very rapid rate and only started to decelerate from 1981 
(see Table 6.8).
TABLE 6.8
GROWTH OF TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT OF MAJOR 
LATIN AMERICAN BORROWERS (per cent per annum)
19S1 - 82
Argentina 28,1 19,4
24,6 14,3
16,2 24,0
Colombia 15,1 12,1
Ecuador 45,2 18,4
Mexico 21,9 26,9
Peru 8,0 9,0
Venezuela 40,9 12,9
Sources World Financial Markets. June 1983, p.3.
In effect, while hindsight and experience bring to the surface the 
factors which should be taken into account in making loans to LDCs, 
there has been no universally observed principle for assessing debt 
situations. It appears futile to search for a magic early warning
sigaal - some point beyond which no further credit will be extended. 
Thia could even have adverse effects because it would trigger off a 
chain of loan retractions leading to a full-scale debt criBiB,
Ne'iatthalesB, few observers feel that the Eurobanks have conducted 
themselves in a prudent fashion in respect of LDC lending In recent 
years. While some defences are available to the banks (specifically, 
the unexpected severity of the recession and the exceptionally tight 
monetary policy in some of the major economies), there seems little 
doubt that Eurobanks should have exercised more caution. This is 
particularly true, in the caae of the bigger, more established 
Eurobanks. It should be added that some of the major LDC borrowers 
could also have been less prodigal.
6.6 Involvement of Banks
The exposure of international banks to LOCs ia considerable although 
only slightly over half (56 per cent) of the foreign debt of LDCs is 
owed to banks. Furthermore, bank lending to LDCs does not emanate 
exclusively from Eurocurrency banks although the moat widely 
publicised category of bank lending to LDCs is in the form of 
publicly announced Eurocurrency bank credits. Table 6.9 shows the 
amount of foreign debt owed to banka by the 21 major LDC borrowers at 
the end of 1982. Of the $319 billion owed to banks, 37 per cent was 
owed to US banks and the balance to non-US banks.
TABLE 6.9
21 MAJOR LDC BORROWERS 
EXTERNAL DEBT OWED TO BANKS - 1982
$ Billions
69,7
Mexico 62,9
Venezuela 27,5
Argentina 25,7
23,2
Philippines 12,6
11,6
Indonesia 9,9
Algeria 8,5
Nigeria 8,5
Colombia 7,1
Israel 6,7
Malaysia 6,6
6,6
5,4
Thailand 4,9
Egypt 4,9
Turkey 4,7
Ecuador 4,5
Morocco 3,9
Ivory Coast 3,4
Source: De Vrlee, R, Morgan International Table* & Charts> Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co., New York, November, 1983, p.4.
Since 1975 the growth of bank lending to all LDCs has averaged 
slightly over 20 per cent per annum; for the major LDC borrowers the 
average has been even higher - 25 per cent per annum.16 This 
growth has been far in excess of the growth in the banks' 
shareholders equity. For example, it is claimed by the American 
Banker that the 10 largest banking holding companies in the US had 
investments amounting to 169 per cent of equity in 'problem plagued'
countries^  A broader measure estimated the equity capital of the 
world's top 100 banka at $160 billion while outstanding bank debts of 
Latin American countries alone exceeded $200 billion.1®
There Is a widely uaed indicator that banks can apply to their own 
lending activities aa a measure of the extent of the build-up of LDC 
external debt, rather than to rely on geueral indicators concerning 
the countries themselves. This indicator is known as the capital 
ratio - the ratio of capital to assets. The primary function of bank 
capital is to act as a risk cushion against unforseen and unexpected 
losses.Banks amass capital through retained earnings out of 
profits and the generation of capital enables the extension of new 
credit to a multiple of the capital accu ated.
A study by Davis showed that the leverage of the 40 Eurobanks 
investigated ranged widely - from 3:1 to 22:1. Leverage wes defined 
as total deposits divided by total capital funds', including 
subordinated debt and non-specific reserves. However, the chief 
executives of the banka concerned felt that a ratio of 15:1 was the 
most appropriate.2® In the case of US banks (data on bank capital 
for other countries are not comparable to those for US banks) the 
growth la lending to LDCb has far outstripped the growth of their 
capital. Since the mid-1970s the major US banks have accumulated 
capital at only around 9 to 10 per cent per annum.^ Federal 
Reserve Board data showed that by mld-1962 credits to the three 
larger Latin American borrowers, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, 
constituted about 113 per cent of the total capital of the nine 
largest US banks. 2^ clearly these banks and their stockholders, if 
not the entire international monetary system, are overly dependent on 
the continued health and prosperity of only a few countries.
6.7 Eurobank Mistakes
Although at least p&rt of the deterioration of the LDC debt ratios 
can be accredited to uaforaeen economic developments such as the 
severe international economic recession and high real interest rates, 
it still appears that the Eurobanks have been guilty of excessive 
risk-taking. There have been a number of reasons for the complacent 
attitude of the Eurobanks.
Firstly, it has been a widely-held view that the banks and their 
depositors could rely on the prospect of central bank lender-of-last- 
resott facilities in the event of a major run on Eurobanks following 
an LDC debt default. Although the world's major central banks agreed 
in Basle in 1975 to go to the aid of banks within their area of 
jurisdiction which might find themselves in difficulty, the collapse 
of Banco Ambrosiano in 1962 exposed weaknesses in the agreement, the 
Bank of Italy declined to take responsibility for Banco Ambrosiano1 a 
foreign interests which were grouped in a Luxembourg holding 
company. 2he Luxembourg Banking commissioner also rejected 
responsibility on the grounds that Banco Ambrosiano Holding was a 
holding company and not a bank. Btese examples show that it is by no 
means certain that offshore banks can rely on central bank support.
Secondly, the competitive nature of the Eurocurrency market has 
caused an erosion of discipline in international lending. While the 
cost of funds to the banks has been broadly equalised, lending has 
been based on differing perceptions of risk and the more cautious 
banks have come under increasing pressure to match competitive 
lending rates in order to retain market share, furthermore, loans 
extended to LDCs before their credit standing deteriorated have 
become more and more risky as a result of aggressive lending by more 
recent participants in the offshore banking system.
Thirdly, there have been a number of misconceptions coo.cem.ing bank 
lending to LDCs. One argument is that countries cannot go bankrupt. 
Although this is technically true, the corollary is also truer that 
countries are less likely to exercise prudential self-restraint in 
their borrowing activities. Another misconception is the belief that
by syndicating bank lending, banks reduce their Individual exposure 
to default risk Co a minimum. However, as there is no secondary 
market for LDC debt the banka have been effectively forced to 
participate in further loans to LDC borrowers which have become 
overborrowed. 2he banks have also argued that by spreading their 
lending among a wide range of LDC borrowers they have diversified the 
Tiek of an LDC default - the assumption being that the economic 
performance of LDCs is sufficiently uncorrelated for such risk- 
spreading to be effective. However, recent developments have shown a 
relatively high degree of systematic risk in LDC lending: for
example, the bulk of LDC bank loans have been in the form of floating
rate dollar debt and thus dependent on the performance of the US
dollar and US interest rates.
Eurobanks have also erred in the assumption that short-term lending 
provides protection against country risk. After 1979 there was a 
significant rise in the ratio of LDC short-term debt to exports. MGT 
estimates the threshold level of this ratio to be 30 per cent and yet 
by 1982 the ratio for ' LDCs was wore than 60 per cent and for
Latin American countr ./<•' over 100 per cent.^ par from being
able CO withdraw sht ■ • credit facilities on maturity, the
Eurobanks have been forc&a to extend an even greater volume of 
short-term credit to LDCs with mounting debt-service difficulties.
These misconceptions have led Eurobanks to grant extensive credit to 
LDCs without subjecting them to the same degree of prudential
security that they apply to corporate borrowers. Until the Polish 
debt crisis, loans to sovereign borrowers rarely attracted specific 
or even general bad debt provisions except where countries had 
actually repudiated debt or 'reached the point where they were so 
fundamentally overborrowed as to make ultimate repayment
questionable.'2  ^ It has become increasingly questionable whether 
bank credit to LDC borrowers in severe difficulty should be counted 
as sssete at all. Banks have been lending troubled debtor nations 
enough for them to make interest payments which then flow right back 
into the banks' income statements. The risk for the banka is that 
these loans may never be collectible and may merely swell the LDC
debt burden, Only very recently have the results of the major US 
banking groups Incorporated a significant Increase in their loss 
reserves.25 Table 6.10 shows the lose reserve ratios for Seven 
large US banks over the past two years.
TABLE 6.10
US BANKS : RESERVES AS A PER CENT OF TOTAL LOANS
30/9/62 30/9/83
Bank of America 0,87 1,21
Bankers Trust 1,10 1,14
Chase Manhattan 1,01 1,02
Chemical 0,96 1,-17
Citicorp 0,76 0,82
Manufacturers Hanover 0,82 0,83
J.P. Morgan 1,02 1,39
Source: Business Week, 7 November, 1963, p.21
Despite this attempt at setting aside more realistic provisions it is 
clear that they would be completely inadequate in the event of any 
major repudiation of LDC debt.
6.8 LDC Mistakes
The LDCa must also shoulder some of the blame for the debt crisis. 
In particular the exchange rate policies of Latin American countries 
have caused long-term structural distortions which severely eroded 
their international competitiveness. la contrast to the 
industrialised economies which have experimented with exchange rate 
regimes since the early 1970a, Le'in American economies have 
persisted with the crawling peg regime popular in the 1960s. Their 
currencies have remained pegged to the US dollar and adjustments have 
been made only periodically by government fiat,26 The forces of 
supply and demand for foreign exchange have been permitted to exert 
little direct influence on the exchange rate.
-ate strength of the dollar since 1980 has led to periods of 
considerable overvaluation for Latin American currencies. Even in 
those economies where devaluations occur they are generally made with 
reference to a programme of demand-aanagement or an incomes policy. 
These programmes have frequently not met their targets causing a 
deterioration of the balance of payments and, ultimately, a sizeable 
further devaluation. In several Latin American countries this has 
led to a cycle of overvaluatlon-undervaluation lasting for three to 
six years.27
Among other damaging effects, these exchange rate policies have 
stimulated destabilising speculative capital flows. It has been 
estimated that between 1975 and 1983 'thousands of individuals, small 
businesses and multinational companies have shipped more than $120 
billion out of the developing countries'.^® Between 1980 and 1982 
capital flight amounting to an estimated $71 billion was measured for 
seven major debtors (Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Indonesia, Egypt, 
Philippines and Nigeria) while their foreign debt rose by $102 
billion.2^  Currency overvaluation hai\ contributed significantly to 
this problem.
In the eyes of official agencies, LDC debtors have, in general, not 
used their borrowed funds unproductively over the past decade. On 
the contrary, the record shows that most of them used external 
capital for productive investment, which sustained their growth and 
helped them increase their capacity to earn foreign exchange.^0 
Cited as an example of this is the fact that gross domestic 
Investment amongst the mlddle-lncome countries, which include the 
larger borrowers from private markets among the [.DCs, rose by an 
annual average of 7,8 per cent in 1970s. For the mature industrial 
countries the rate was only 1,6 per cent. OOP growth In the 
developing countries averaged 5,6 per cent per annum in the 1970s 
against 3,2 per cent for the industrial economies
It is difficult to determine exactly at which point foreign debc for 
the purpose of financing growth Is transformed into foreign debt 
which finances consumption. However, «s ahown in Table 6.11, G,)P 
growth in some Latin American countries slotiud dramatically in 1981/2
while their current account balances (as a percentage of exports) 
remained large.
TABLE 6.11
GDP AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES IN LATIN AMERICA
REAL GDP GROWTH 
(annual average - %)
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
(% of exports, annual)
1979/80 1981/2 1979/80 1981/2
Argentina 4,3 -6,0
7,3 -1,7
7,9 -2,6
Colombia 4,5 3,0
Ecuador 4,9 2,9
Mexico 8,7 4,5
3,5 2,3
Venezuela -0,2 0,0
Source: . World Financial Markets. October 1962, pp.3-4.
It is probably reasonable to argue that much of the sharp 
deterioration in these numbers was a consequence of the severe 
recession in the industrial economies. However, it is known that in 
1982 banks of some highly indebted LDCe raised increasing amounts of 
very short-term money through their foreign branches, using this 
money for the funding of longer-term loans to debtors at home; bank- 
co-bank deposits were therefore used to finance balance of payments 
deficits at that time.^
6.9 Controls
Calls for greater control over international bank lending have been 
more vociferous since the external debt position of Mexico reached a 
head in August 1982. One large US bank - citibank - has come in for 
special criticism for its practice of ’regulatory arbitrage1.33 
This is the practice of taking advantage of wide regulatory
disparities between different offshore jurisdictions. For example, 
the Swiss and French authorities Imposed local repotting 
requirements for foreign banks on different dates thereby opening 
the way for 1 window-dressing' operations designed to improve 
Eurobank's repotted liquidity on the relevant closing dates. In 
addition, time zone differences have enabled Citibank and other 
Eurobanks to pass positions from one centre to another overnight, 
‘In the extreme, deals could be kept off the closing books of any 
centre by passing them through successive time zones.
There are a number of organisations in existence designed to develop 
better co-operation between the world's bank supervisors. It is 
difficult to say precisely how effective these organisations are in 
supervising international banking activities. Because they lack 
regulatory powers it appears that they have been ineffective in 
coping with serious crises. The organisations ates
Groupe de Contact
Z-iia I informal club of EEC banking supervisors, formed in 1972 
to achieve closer understanding and practical co-operation between 
the banking supervisory authorities of the member states.
EEC Banking Advisory Group
This is a high-level policy-making committee, established in 1979, 
which usually meets in Brussels to advise the European Commission on 
how to harmonise the regulatory framework of the EEC Banking Systems.
' Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors
This group represents a 'dozen or so* offshore centres and first met 
in October 1980. It has agreed to establish formal arrangements for 
keeping members up to date ia practical matters such as licences 
granted and withdrawn, regulatory ctianges and alterations in 
supervisory arrangements.
Coamlsaloa of Latin American and Carribean Banking Supervisors
This group, representing 21 countries, first met in Mexico City in 
1981. Meetings are irregular and aim at exchanging information and 
discussing banking supervision techniques, mechanisms to protect 
bank deposits and inspection procedures.
Ihe Basle Committee
This is a standing committee officially entitled the 'Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices’. It was set up by 
the central bank governors of the Group of Ten Countries and 
Switzerland in 1974 to improve the co-ordination of national 
surveillance of the international banking system.
In July 1983 the Basle Committee published a revised version of the 
1975 Concordat setting out the principles governing the division of 
supervisory responsibilities between parent and host authorities 
with regard to foreign establishments of banks,^ The report 
examines ways in which supervisory gaps can be prevented, including 
gaps that arise from the existence of holding companies and 
non-banking companies within banking groups. For example, the new 
guidelines recommended that where holding companies are at the head 
of groups that include separately incorporated banks operating in 
different countries, the authorities responsible for supervising 
chose banks should endeavour to co-ordinate their supervision.^® 
The report addresses in detail the problem of which supervisory 
authorities are responsible for foreign bank branches and foreign 
bank subsidiaries as well as consortium banks.
A far more radical set of proposals for international bank 
supervision was drawn up as part of the legislation to authorise the 
US Congress to contribute an additional $8,4 billion to the 
International Monetary Fund which was passed in November 1983. 
Earlier in the year US bank regulatory authorities had put forward a 
package of measures which included tougher monitoring of country 
risk and Increased disclosure. However, the House of 
Representatives insisted on even tougher measures, particularly in
the area of apeciaJ. loss provisions. Ihe legislation requires that 
special uniform reserves be set up 'where there is a substantial 
likelihood that such debt cannot reasonably be expected to be repaid 
in accordance ■ with its original, terms and conditions without 
additional borrowing or restructuring.* (Section 404 of the 
International Recovery and Financial Stability Act).
Despite these attempts to exert greater control over international 
bank landing almost all the proposals put forward as solutions to 
the international debt crisis warn against a sharp curtailment of 
commercial bank lending to LDGs. There are good reasons for this: 
already since the Mexican rescheduling in 1962 there have been signs 
of a contraction in the Eurocurrency interbank market and of a 
withdrawal of small banks from medium-term credit syndications. 
These developments have aade each major rescheduling operation a 
nerve-wracking affair.
Ihe maintenance of interbank lines has been crucial in several of 
the rescheduling packages. These lines provide essential liquidity 
to the LDCs for financing their external trade. Withdrawal of such 
short-term credit would make it impossible for LDCs to expand their 
export markets and would also prevent the import of essential 
capital goods.
Retaining the participation of the smaller Eurobanks in medium-term 
credits to LDCs is also essential. It is estimated that some 830 
banks participated in the S6,5 billion rescue package for Brazil 
towards the end of 1983,^  The bulk of these were small banks, 
some with assets of less than 65 billion. Many of these banks have 
relatively low exposure to LDC borrowers and are reluctant to 
increase it. Nevertheless, without their participation the 
Burobanking system would be very hard-pressed to raise the necessary 
funds to keep the more heavily indebted LDCs afloat.
These two issues - the contraction of the interbank market and the 
withdrawal of small Eurobanks - illustrate clearly the dilemma 
facing International banking regulators. While there is a 
justifiable feeling of disapproval at the extent i:o which the debt
crisis has become so severe, there is also recognition that any
significant clamp-down on bank lending would only aggravate it, Ihe
interbank and sir'll bank issues show also that the market, at least 
to some extent, contains within Itself the mechanism to punish 
imprudent banking practice. Because of the distinct possibility of 
major LDG loan defaults Eurobanks have had to increase bad debt 
provisions, re-examine thelt country risk exposure estimates and,
worst of all, to make further large new credit lines available to
their worst customers.
Of the various proponents for nolutions to the debt crisis probably 
the most widely known is Mmoer de Vries of the Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company. De Vries identifies three board approaches.^® One 
approach emphasises the short-term, liquidity aspect and stresses 
the need for deflationary policies by LDCs. K ’oponents of this 
argument point out that a country's external payments position can 
improve significantly within a relatively short period following the 
adoption of appropriate adjustment policies.
A second approach regards the LDC debt crisis as essentially a 
longer-term, solvency problem. Ihe proponents of this view believe 
that LDC austerity programmes will generate too much socio-political 
strain. Iftey favour a programme of economic expansion amongst 
developed countries along with a writing off and/or transfer of LDC 
debt to new institutions.
De Vries finds that both of these approaches are too risky, ftte 
first proposal, entailing LDC deflationary policies, can be 
successful for a single country but the current crisis has involved 
significant numbers of important participants in world trade. I$ve 
LDCs constitute a sizeable market for developed country products, 
accounting for nearly 40 per cent of US exports and 28 per cent of 
OECD exports.^ Prolonged and generalised contraction in LDC 
growth would have severe ripple effects for the expansion of world 
trade. There can also be political constraints on a country's 
ability to implement adjustment programmes. In particular it 
remains to be seen whether political stability in Argentina and
Brazil can be maintained under the austerity programmes they have 
agreed to with the IMF.
The second proposal, Involving expansionary developed country 
policies and the writing off of LDC debt, would also not be
satisfactory. It contains the danger of a resurgence of 
international inflation.* reduced at great cost so fat in the 1980b
end would also severely affect the profits of Eurobanks and hence
their willingness to lend to LDCs.
De Vries advocates a third approach which 'takes positive elements 
from the two former approaches and strives for a more careful 
balance between adjustment and financing.This approach 
recognises five essential elements. Firstly, there needs to be a 
moderate recovery in OECD economies. Secondly, considerable time is 
requir i for some LDC debtors to reduce their debt ratios to more 
acceptable levels. Thirdly, LDCs aeed to pursue restrictive demand 
management policies according to IMF guidelines in order to
guarantee participation of Eurobanks. Fourthly, an environment 
should be created in which Eurobanks are encouraged to provide 
additional finance to LDCs. Fifthly, Eurobank lending should be 
increasingly supplemented by credit from official agencies.
On the basis of these requirements, De Vries has formulated a 
base-case scenario for dealing with the international debt problem. 
Ihe base-case assumptions are:
1. Real OECD GNP growth averaging 3,5 per cent in 1984/5 and 3 per 
cent between 1985 and 1990.
2. OECD inflation not exceeding 6 per cent between 1984 and 1990.
3. A moderate decline in the effective exchange rate of the US 
dollar in 1984 and 1985.
4. A 6-month Eurodollar interest rate averaging not more than 3 per 
cent in real terms up to 1990.
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5. An oil price not exceeding $32 per barrel by 1965 and a zero 
real Increase thereafter.
6. A recovery in non-oil commodity prices auch that they regain 
about two-thirds of their decline between 1960 and 1982 by the 
end of the decade.
Under these assumptions there is relatively slow progreea towards 
better LDC debt ratios during the first couplc of years. For
example, the LDC debt-export ratio only declines from 196 per cent 
in 1963 to 166 per cent in 1965 - still above the 'threshold level' 
of 160 per cent exceeded for the first time in 1982. However, by 
1990 this ratio drclines to 123 per cent - well below the threshold 
level and equivalent to the level prevailing immediately after the 
first oil crisis. Even by 1990, however, three borrowers still have
debt-export ratios well above the threshold levels. They are
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.
Ihe De Vries base case can be criticised on many grounds s for
example, the simulations show that it is very sensitive to OECD GNP 
growth which is required to achieve a 3 per cent average rate 
between 1986 and 1990 during which time there will almost certainly 
be a downswing in the international business cycle. However, the 
exercise is extremely useful in illustrating the ponderous nature of 
the debt problem. Even with the relatively optimistic assumptions 
of the base case, LDCs as a group will be required to make negative 
net financial transfers (I.e. suffer a contraction in net capital 
inflows) for the remainder of the decade and beyond. Furthermore, 
the buse-caae scenario only works if there is considerable 
co-ordination between Eurobanks and official lending agencies and a 
very disciplined approach to economic policy by the major LDC 
debtors. These requirements will sorely test the structure of the 
international monetary system as well as the socio- political fabric 
of some of the major LDC debtors.
In aiming for a finely-tuned balance between continued financing for 
LDCs and long-term LDC adjustment policies the baae-caae strategy 
highlights the long-term nature of the LDC debt problem (which, in
reality, commenced In the early 1970s and was not properly attended 
to until 1982) as well as the global co-operation required to 
prevent international financial chaos. If the problem is seen in 
this broader context it is clear that mpvea to control international 
bank lending must be conducted with caution.
6.10 Conclusion
Although at least part of the responsibility resides with the LDCs 
themselves, it cannot be denied that Eurobanks were irresponsible in 
their lending activities to LDCs during the latter part of the 1970s 
and the early 1980s. Even the shift to excessively tight monetary 
policies in the industrialised countries and the severe recession, 
high interest rates and overvalued US dollar which followed cannot 
fully exonerate the Eurobanks for blame for the so-called 
international debt crisis. However, calls for controls over 
international bank lending which ignore the need for long-term 
co-operation between banks, official agencies and the debtor 
countries will only cause a further deterioration in the 
international monetary system.
CHAPTER 6 
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CHAPTER 7
GOLD, THE EUROCURRENCY M&RXET AMD THE PEST CRISIS
7.1 Introduction
The idea has been formulated in previous chapters that the 
development of the US dollar since World War II as the major currency 
for international transactions baa been desirable because a single 
world currency can reduce the uncertainty and Improve the efficiency 
of international financial transfers. The rapid expansion of 
economic activity over the past 35 years created the need for 
extensive international money markets - a need which was satisfied by 
the emergence and growth of the Eurocurrency market which played a 
major part in promoting the role of the dollar in international 
finance.
However, until 1979 the US authorities were unable or unwilling to 
follow the combination of monetary and fiscal discipline necessary to 
sustain the confidence of the international community in the US 
dollar. Ever since 1979 when a policy of strict monetary policy was 
inf Mated and, for the most part, adhered to, there have still been 
doubts concerning the future role of the dollar in the international 
monetary syiitea.
These doubts stem partly from continuing fears concerning US domestic 
economic policies and partly from anxiety concerning the stability of 
the Eurocurrency market. Currently, fears concerning US domestic 
economic policy are centred on the inability of the authorities to 
cope with the dilemma of large Federal budget deficits and growing 
trade and current account deficits.
As for the Eurocurrency market, it has for more than a decade been so 
large that it has acted as the predominant medium for destabilising 
international short-term capital flows in response to exchange rate 
uncertainties. Here the market's role has been passive in the sense 
that it has provided the means but has not been the underlying cause 
for speculation In foreign exchange markets. However, the
Eurocurrency market hae also played a more active role in that ite 
own Internal mechanism has contributed to Instability In the 
International financial syuteoa. It has achieved this through the 
process of increasing tbe International velocity of money (discussed 
In Chapter 5) and providing the facility for excessive bank credit to 
LDCs (discussed In Chapter 6). Again it was argued In Chapter 4 that 
the Eurocurrency market could even have been prevented from carrying 
out this more active destabilising role If the US monetary 
authorities had practised more responsible monetary policies.
There Is no doubt that the US dollar is etill vulnerable to a 
substantial loss of confidence which could cause International 
investors, traders and central banks to ditch the currency for other 
avenues of Investment. Despite the fact that gold bullion is no 
longer officially the centrepiece of Che international monetary 
system it is still regarded as an important store of value and at 
least part of any funds seeking alternatives to the US dollar will 
probably find their way into the gold markets.
This chapter discusses the recent history of the role of gold in the 
international monetary system, and considers the factors influencing 
the very sharp rise in the gold price during the 1970s. Movements in 
th.9 gold prise have frequently been very volatile, reflecting the 
uncertainty and changing expectations of participants in the 
financial markets. Ihe economic policy of the US provided the 
motivation and the Eurocurrency market the means for this volatility.
7.2 End of the Cold-Dollar System
During the 1960s the international monetary system came under 
Increasing pressure because the growth in the value ol world reserves 
was inadequate to meet the need for international liquidity. Graph
7.1 illustrates the extent to which the nominal growth in 
international tfade (exports and imports) outstripped the growth in 
international liquidity between 1954 and 1970. Throughout this 
period, what growth did occur in international reserves was accounted 
for mainly by US dollars - the dominant reserve currency - for the 
official price of gold was held at $35 per ounce until 1971.
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This does not mean the gold was not an Important component of 
international reserves. On the contrary, throughout the period until 
1970, the value of gold reserves exceeded the value of foreign 
currency reserves, although the ratio declined sharply between 1954 
and 1970. The international monetary system was based on a de facto 
gold-dollar standard.
Unfortunately, two factors prevented gold from playing its proper 
role under such a gold-dollar standard. Firstly, the amount of newly 
mined gold available each year was not sufficient (once fabrication 
and private investment demand were satisfied) in combination with the 
growth in the US dollar component of world reserves to natch the need 
for international liquidity. Although the physical stock of gold in 
international reserves did rise (from 992 million ounces in 1954 to a 
peak of 1 194 million ounces in 1965 - or some 20 per cent) it has 
been shown (in Graph 7.1) that international reserves were still 
inadequate.
GRAPH 7.1
WORLD TRADE' S RESERVES
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"reserves (Inc gold at market prices)
Source: International Financial Stats,
Secondly, despite the obvious need for a rise in the dollar price of 
gold, the US authorities successfully prevented this solution from 
being implemented. Ibere were numerous reasons for this. One was 
that President J.F. Kennedy during his election campaign in 1960 
pledged that he would not raise the price if elected following a 
surge in the market price of gold during the campaign. Owing to a 
narrow victory the Kennedy Administration was reluctant to embark on 
any monetary experiments.^
Another argument was that the main gold producers were South Africa 
and USSR. Owing to their political status the US was reluctant for 
them to benefit from a rise in the priced other arguments were 
that it was wrong for gold speculators to benefit from a rise in the 
gold price and that only the richer countries holding gold reserves 
would benefit so that the US would be breaking faith with countries 
holding dollar reserves.^
The rigidity of the stance of the US la clearly summed up in Table
7.1 which shows the physical volume and value (in SDRs) of world gold 
reserves and the ratio of the value of gold reserves to the value of 
foreign exchange reserves held internationally.
TABLE 7.1
RATIO OF THK VALUE OF WORLD GOLD RESERVES 
TO THE VALUE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
Ratio of Value 
of Gold Reserves 
World < jld Co Value of
Reserves Value (SDR Billions) Foreign Exchange
(m Qz) End of Period Reserves
1954 34,8 2,1
1955 35,1 2,1
35,8 2,0
1957 37,1 2,2
1958 37,9 2,2
1959 37,8 2,4
1960 38,6 2,1
1961 38,9 2,0
1962 1 119 39,2 2,0
1963 1 149 40,3 1,8
1964 1 163 40,9 1,7
1965 41,9 1,8
1966 41,0 1,6
1967 39,6 1,4
1968 46,4 1,4
1969 39,2 1,2
1970 39,5 0,9
Sources laternationaL Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1983.
Ihe attitude of the US created a major obstacle for the effective 
operation of the gold.-dollar standard. Aa shown In Chapter 4 by I960 
the dollar shortage of the 1950a had become a dollar 'overhang*, I.e. 
the ratio of US external liquid liabilities to US holdings of 
international reserves fell below unity after declining steadily 
throughout the 1950a (see Table 4.1). The need for US dollars to 
provide liquidity for the rapid increase in international economic
activity was not in question. The problem was that fears started 
growing that the US would ultimately be unable to guarantee the 
conversion of foreign-held dollars for gold. Iheae fears gathered 
strength during the second half of the 196Ds as the US inflation rate 
rose and the US balance of payments came under Increasing pressure.
Sie international monetary system was confronted with a major 
dilemma. It needed International reserves to grow more rapidly but 
it could not sustain a rapid accumulation of US dollars alone because 
of nmmting uncertainty concerning that currency's stability.
Adequate harmony between the two components of the gold-dollar system 
was lacking. In the eyes of Dome analysts the only solution to the 
weakness of the system was a rise in the price of gold. It was the 
value of the growth in gold reserves that had to be kept in harmony 
with the growth in tha value of dollar reserves.*
Matters came to a head towards the end of the 1960s. At the start of 
the decade (In November 1961) the central banks of the United Kingdom 
and six continental countries joined the US n supplying the gold 
needed to keep the market price of gold near to $35 per ounce. The 
US' share in this 'Gold Saol* was 50 per cent. Although in its early 
phase the Gold Pool wca cble. to operate as a net buyer of gold (owing 
partly to Russian sales) ay the mid-19£Za the price of gold was again 
being held down ir- offilalal sales. Following the sterling 
devaluation in late 3367 demand for gold rose strongly and by March 
1968 the Cold Pool participants were forced to suspend the sale of 
gold to the markets. The Gold Pool came to act end and a two-tier 
market was established: site $35 per ounce prSza whs effective for
official transactions but: the open market ptljcs «att left to supply 
and demand.
The gold price made little headway during the three years following 
the breakdown of the Gold Pool - averaging $4$,09 in 1969, $35,94 in 
1970 and $40,80 in 1971. Part of the reason far this was steady 
selling of gold by South Africa because of balance of payments 
difficulties. Other reasons included the activation of the scheme to 
issue Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as an alternative source of
international reserves and the agreement at the end of 1969 between 
the IMF and South Africa to put a floor of $34,9 per ounce on the 
price of South African sales.-*
The inevitable consequence of the refusal by the US to revalue gold 
eventually occurred during the third quarter of 1971. On 15 August, 
President Nixon formally suspended the convertibility of the dollar 
into gold and the foreign exchange markets closed for a week. The 
announcement had been preceded by periods of furious selling of the 
dollar and massive flows of short-term foreign capital into the 
Deutschmark. There were two sound economic reasons behind the run on 
the dollar. The first was the deterioration in the US trade balance 
from 1965. Table 7.2 shows the trade balance as a percentage of 
gross national product between 1960 and 1971 when it moved into 
deficit for the first time in the post-war period. The second was 
the acceleration in US inflation after 1965. The annual inflation 
rate between 1960 and 1971 measured by the consumer price index is 
also shown in Table 7.2.
TABLE 7.2
UNITED STATES TRADE BALANCE AND INFLATION i 1960 - 1971
Trade Balance Annual Inflation
X of QNP Rate (CPI) - X
0,1 1,5
1,1 1,1
0,8 1,1
0,9 1,2
1,1 1,3
0,7 1,6
0,5 3,1
0,5 2,8
0,1 4,2
0,1 5,4
0,2 5,9
-0,3 4,3
Source; International Financial Statistics, Yearbook. 1983.
These two economic fundamentals finally undermined confidence In 
che US dollar ao that despite its pivotal role in international 
monetary transactions, international asset holders were forced to 
seek alternative havens. In the decade which followed the official 
demise of the gold-dollar system, the gold price rose to a peak (in 
1980) that was about twenty times higher than the official price in 
1971. (It should be noted that the official price of gold was set 
at $38 per ounce at the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971). 
toe following section of this chapter attempts to identify the 
various factors that have influenced the market price of gold since
Gold Price Unleashed
From 1972 the aarket price of gold rose sharply reaching an average 
of $64,9 during the fourth quarter compered with 643,6 a year 
before - a rise of 49 per cent.6 The price continued to rise in 
1973 and 1974 eventually reaching a peak of $183,9 in December 1974 
(monthly average). Thereafter the price subsided radically to only 
$109,9 In August 1976. Ihen followed another spectacular bull 
market with the price rising to over $600 in January 1980. The 
price then collapsed to a level of $315,9 in June 1982. She 
movement in the gold price between 1972 and 1982 can be correlated 
quite closely with four economic variables: the US inflation rate, 
the trade weighted US dollar exchange rate, the US business cycle 
and real, after-tax US interest rates. The next four sub-sections 
expand on these four influences on the gold price. The following 
section considers the behaviour of the gold price after mid-1982.
7.3.1 United States Inflation
Graph 7.2 shows the close relationship between the direction 
of movement as well as peaks and troughs between US inflation 
and the dollar price of gold. A peak in US inflation 
occurred in December 1974 (12,3 percent) simultaneous to the 
peak in the gold price. Inflation then declined, reaching a 
trough (4,7 percent) two ye&ts later in December 1976 - only 
a few mouths after the trough in the gold price. The next 
peak in United States inflation occurred In March 1980 (14,8 
percent) only two months after the peak in the gold price.
GOLD PRICE vs U.S. INFLATION
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Sources: Consolidated Boiafields, London and IMF, Washington.
It was only during the second half of 1982 chat this 
relationship appeared to break down - desoite a further 
decline in US inflation to a trough of 2,4 percent In July 
1983, the gold price ran initially to a peak of 6491,1 in 
February 1983 before declining to below $400 again by the end 
of 1983. It ia maintained that despite this apparent 
severing of the link between the gold price and US inflation 
over this brief period the relationship between the two still 
bolds. This period ie discussed in more detail in Section 
7.4.
Although a sere visual correlation between gold and US 
inflation is simplistic there can be little doubt that 
holders of wealth will seek out those assets which retain 
their value in an inflationary environment. Although gold 
bullion bears no interest, indeed physical gold incurs a 
storage cost, it is still regarded as an important investment 
alternative in an environment in which national currencies 
are debased by pet .stent price increases. For one thing, 
gold is not the liability of any issuer as are monetary 
assets and therefore offers the holder an independent store 
of -wealth.
This relationship between the gold price and US inflation is 
widely recognised by investment analysts and receives 
prominent attention in numerous newsletters and analysts' 
reports which recommend gold and other precious metals to 
clients. For example, in a recent article Gonrie stated that 
after 1968 when the US dollar was increasingly depreciated 
through excess monetary growth, the price of gold denominated 
in US dollars came to stand as a proxy for the world's 
reserve currency and the final arbitor of the real value of 
goods in an inflationary world. 'In turn, the rise and fall 
of US inflation has also come to be seen as a proxy for the 
ghastly after-effects of bouts of US credit creation and 
thus, depreciation of the real value of the US dollar. In 
that environment, since 1968 the price of gold has tracked 
and usually lead movements in US inflation with a great 
degree of accuracy'.*
The concept of gold as the ' final arbitor of the real value 
of goods in an inflationary world' dates back to the era of 
the gold standard. The mechanism of the gold standard can be 
analysed using the instruments of the quantity theory of 
money. The basic identity MV-PQ showed how an increase in 
the money supply, M, owing to an inflow of gold would raise 
the price level, P, (given velocity, V) and the level of 
output, Q, resulting in a deficit on the balance of trade. 
This necessitated an outflow of physical gold in settlement 
which reversed the initial inflow. Under such a system there 
was a tendency towards stable prices in the long run and 
hence, long run protection for the national currency.
Although there is considerable doubt as to whether the gold 
standard which wae in operation during the latter part of the 
19th century and the early part of this century really 
operated in this way at all, the system has still had its 
adherents in recent years.8 Reea-Mogg maintains that a 
government which goes on gold makes a statement to its people 
that in future the nation will have to earn its money, that 
government and individuals will have to pay their way in the 
world in the hardest of hard currencies, and that the money 
supply will be limited.*
Although the gold standard era le long past with little 
prospect of being resurrected, gold Is clearly still the 
currency of final resort which acts as the watchdog against 
monetary mismanagement in international finance. Ibis is 
particularly true in relation to the dollar which, as the 
world's numeraire needs the most careful management of all. 
In the era since the demise of the Brettor. Woods system the 
Eurocurrency market came to maturity enabling international 
asset-holders rapid access to alternative investment 
instruments. At such a level of sophistication it is little 
wonder that movements in the gold price have quickly 
reflected inflationary trends in the US.
7.3.2 Ihe United States Dollar Trade Weighted Exchange Rate
A further factor which could explain the rise in the gold 
price since 1972 is the performance of the US dollar against 
other investment media. ' Underlying this assertion is the 
fact that there are a limited number of alternative 
investment vehicles available to international investors. 
These include a few national currencies such as the 
Deutschmark or the Japanese yen, precious and other metals 
ouch as gold and a variety of other assets such as valuable 
carpets, stamps, etc.
At times when the fundamental value of the dollar is 
threatened by accelerating inflation or a deteriorating trade 
balance, international investors tend to shift a portion of 
their dollar holdings into these alternatives. This causes 
the relative value of the dollar to decline.
A decline in the dollar is reflected in its value measured 
against a basket of currencies. Ihe nominal effective 
exchange rate of the dollar constructed by Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company is an index of the dollar's value measured 
against the trade-weighted values of 15 other major 
currencies. Graph 7.3 shows the relationship between the
Inverse of this index and the gold price over the period 1972 
to 1982. During periods when the nominal effective value of 
the dollar has risen (a decline on Graph 7.3) the gold price 
has declined and vice-versa.
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Clearly when International investors diversify away from the 
dollar they do not Invest solely in other currencies. At 
least a portion of the funds shifted into other investment 
avenues has ended up in gold bullion.
In fact, the available investment outlets in other major 
currencies are quite limited. For example, the Deutschmark 
liabilities of Eurocurrency banks In the BIS reporting area 
to non-banka in raid-1982 amounted to only DM 27,8 billion (or 
$10,9 billion) out of total Eurocurrency liabilities to 
non-bankt. in 1982 of over $500 billion.*® in addition, 
estimates by the Deutsche Bundesbank show the Deutschmark, 
assets held in Germany by foreign entities by mld-1963 
amounted to DM 306 billion (or $117 billion).*1 However, 
more than 60 per cent of these investments had a maturity of
more than one year which indicates the limited ability of the 
domestic German financial markets to accommodate short-term foreign 
capital inflows. As it can be said that the Deutschmark is the 
second most important international investment currency after the 
dollar, albeit a very long way behind the latter. It Is clear from 
these statistics that non-dollar international currency markets are 
quite thin.12
The Japanese yen plays an even smaller role in International 
finance than the Deutschmark, For example, while the Deutschmark 
accounts for 11,6 percent of international foreign currency 
reserves, the yen accounts for only 3,9 per cent.13 Until very 
recently the Japanese monetary authorities have avoided 
liberalising the Japanese financial markets, preferring to control 
interest rates and to channel scarce capital to designated growth 
industries. Although this started to change from 1980 when formal 
foreign exchange controls were abolished and also, more recently, 
with measures such as the revision of regulations concerning 
foreign Investments in Japanese stocks, the Japanese yen has still 
continued to offer a relatively minor Investment alternative to the
The gold market Itself is also quite thin. Table 7.3 below shows 
the percentage of gold bullion supply over the period 1972 to 1982 
absorbed in fabrication demand. (Fabrication demand is defined as 
gold used in jewellery, electronics, dentistry and industrial/ 
decorative applications as well as in medals, medallions and 
coins).14
TABLE 7,3
FABRICATION DEMAND FOR GOLD
Fabrication Demand as % 
of Total Supply to tha Noa- 
Cwanunlst Private Sector
1972 109
1975 89
1976 97
1977 87
1978 92
1980 68
1981 106
Average 86
Source: Gold 1983, Consolidated Goldflelds PLC, London, 1983, p.24.
In two of the years shown above, 1972 and 1981, fabrication 
demand actually exceeded gold bullion supply indicating 
dishoarding (i.e. the sale of gold from existing stocks). In 
1982, the market value of total gold bullion supply (1 122 
metric tons) was $13,5 billion of which 95 percent or $12,9 
billion was used for fabrication.^ Clearly a relatively 
small shift in sentiment away from the US dollar in favour of 
gold would exert significant pressure on the gold price. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the movements in the 
trade-weighted value of the dollar and the gold price resemble 
each other quite closely.
7.3,3 The International Business Cycle
Although there are considerable variations, a significant 
proportion of total gold supplied to the non-communist world 
each year is used for fabrication purposes, as is shown in 
Table 7.3 above. In 1982, even excluding the manufacturing 
of medala and coins, fabrication demaad for gold accounted 
for 82 percent of total gold supply in that year„^ ® 
Because of this high proportion of gold used for 
manufacturing purposes it does not seem unreasonable to 
expect the price of gold to follow a similar trend to that of 
other commodities, especially other metals.
The prices of metals tend to follow a cyclical pattern 
determined to a great extent by the business cycle of OECD 
countries. As aggregate demand in the major industrial 
countries gains aooentuo it follows that the demend for 
commodities should rise, leading to an appreciation in their 
prices. Graph 7.4 flhows this to have been the case between 
1972 and 1982. During periods of economic downswing in 
1974/75 and 1980/82 metals prices including the gold price 
declined while during upswing phases they rose.
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7.3,4 United Statea Real Post-Tax Interest Rates
The fourth variable which had a close correlation with the 
gold price over the period 1972 to 1982 Is the real post-tax 
rate of Interest in the US. Graph 7.5 shows the relationship 
between the gold price and the real after-tax Interest rate 
in the US over the period. This variable Is derived by first 
subtracting from the US Treasury bill rate the top rate of
income tax and then subtracting the expected rate of consumer
price Inflation.1  ^ Real rates are important because they 
are thought to be particularly relevant to saving and
investment decisions. In addition, the real rate appropriate
to private saving and Investment decisions la one which takes 
account of the tax treatment of Interest. In principle, the 
pre-tax real rate la relevant only to borrowers whose 
Interest payments cannot be offset against tax, and to 
lenders whose Interest income Is not taxable.1®
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As Graph 7.5 shows, throughout the period from 1972 to 1981,
real poat-tax interest rates In the US were slgnflcantly 
negative. This meant that the tax-paying investor holding US 
dollar assets was not preserving the value of his asset,
whereas if he had switched into hard assets such as gold the
value of hie asset would have more than held its own despite
the fact that there is no yield on an investment in gold 
bullion. Conversely, the return to positive real post-tax 
interest rates in 1982 rendered gold unattractive relative to 
dollar assets.
When attention is focussed on the real return offered on a 
particular asset such as the US dollar it is not surprising 
to find that a close correlation exists between it and the 
price of gold bullion. When the dollar has offered good 
value the price of gold has weakened and vice-versa.
Pie Gold Price and the International Debt Crisis
Graph, 7.6 shows the performance of the gold price during the second
half of 1982 and the early part of 1983. During this period the
price rose from a monthly average of $316 per ounce in June 1982 to 
$491 per ounce in February 1983. Thereafter, the price declined to 
below $400 per ounce in early 1984. The sharp rise in the gold 
price during this brief period appears to have been in conflict 
with the performance of at least three of the four variables 
considered above.
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During the period June 1902 Co February 1983 the US inflation rate 
measured by the consumer price index (year-on-year basis) fell from
7,1 to 3,5 per cent and, in fact, continued to decline until the 
third quarter of 1983.^  At the same time the trade-weighted 
dollar index was static : it was 111,1 in June 1982 and 111,0 in 
February 1983, although it rose as high as 115,0 in November 
1962.20 The international business cycle was still in a 
downswing phase $ for example, the index of US industrial 
production declined from 94,4 to 94,0 over the period although it 
actually fell to a low point of 91,8 in November 1982.^
However, the fourth variable, the post-tax real US interest rate 
actually moved sharply in a favourable direction for gold over the 
period. From a level of plus 1,53 per cent in June 1982, this 
variable declined to minus 0,6 per cent in February 1 9 8 3 . This 
ia not surprising as the US Treasury bill rate declined from 12,75 
per cent in June 1982 to a low point of 7,88 per cent in February 
1983.23
Despite the slightly more favourable performance of the poat-tax US 
interest rate over this time the sharp rise in the gold price does 
appear to have been excessive. The performance of the gold price 
in the year following its rise to the $500 per ounce level in 
February 1983 appears to confirm this; at one point in early 1984 
the price fell below the 6370 per ounce level. Ihis latter 
performance was more in line with the four variables undi.r 
consideration: US inflation only started to rise slowly towards
the end of 1983; the US dollar was exceptionally strong throughout 
1983; other metal prices were virtually unchanged at the end of 
1983 from the levels recorded in the second quarter of 1982.2* 
Post-tax real US interest rates probably rose again after February 
1983 because there was littl-s expectation of a resurgence of OS 
inflation, while the Treasury bill rate reached 9 per cent at the 
end of the 1983 from under 8 per cent in February 1983.
Another development, then, is necessary to explain this 
uncharacteristic surge in the gold price. It la generally accepted 
that fears related to the international debt crisis, triggered off
by Mexico during the third quarter of 1982, were responsible.^ -* 
Although Eurobanks had been lending large sues to LDGs for a number 
of years, the closing by Mexico of its foreign exchange markets In 
August 1982 sparked off a chain of uncertainty and loss of 
confidence In the International financial system, Thera were fears 
of a breakdown In the Interbank mechanism of the Eurocurrency 
market which could have led to a widespread withdrawal 6$ 
deposits. Furthermore, there were fears of a repudiation of 
foreign debt by some of the larger debtor countries which could 
have led to a dramatic squeeze on the largest lenders In the 
Eurocurrency market. It was felt that the world's major central 
banks would prevent a full-scale collapse of the International 
banking network by pumping cash Into the system. Such a move would 
have Increased International liquidity, produced a decline in 
interest rates and ultimately an acceleration in international 
inflation, all of which would have stimulated the speculative
demand for gold.
In the event, despite some acceleration in money supply growth in 
the US and a corresponding fall in US interest rates, the collapse 
of the Eurobanklng system was averted without a rekindling of US 
and world inflation. Once the markets perceived that responsible 
action was being taken, the fears which led to the sharp 
anticipatory buying of gold abated, and with them the price of 
gold. For the time being at least, despite the problems still
confronting LDC debtors and their creditors (discussed in Chapter 
6), the intematiocal debt crisis has receded as an' Important 
determinant of Che price of gold.
As to the future prospects for the gold price much will depend on 
the willingness of the US monetary authorities to maintain a
realistic rate of return on dollar assets. This will entail
pursuing a monetary policy that is consistent with relatively Ijw 
inflation and sustained economic growth and a fiscal policy that 
does not generate excessive competition between the private ard 
public sectors for financial resources, e.-vpn*-’ , monetary policy 
appears sou&d but there la too large a gap .cween Federal spending 
and revenue. Should the authorities successfully reduce Federal
budget deficits there is every prospect that international Investor 
confidence in the US dollar will be coneolidated. Naturally the 
phenomenon of the buainesa cycle will at times cause investor 
preferences to shift away from tile US dollar at the margin, tor 
example, during a period of acceleration in US inflation. However, 
if the US authorities are sufficiently adept at harnessing money 
supply growth so aa to maintain a real rate of return on dollar 
assets such ahifte are unlikely to produce severe exchange rate 
instability.26 Under such circumstances investor demand for gold 
will be restrained ard the gold price is unlikely to rise 
substantially faster than the real rate of growth in the world 
economy.
The final section of this chapter is concerned with a brief 
analysis of the role of gold in South Africa's external accounts. 
The massive rise in the gold price since 1972 was a considerable 
bonanza for the South African economy but it has also reflected the 
instability of the international monetary system. This, in turn, 
has had important implications for South African exchange rate 
policy, a question which will be taken up in chapter 8=
7.5 Gold and the South African Balance of Payments
Although South Africa's gold output haa declined steadily since the 
early 1970s the value of that output has played a growing 
importance in the country's balance of payments. Table 7.4 shows 
South African gold mine production between 1972 and 1983 and the 
rand value of gold exports over the same period.
TABLE 7.4
South African Gold Mine Value of South African 
Production (Metric Iona) Cold Exports (Ra)
1972 910 1 161
1973 855 1 770
1974 759 2 565
1975 713 2 540
1976 713 2 346
1977 700 2 795
1978 707 3 864
1979 705 6 003
1980 675 10 141
1981 658 8 340
1982 664 8 627
1983 680 9 929
Sources: Gold Production: gold 1984 > Consolidated Gold Fields P1X, 
London, 1983, p.14.
Gold Exports t South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly 
Bulletin, various issues.
During this same period the dollar price oi" gold rose from an 
average of $58/es t» $424/oz. Furthermore, the rand-dollar 
exchange rate fell from an average of $1,29 in 1972 to only $0,90 
in 1983 Thus the average rand price of gold moved from R.45,1 
in 1972 to R.471,1 in 1983, a riae of 945 per cent.
This rapid rise in the rand gold price has, of course, encouraged 
the Bines to mine lower grades of gold-bearing ore so that not all 
of the decline in South African gold output can be explained by 
depletion of reserves.
The South African economy can be classified aa an ’open' economy. 
Over the period 1972 to 1983 total exports of goods end services 
constituted an average of 30 percent of GDP (see Table 7.5). Over 
the same period the ratio of total imports of (»ovds and services 
was 31 percent on average.
TABLE 7.5
SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE 
GOODS AMD SERVICES: X OF GDP
W o r ts
1972 26 27
1973 26 27
1974 26 32
1975 28 35
1976 28 34
1977 31 30
1978 33 30
1979 36 30
1980 37 33
1981 30 36
1982 28 33
1983 27 27
Source: South African keserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, various
The bulk of South African gold production is exported and gold 
exports play a crucial role in generating the foreign exchange 
necessary to Import the capital goods vital for the continued 
expansion of the country's industrial base. In fact, the reliance 
on gold exports has expanded since 1972 as can clearly be seen from 
Graph 7.7. In recent years the contribution of gold to total 
exports of goods and services has been between 39 and 45 per cent 
compared to a level of between 27 and 37 percent earlier. Before 
1972, for example, in the period 1963 to 1971 the average ratio of 
gold exports to total exports was 32 percent. Thus it is true to 
say of recent times that South Africa has become more heavily 
dependent on gold than at any other time in the past 20 years.
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Conclusion
During the 1960a considerable pressures built up in the 
international monetary system owing to rising US inflation and the 
deterioration in the US trade balance. This created uncertainty 
concerning the status of the US dollar as the world's numeraire. 
During this period world trade expanded rapidly and there was a 
growing need for international liquidity which could not adequately 
be met by an Increase in dollars alone. One solution which 
suggested itself was an increase in the price of gold which 
constituted a major portion of international reserves but was not 
being produced in sufficient quantity. Unfortunately this option 
was rejected. This left the international monetary system with a 
dilemma: it was becoming Increasingly reliant on the major
international reserve asset - the dollar - while economic 
fundamentals were rendering the status of the dollar increasingly 
suspect.
This dilemma was resolved in the early 1970s with the breakdown of 
the gold-dcllar standard and the fixed exchange rate system and 
thereafter followed a decade of exceptional volatility including a
• spectacular rise in the gold price. The Eurocurrency system played 
an important role during this period by providing the means for 
rapid, large-scale financial transfers.
By the early 1980s gold had assumed an even more important role in 
the South African balance of payments than in the 1960s, 
constituting around 40 percent of total exports of goods and 
services. Thus the South African economy was directly affected by 
events in the international monetary system during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. In Chapter 8 the impact of these events on the South 
African exchange rate policy will be analysed.
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CHAPTER 8
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
8.1 Introduction
During the post-war period until December 1971 only a single 
alteration in the rand-dollar exchange rate occurred - in September 
1949. However, after August 1971 when the US suspended the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold. South Africa was forced to 
re-examine ite exchange rate policy. In the years that followed 
various strategies were adopted including a managed float and 
rejection of a sterling peg in favour of the dollar. The period was 
characterised by the international movement away from fixed exchange 
rates based on the gold exchange standard to floating exchange 
rates. World comDOi'i.ty prices such as gold and oil rose 
dramatically which exerted considerable impact an tL 'th African 
balance of payments. Simultaneously, the Eurocu. . - market 
reached maturity providing the resources for rapid capital movements 
in response to changing exchange rate expectations.
Although the South African foreign exchange market was to a large 
extent insulated from direct Eurocurrency flows, the impact of these 
flows on the exchange rates of South Africa’s major trading partners 
caused the domestic monetary authorities to continually re-assess 
their exchange rate policy. Early in 1979 the evolution of South 
Africa's foreign exchange markets was taken a major step forward by 
the acceptance by the government of the recommendations of the 
Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System 
and Monetary Policy in South Africa entitled 'Exchange Rates in 
pouth Africa’.1
The report recommended, .inter alia, aa a long-term objective, the 
introduction of a market-determined flexible exchange rate far an 
independent rand subjcct to Reserve Bank management but with only 
limited tixchange control.2 it also recommended the development of 
an active ana competitive forward exchange market in South Africa.3
Ihe first section of this chapter will briefly discuss the history 
of the rand exchange rate between 1971 and 1979, followed by a 
review of the basic recommendations of the Commission. Ihe next two 
sections focus on developments in the spot and forward rand markets 
in response to these recommendations. This is followed by a 
discussion of the possible Introduction of a Eurorand market and a 
comment on future developments in the forward exchange market.
6.2 The South African Rand : 1971 - 1979
8.2.1 Pre-1971
During the post-war period until December 1971 only a .ingle 
alteration in the rand-dollar exchange rate occurred - that in 
September 1949. Thus the par value of the rand in terms of 
gold was retained throughout the period 1967 - 71 despite the 
14,3 per cent devaluation of sterling in November 1967, and 
other developments such as the two-tier gold market in 1968 
and adjustments in the exchange rates of other major 
currencies like the Deutschmark and the Swiss and French 
francs over the 1969-71 period.
South Africa was forced to re-examine its exchange rate policy 
in August 1971 when the US announced the suspension of 
dollar-gold convertibility and the exchange rates of the 
world's major currencies commenced to fluctuate. It was 
expected that the currencies of South Africa's major trading 
partners would appreciate against the dollar and this created 
uncertainty a'*out the balance of payments. Ihe reaction of 
the authorities was to adopt a temporary link with the dollar.
6.2.2 Ihe Smithsonian Agreement
On 18 December 1971 at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington 
the Group of Tea agreed on a 7,89 per cent devaluation of the 
dollar and a revaluation of the other major currencies of 
varying amounts.4 Ihe uncertainties concerning the rand had 
not been alleviated by the temporary dollar link and it
required a 12,28 per cent devaluation of the rand three days 
after the Smithsoaiaa Agreement to restore the net inflow of 
capital to the private sector. In addition the link with
sterling was restored.
6.2.3 Sterling Floats
Exchange rate speculation was extensive during the fi'.ret half 
of 1972 in international money markets as the debate on 
proposals for international monetary reform continued. Ihe 
level of uncertainty was accompanied by a rise in the price of 
gold on the free market to hitherto unprecedented levels in 
excess of $60 per ouncts.
Heavy speculation against sterling forced the UK authorities 
to allow the pound to float from 30 June 1972. Ihe South 
African authorities decided to maintain the sterling link 
because the balance of payments was still under pressure and 
economic growth was a priority.^
The floating of sterling marked a weakening in traditional 
investment links between South Africa and the UK due to the 
imposition at the time of the investment dollar premium on 
South African portfolio investments by UK residents.
8.2.4 Effective Rand Revaluation
From 25 October 1972 the rand-dollar link was re-established. 
This amounted to a 4,2 per cent devaluation in terms of gold, 
thereafter the trade-weighted exchange rate appreciated until 
early 1974 after showing a steady depreciation from 
mld-1971.6
It appears that the authorities were confident that the 
balance of payments had bean restored to a sufficiently strong 
position as there was a surplus on current account as well as 
a sustained inflow of long-term capital.
8.2.5 Another Revaluation
In early 1973, the US dollar came under presauce. During the 
fleet few days of Februaty foreign exchange activity in 
international markets was enormous, highlighted by rampant 
speculation against the dollar.
The South African authorities decided to maintain the par 
value of the rand which amounted to a noticeable revaluation 
In the trade-weighted Index. Reasons given were that the gold
and foreign exchange reserves were sound, that the economic
climate was favourable for an acceleration in growth and that 
a further depreciation was undesirable given the rate of 
inflation.^
Simultaneously, the gold price continued to move to record 
levels. The dollar devaluation failed to stop foreign
exchange speculation and in March 1973 aone of the EEC
currencies commenced to float jointly agaiob : the dollar while
other major currencies including sterling, yen and the 
Canadian dollar embarked on a policy of generalised floating. 
Since that time, the regime of floating exchange rates has 
been firmly entrenched.
8.2.6 Revaluation Again
After a period of steadiness the dollar continued to
depreciate in Hay 1973 while South Africa's gross gold and 
foreign exchanges reserves roae to record heights due to a 
particularly strong current account surplus.® The gold
price also reached a peak on the free market at this time.
The rand was revalued effectively by around five per cent on 5 
June 1973.
8.2.7 The Oil Crisis
The current account moved back into defJrlt In the last 
quarter of 1973 due mainly to the effect of the economic
upswing on imports. Ihe drastic increases in the oil price 
and the parallel appreciation of the dollar in international 
markets also o, ributed to what was to be a sharp decline in 
gold and foreign exchange reserves during 1973/74. 
Furthermore, the capital account of the balance of payments 
registered a reversal into deficit after the large surplus of 
the previous few years.
With inflation running at double figures by the end of 1973 
devaluation would have been very unwelcome. Ihe monetary 
authorities set out to remove devaluation fears and hence 
adverse speculation against the rand by following a tighter 
monetary policy.
8.2.6 Ihe Managed Float
On 21 June 1974 the authorities announced that the rand would 
be subjected to a managed float whereby small but frequent 
adjustments against tne dollar would be made according to the 
balance of payments position and domestic economic 
conditions. One of the factors leading to this policy was the 
hope that frequent adjustments of the exchange rate in either 
direction would discourage traders from taking a view on ths 
exchange rate and would hence reduce leads and lags.
Between June 21 1974 and April 4 1975, the rate was adjusted 
upwards seven times and downwards four times, the net result 
was a trade-weighted depreciation of some seven per cent.® 
The Reserve Bank maintained that the policy 'worked reasonably 
well up to March 1975'1® but Gidlow asserts that it was 
unsuccessful because the business community was soon able to 
predict exchange rate adjustments so that the policy 
effectively encouraged leads and lags.1*
It is clear that leads and lags led to the final abandoning of 
the managed float : 'On 27 June 1975 the authorities changed 
their policy of Independent managed floating because the
strengthening of the dollar and the weakening of sterling 
encouraged unfavourable leads and lags In foreign payments and
receipts'.12
8.2.9 Kand-Dollar Devaluation
At the same time that the managed flcat was terminated the 
rand was devalued by 4,76 per cent against the dollar. 
Speculation continued at this time as the dollar appreciated 
markedly and in August exchange controls were eased to 
encourage capital inflows. Monetary policy waa also tightened.
During this time the cyclical economic downswing failed to 
produce a significant improvement in the gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. The gold price was falling rapidly - a 
declina that was to continue until the third quarter of 1976 - 
and there were large private sector short-term capital 
outflows In the second *nd third quarters. The strain ott the 
reserves led to intensive compensatory financing by the 
Reserve Bank with the 'liabilities related to reserves1 
account registering substantial inflows in the same two 
quarters. The authorities reacted by devaluing the rand 
sharply by 17 >9 per cent an 11 September and they tightened 
monetary policy still further.
Ihe deficit on current account reached a low point at the 
close of 1975. However, the leads and lags prpblem again 
appeared in December as the trade-weighted value of the rand 
appreciated. In March, the Minister of Finance, announced in 
the Budget a decrease in the rate of increase in government 
expenditure and other frugal measures.
The inflow of long-term capital slowed during the first half 
of 1976 and the current account deficit remained high as 
government expenditure reacted slowly to the tight budget. 
Gold and foreign exchange reserves plummeted along with the 
gold price. Thus further measures to prop up the balance of 
payments included an increase in the Bank Elate to nine par 
cent in July and an import deposit scheme in August.
Bie internal political developments of 1976 contributed to a 
substantial o^ration on the short-term capital account.
Net outflows r'f .^ .'vrt-tero capital reached very high levels In 
the second tu-i '.ilrd quarters, The authorities were once 
again borrowers from foreign sources to support the foreign 
exchange reserves.
During 1976 the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
eventually brought about an improvement in the current 
account. This recovery was aided by a rise in the gold price 
in late 1976 and economic recovery in most industrialised 
countries which boosted exports.
During 1977 the short term capital account recorded 
substantial outflows which served to concentrate the 
authorities’ attention on balance of payments p o l i c y I t  
is likely that political factors were as important as economic 
factors as reasons behind the extensive short-term capital 
outflows from the private sector which reached alarming levels 
in 1977 and again in 1978. Indeed, a remarkable swing into 
surplus on current account aided by record gold price levels 
in 1978, complemented by a rapidly depreciating dollar between 
September 1977 and October 1978 (which led to a fall in the 
rand's trade-weighted value of 16 per cent)1* would, under 
normal circumstances have led to short-term capital inflows. 
According to the Reserve Bank, the outflow of short-term 
capital was related both to a decline in the foreign financing 
of imports and political uncertainty in Southern Africa.^ 
The decline in foreign financing was due increasingly to the 
narrowing differential between domestic and foreign interest 
rates which was reduced to zero during the second quarter of 
1978 after which the reverse differential (I.e. foreign 
interest rates exceeded domestic rates) widened rapidly.
Measures were taken to tighten exchange control in March 1977 
which affected dividend repatriation by foreign-controlled 
South African organisations and an import surcharge of 15 
percent was i m p o s e d . T h e  1978 budget Imposed further 
restrictions on dividend repatriation and transfer of 
redemption proceeds of gilts and semi-gilts by 
non-residents.^
Another measure related to the balance of payments was the 
decision to value South Africa's official gold holdings on a 
market-related basis from April 1978. This was in line with 
the new IMF Articles of Agreement which abolished the official 
price of Rold.
Late 1978 marked the publication of the proposals of the De 
Kock Commission^® which recommended a more flexible exchange 
rate regime for the rand. By that time, despite capital 
outflows, the rand was in a stronger position than at any time 
during the previous two years owing to a significant 
improvement in exports helped by a gold price at well over 
$200 per ounce.
The time was therefore ripe in early 1979 to take a major 
evolutionary step by severing the link with the dollar which 
had been in force for 41 months - the longest period of 
exchange rate fixing since the demise of Bretton Woods. This 
was done on 27 February 1979 and a new era commenced for the
De Kock Commission Report
Although South Africa only adopted a flexible exchange rate policy 
from 1979, the architect of the new policy. Dr. Gerhard De Kock, had 
shown as early as 1973 that the exchange rate system had undergone a 
radical change : "'n Moderne Rip van Vinkel wat twintig jaar gelede 
aan die slaap geraak en onlangs eers wakker geword het, sou die 
huidige wSreld van wisselkoerse nie herken ale ... die meeste 
vername geldeenhsde is tans beslg on •onwettigliV te sweef".19
I' la Interesting to note that’ De Kock regarded the adoption of 
generalised floating In 1973 as 'Illegal' in the sense that the IMF 
still supported a return to the parity system at that time. It was 
only in 1978 that the third Amendment of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement came into operation, permitting members a free choice as 
to the exchange rate regime they wished to adopt. In view of the 
history of the co-operation between the IMF and South Africa the 
eventual acceptance of fluctuating exchange rates by the IMF may 
have contributed to the timing of the Commission's recommendations 
at the end of 1978.
In the Interim Report De Kock pointed out that under the current 
international system the rand was, in effect, already floating - 
with the US dollar in terms of most other currencies - and that 
floating of one kind or another was, for the time being at least, 
inevitable for the rand.2®
Apart from the distinct need to adapt to external developments in 
the international foreign exchange markets, the Interim Report also 
identified numerous defects of the fixed exchange rate system for 
South Africa. One major defect was that changes in the country's 
balance of payments position tended to be reflected immediately in 
the level of foreign reserves held by the Reserve Bank, and not In 
changes in the exchange rate. Under conditions where the reserves 
were declining this often gave rise to serious speculative capital 
outflows, including leads and lags in foreign payments and
receipts. When the authorities attempted to defend the pegged
exchange rate which was clearly overvalued, in the opinion of the
market, speculators not only anticipated a devaluation but knew from 
experience that, when it came, it would be likely to be a fairly 
large adjustment. With such a one-way risk and such great potential 
rewards, they had every reason to speculate.21 It was felt that 
under a more flexible exchange rate system any speculative pressure 
would be borne, in part, by the exchange rate rather than the
foreign exchange reserves and thiic after a certain point speculation 
would cease.
Another important consideration in the report was tbt desire for 
more independence for domestic monetary anil fisca teles.^
Under the ayetem of a fixed rand dollar exctu *■« the
authorities frequently had to grant a lower priori L> economic
objectives of attaining satisfactory economic growth, lowering
unemployment, achieving balance of payments equilibrium and
controlling inflation in order to defend the fixed exchange rate. 
The Interim Report took the view that by adopting a flexible 
exchange rate policy greater attention could be devoted to these 
other objectives. However, it le also clearly stated that in 
attending to these other policy objectives sufficient discipline 
should be exerted such that the rand should become a strong
currency.2* Unfortunately this latter objective has not been
A further defect of the exchange rate system in operation in 1976
was that In the event of a depreciation of the rand the Reserve Bank
was exposed to large loaaee In its forward exchange book. For 
example, during the six years up to March 1978 these losses amounted 
to R1 046 million. ^  The losses were a consequence of the 
Imbalance between forward sales and forward purchases of foreign 
exchange by the Reserve Bank. For example, at the end of 1978 
Reserve Bank forward salee exceeded forward purchases by R2 500 
Billion.2® This imbalance resulted, in turn, from the fact that
while the cost of forward cover offered by the Reserve Bank was 
cheap (fixed artificially at 1 per cent for both purchases and 
sales) a major proportion of South Africa's export revenues flowed 
directly to the Reserve Bank without being covered forward in the 
foreign exchange market. Therefore, even when the exchange rate was 
perceived to be in equilibrium, Importers would tend to take out 
(cheap) forward cover but there would not be fully compensating 
sales of forward exchange by exporters. Whenever expectations of a 
devaluation emerged, the imbalance would be aggravated by leads and 
lags. Those importers still without forward cover would cover while 
exporters would completely withdraw from the forward exchange 
market. In addition to proposing a more flexible spot rate so that 
the certainty of a one-way movement in the exchange rate would be
diminished the Interim Report also recommended the development of a 
more sophisticated forward exchange market. These recommendations 
ere discussed in Section 8.5.
8.4 Steps Towards a Managed Float
Since the acceptance by the government in early 1979 of the 
recommendations of the Interim Report significant progress ties been 
made in achieving the goal of a sophisticated foreign exchange 
market in South Africa. In the spot market an evolutionary process 
of reform was put into operation immediately and numerous important 
steps had been taken by early 1981. These included i
1) the withdrawal by the Reserve Bank of fixed buying and selling 
rates previously prescribed for foreign exchange transactions;
2) the setting of limits by the Bank for the amounts authorised 
foreign exchange dealers were allowed to hold abroad;
3) the introduction of the Reuters monitor system for rapid 
dissemination of foreign exchange market information;
4) the gradual Introduction of more frequent daily adjustments in
spot foreign exchange rstes by the Bank;
5) the occasional intervention in the market by the Bank on its
own initiative;
6) the channelling of Krugerrand sales proceeds directly through
the Chamber of Mines.**'7
The following two years (up to September 1983) saw further major 
steps towards the development of a (managed) floating spot rand 
exchange rate. The most important of these included ;
1) the restriction by the Bank of its exchange rate quotations
for raad/dollar deals to authorised foreign exchange dealers 
in South Africa alone;
i increase in Khe daily adjustments of i 
a much as 30 points per day;
the scrapping of foreign exchange controls for non-re 
and, therefore, the elimination of the dual exchanj 
system which had been in operation from 1961 in one 
another;28
the channelling of the proceeds of gold bullion sales through 
the South African mining houses directly into the foreign 
exchange market. (This measure was partially reversed in 
early 1985).
With the latter two steps the recommendations of the Commission with 
respect of the spot market were, for the most part, implemented. 
The objective had been to introduce a unitary exchange rate system 
under which an independent and flexible rand finds its own level in 
well-developed and competitive spot markets in South Africa, subject 
to Reserve Bank ' “intervention" or "management" by means of purchases 
and sales of foreign exchange (mainly US dollars), but with no 
exchange control over non-residents and only limited control over 
residents.28
Before proceeding with a review of how far the authorities have 
progressed in implementing a more fully-developed forward exchange 
market in South Africa it is of interest to assess the performance 
of the rand exchange rate since 1979. Such an analysis will be 
conducted using the theory of purchasing power parity as applied to 
the rand-dollar exchange rate. Although some of the other major 
currencies play important roles in South Africa's total foreign 
exchange transactions, the dollar is, nevertheless, the primary 
currency for trade.
The basic tenet of the purchasing power parity (ppp) theory is that 
exchange rate movements fully offset movements in domestic price 
levels.30 The PPP analysis is by no means the only method of
examining exchange rate adjustments but there is no doubt that the 
movement of price levels in different economies affects their 
exchange rates over time.31
The PPP line has been constructed for the period 1974 - 1964 (see 
Graph 8.1) by creating an index from the quotient of US and South 
African producer price indices. Because South African inflation has 
tended to exceed US inflation over the period the PPP line has 
declined. While there is debate as to which price index to use, the 
analysis here shows very similar results whether producer price or 
consumer price indices in the US and South Africa are used.
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A further problem with PPP analysis is to determine a point at which 
the rand-dollar rate was ir ‘•■r.lHbrlum and, therefore, on Its PPP 
line. The point chosen hefu ms mid-1977 *'hen the current account 
of the South African balance of payments was moving through a point 
of balance i.e. from deficit to surplus. The selection of this 
point appears justified for the following reasons:
Firstly, at other points over the period when the current account 
was in balance the rand-dollar exchange rate also passed through the
PPP line. For example, in 1981 when the current account moved from 
a large surplus to a large deficit, the rand fell sharply against 
the dollar and by 1982 had penetrated Chn PPP line. With the return 
to surplus in 1983 the rand rose above the PPP line only co fall 
again in late 1983 and in 1984 with Che swing back into deficit.
Secondly, it shows the rand as undervalued after the devaluation in 
September 1975, ttte fact that the rand was undervalued following 
this step appears to be supported by the Interim Report. For 
example, It la stated in the Report .* 'It is possible chat, if a 
leas rigid exchange rate system had been in force, the depreciation 
of the rand would have occurred more gradually over a period of time 
and would, in total, have been lest* than the actual extent of the 
devaluation'.^ 2
It is clear from the graph that while for short periods the rand has 
remained above or below its PPP line it has tended to move in the 
direction indicated by the line. During periods when a surplus on 
the current account has been recorded, for example, in 1979/80, the 
read has risen above its PPP line and vice versa for a deficit. It 
is interesting that this has been true ooth during the period of the 
fixed exchange rate regime and since 1979 when a more flexible 
approach was adopted.
During 1984 the rand fell to a point considerably below the PPP line 
so that, on the basis of this analysis alone, the rand was dearly 
undervalued. While there were important reasons for the rand being 
undervalue'1, notably, the exceptional strength of the US dollar in 
1984 and the return to a deficit on the current account of the 
balance of payments, there are reasons for believing that the rand 
will not in the future rise significantly above its PPP line against 
the dollar, as it did ii>. the period 1973/4 and 1979/80.
These reasons are as follows:
Firstly, can current account surpluses are likely to be
smalle, ter duration than during the 1970s owing to the
low probe ;f a repetition of the specutacular surges in
commodity priceu experienced in that decode.
Secondly, It is expected that the new constitutional arrangements in 
South Africa will lead to a sustained high rate r>f growth in 
government spending which will boost imports.
Thirdly, the policy of the authorities to remove foreign exchange 
control will help to avoid the situation that occurred in 1980 when 
very large foreign exchange inflows were bottled up within the 
domestic markets which pushed the exchange rate up very sharply.
In nummary, over the period 1974 to 1984 the rand-dollar spot 
exchange rate fell considerably in line with the higher inflation 
rates experienced in South Africa vis-a-vis the US. Since 1980 when 
South Africa embarked on an evolutionary course towards flexible 
exchange rates, the fall in the rand has been quite spectacular. 
Part of this has been a consequence of the tight monetary policy 
followed in the US which has strengthened the dollar. However, the 
decline in the rand has also stemmed from domestic problems, in 
particular, the inability to gain control over money supply growth 
and inflation. To date, therefore, the objective of the Interim 
Report to make the rand a strong currency has not been successful. 
The means to achieving this was to adopt a flexible exchange rate 
policy in order to achieve greater independence for domestic 
monetary and fiscal policyUnfortunately, neither monetary nor 
fisci’l policy have been sufficiently disciplined to take advantage 
of. tin: more flexible exchange rate policy.
Developments in the Forward Exchange Markets
Zn tha Interim Report it was recognised that a well developed 
foreign axchange market could not be achieved without measures to 
create an active &nd competitive forward exchange market in South 
Africa. The RepuL't Identified numerous deficiencies in the forward 
market which was administered by the Reserve Bank. These 
deficiencies included an Imbalance between forward cover available 
to importers <12 months) and exporters (6 months); artificially set 
forward cover based on the spot rate plus 1 per cent commission
which bore no relation to domestic versus foreign Interest rate 
differentials; and the absence of forward cover facilities for 
foreign loans taken out by private sector firms.^
Host of these deficiencies were attended to within a year or ao of 
the' publication of the Interim Report. For example, in February 
1979 the Reserve Bank began quoting forward rates which were baaed 
on spot rates and took into account the difference between market 
interest rates in South Africa and comparable rates overseas. 
Further, early in 1980 cover for 12 months wets extended to exporters 
and banka were given greater freedom in respect of the type of 
transactions for which forward cover could be provided.^
However, theee measures were not sufficient to relieve the Bank of 
ita role as the final arbiter of what the 'corr&ct* exchange rate 
should be.^ 6 There still existed an artificial separation between 
the spot and forward markets such that forward market transactions 
had 10 effect on the spot exchange rate. This was because 
authorised foreign exchange dealers could, under the existing 
arrangements, be covered in full and at any time and without any 
restriction with the Bank.
Without a fully market-determined spot exchange rate the Bank 
continued to face the problem of the one-way option. In particular, 
its forward sales jf foreign exchange considerably exceeded its 
forward purchases. For example, during the first quarter of 1981 
new forward contracts for the sale of foreign exchange by the Bank 
exceeded forward purchases by R2,3 billion (i.e. R3,6 minus XI,3 
billion). T'ii.4 made the Bank extremely vulnerable to losses on 
forward exch/.r^ s contracts when the rand-dollar exchange rate wad 
under pressure aa it was throughout 1981 and during most of 1982. 
In June 1982, 'the Bank made an unusual disclosure of the losses made 
on forward jxeKing# contracts. During the first quarter an amount 
of R1 317 mJ'U.vo appeared in the category 'net other assets and 
llabilitiea" or the monetary banking sector.37 Although a 
complete bnuikrwn of this increase was not available, a 'major 
jart' of it consisted of exchange losses made by the Bank on forward 
exchange contracts. Itieee losses are for the account of the central
government and are considered as claims of the monetary banking
sector on the government.^® They also came on top of the lv«-ses
amounting to Rl 046 million during the six years up to Mart 1978
(mentioned in the Interim Report),
It was felt that ia order to establish better balance in the forward 
market, the spot exchange rate needed to find its own level based 
primarily on che dictates of supply and demand. The Ue Kock 
Cocmmiseion felt - rightly or wrongly - that should this be the case 
both importers and exporters would be equally likely to seek forward 
cover because of uncertainty as to the future movement of the spot 
rate. It was recognised that better balance and greater depth in 
the spot market could be created by paying the proceeds of gold 
bullion sales to the mining houses in dollars and allowing De Beers 
to siphon its foreign exchange receipts directly into the domestic 
foreign exchange market. When these measures were implemented in 
1983, along with the abolition of exchange controls over 
nou-reaidente, the Bank ®ade significant progress in reducing its 
dominant Influence over the exchange rate.
However, the vexti crucial step was to establish the proper linkages 
between the spot nnc forward markets. Here the authorities faced a 
dilemma. Ie has frequently been the policy of the monetary 
authorities in South Africa to encourage importers to make the 
maximum use of foreign rather than domestic credit by offering 
attractive forward cover terms through the Reserve Bank."** while
this policy benefitted the net gold and foreign exchange reserves, 
it has also contributed to the imbalance in the forward exchange 
market $ the Bank has tended to be a net seller of forward dollars. 
Furthermore, because the Reserve Bank offered direct forward cover 
facilities, demand for forward cover did not impact on the spot 
exchange rate in the way that it does in sophisticated forward 
exchange markets. Zlie Bank feared that should it completely 
withdraw from the forward market undue pressure on the spot exchange 
rate could arise because authorised dealers would purchase spot 
foreign exchange in order to hedge their forward foreign exchange 
commitments. Any attempt by the Bank to support the spot rate could 
then result in a large drain on the net gold and foreign exchange 
reserves.
The Bank favoured a more evolutionary process of withdrsMZ from the 
forward exchange market - in line with its evolutionary approach to 
the establishment of a floating spot rate.
With the introduction of a floating apot rate in September 1983 the 
Bank announced the introduction of a epot/swap system of forward 
exchange. Under this system the Bank continued to offer forward 
cover, but on a swap basis as opposed to the previous method of 
providing cover outright. Authorised dealers could no longer take 
out straight forward cover with the Bank on behalf of clients. 
Instead they covered oversold foward positions by buying in the spot 
market and effecting swap arrangements either in the market or with 
the Bank,40
Hius, where a dealer found that he could not cover a net forward 
position in the domestic interbank market, the Reserve Bank offered 
him a re-purchase arrangement for the amount and maturity of his 
exposed position. This obviated the need for local dealers to place 
dollar deposits offshore. This arrangement was due to expire in 
September 1966 and in the interim period the Bank was progressively 
to reduce the scale on which it was prepared to offer swaps to the
Apart from avoiding a sudden shock io the foreign reserves, phasing 
in the spot/swap system also had the objectives of gradually 
fostering a broader and deeper interbank foreign exchange market and 
of establishing the normal linkages between spot and forward foreign 
exchange transactions. It was hoped that the interbank market would 
develop as the Bank withdrew progressively while the spot-forward 
linkages were created because the dealers hedged exposed forward 
positions with offsetting spot transactions.
By September 1966 it was the intention that transactions in the 
forward exchange market would be conducted independently of the 
Reserve Bank (although the Bank would continue to intervene from 
time to time). This implied that the current limits on authorised 
foreign exchange dealers in placing deposits in the Eurocurrency
market would have to be removed or at least significantly reduced. 
In reality, the Bank's programme of withdrawal has not been a 
success ae will be discussed In Section 8.7. The following section 
discusses the possible development of the Eurorand market.
8.6 A Eurorand Market
South Africans are not unfamiliar with the Eurodollar market. It 
has probably been used for financing purposes more than any of the 
other International markets available to us.^ Borrowings In this 
market are not restricted to any type of transactions. It Is used 
for trade finance (mostly up to six months), working capital 
requirements, and, in times of tight domestic liquidity, by banks to 
supplement funding requirements. Towards the end of 1983 many 
corporate borrowers took out extensive Eurodollar loans without 
covering forward in the belief that the rand-dollar spot rate would 
strengthen thereby giving them the benefit both of lower Eurodollar 
interest rates and a capital gain oa the currency. This has proved 
to be an expensive mistake.
The Eurodollar market is also extensively used by long-term 
borrowers, particularly public corporations such as Escom. These 
loans are usually handled by an overseas lead manager bank which 
will sign the agreement with the local borrower and then syndicate 
the loan with a number of overseas (and, more recently, local) banks 
on a private placement basis.*2 This type of borrowing is more In 
the nature of a Eurobond or foreign bond issue.
With the proposed withdrawal of the Reserve Bank from the forward 
exchange market the question of the development of a Eurorand market 
has arisen. Such rand deposit facilities could be offered in two 
forms. Firstly, a more active Eurorand market could develop where 
interbank rand deposits are hel. in major financial centres such as 
London and New York. Secondly, non-residents could be granted 
permission to make use of onshore rand deposit facilities without 
restrictions.
At first sight the prospect of a Eurorr.nd market appears exciting. 
Ihe 1983 Yearbook of International Financial Statistics published by 
the IMP shows that in 1981 South Africa ranked 18th in terms of 
total merchandise trade (including gold bullion sales) (see Table 
8.1).
TABLE 8.1 
TOTAL MERCHANDISE TRADE 1981 
t Billions
United States
West Ge._ny
.iapan
France
United Kingdom
161
Saudi Arabia 145
Canada 138
Netherlands
Belgium
Switzerland
Australia
South Africa
Source: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook. 1983.
Furthermore, it is estimated that at the end of 1983 around 31 per 
cent (813,7 billion) of the market capitalisation of mining shares 
quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was owned by
non-residents.43 However, these figures belie the true nature of 
the currency flows through the South African foreign exchange
market. For, on the trade side, the rand is not the predominant 
currency for the denomination of transactions. In the case of 
exports it is likely that a negligible proportion of total exports 
(Including gold bullion) is paid for in rands. All the major
metals and minerals are priced in dollars and, in a few cases,
sterling. lo a great, although slightly lesser extent, South
African imports are also paid for in foreign currencies.
Aa for foreign ownership of South African shares, two factors limit 
the need for trading purposes. Firstly, a large proportion of the 
trading by foreigners is actually conducted in New York or London 
between foreign parties which excludes the need for rands. 
Secondly, scrip available for trading has been declining since 1969 
aa a growing proportion of South African shares have been taken up 
by major institutions as a long-term investment.^ However, it 
la true that the volume of foreign trade conducted in Johannesburg 
has picked up considerably since the abolition of exchange controls 
for non-residents in February 1983.
It appears, therefore, ou the basis of the denomination of trade 
and capital flows that the rand plays a very small role despite the 
relatively large value of such transactions by international
standards. This implies that there is very limited need for 
offshore rand deposit facilities.
Another factor militating against the establishment of a Eurorand 
market is the weak currency status of the rand. Apart from the 
fact that South African inflation appears almost endemlcally higher 
than that of its trading partners it is also interesting to note 
that the economy is by nature a capital-importer and has tended to 
run current account deficits since the mid-1960s. This fall has 
been obscured by recent history - between 1977 and 1980 there were 
considerable surpluses on current account.
TABLE 8.2
SOUTH AFRICA : % OF G D P
Current Account Imports2
Surplus or Deficit1- (Constant Prices)
-0,8
-2,8
-0,3
-2,0
0,4
-2,4
-6,7
-7,4
-0,6
-0,3
-4,1
-6,7
-5,4
1,2
3,4
6,1
4,6
-5,7
-4,1
0,3
Sources: (1) Kconostat Database System, Rosebank, until 1975. Quarterly 
Bulletin. South African Reserve BanK, 1976 to 1983.
(2). A Statistical Presentation of South Africa’s National 
Accounts for the Period 1946 to 1980. South African Reserve 
Bank, September 1981 and Quarterly Bulletin. South African 
Reserve Bank, various issues.
However, as ahorn in Table 8.2, this has tended to be the exception 
- caused by the phenomenal rise in the gold price at the time.
As South Africa is likely to continue to rely heavily on capital 
goods Imports for its industrial expansion, it seems likely that 
current account deficits will persist. This prospect is made even 
more likely if it is taken into account that the country's 
programme of import replacement initiated during the 1970s can 
probably Ux-t go much further than the point attained during 1983. 
By then, imports as a percentage of gross domestic product had 
declined to only 18 per cent compared with the level of 31 per cent 
recorded in 1974 (see Table 8.2). If South Africa is to continue 
to import capital to finance current account deficits, there will 
be little room tor exporting capital to stimulate the growth of an 
offshore rand deposit market.
In conclusion, although a small Eurorand market is already reported 
to exist,*5 economic fundamentals make it very unlikely that it 
will play a major role ia South African foreign exchange 
transactions in the future. Ihis leaves the alternative of 
establishing domestic rand deposit facilities for foreigners which 
implies that the authorities will need to make further changes in 
the exchange control regulations.
The current difficulty with the provision of rand deposit 
facilities to foreigners in South Africa is the prohibition on non­
resident investment in money market Instruments which are bearer- 
owned, Non-residents are restricted to deposits with banks or 
purchase of government stock. The basis for this restriction is 
the fesr that residents could sell money market paper to 
non-residents, accepting payment overseas, which would constitute a 
drain oa the net foreign reserves. As there is no register of 
money market instruments the Reserve Dank would not be able to 
control capital outflows from this source.
If the onshore rand deposit market Is to resemble a Eurocurrency 
market system and thereby generate reasonably active foreign 
participation, such restrictions will have to be removed. In 
addition, other impediments, not imposed in the Eurocurrency 
markets, such as the 10 per cent withholding tax on Interest from 
foreign deposits and even the liquid asset requirements on bank 
deposits will have to be reconsidered because they effectively 
lower the rate of interest available to depoait-holders.
Recent Developments
A major principle underlying the Interim Report was the assertion 
that a more flexible spot exchange rate would generate sufficient 
uncertainty concerning the future direction of movement in the rand 
as to encourage balance in the forward exchange m a r k e t T o  
this end in September 1983 the authorities embarked on the final 
stage to link the spot and forward markets such that the spot rate 
achieved the adequate degree of flexibility. As mentioned in 
Section 8.5, in addition to introducing the spot/swap system of 
forward exchange, they allowed the proceeds of gold bullion sales 
to flow directly through the market. Furthermore, they permitted 
invisible receipts and payments to be covered forward.
It was the intention of the Reserve flank to withdraw progressively 
from providing spot/swap facilities to the market. Each September 
until 1986 the Bank was to reduce in stages the maximum quota of 
swaps between it and each authc,/lsed dealer. The Bank hoped that 
over this period of phased withdrawal the interbank market would 
gradually become more sophisticated such that forward sales and 
purchases of foreign exchange would be matched with diminishing 
recourse to the bank.
Unfortunately, two factors have severely inhibited the development 
of such a balanced forward market. Ihe firs: of theme was the 
unprecedented decline in the spot exchange rate between teid-1984 
and early 1985.
During July 1984 the rand came under severe pressure against the US 
dollar and declined from around $0,76 towards the end of June to 
just above $0,60 at the end of July, a decline of over 20 per cent 
in only 5 weeks. In this particular example there had been 
widespread expectation that the rand was due to rise and many 
importers had taken uncovered foreign loans, Ihe subsequent 
decline ia the rand led to a large volume of forward covering, and 
by early 1985 the rate had fallen further to $0,42.
During this startling decline, the rand spot rate did not appear to 
reach a point where the probability of a further decline was 
equalled by the probability of a rise. Furthermore, lar^e-acale 
switching from foreign to domestic credit occurred as importers 
perceived that the exchange rate risk outweighed the benefit of 
relatively lower interest rates overseas.
These pressures occurred at a point where the net foreign reserves 
of the monetary banking sector were already low (see Graph 8.2). 
Ihe Bank attempted to prop up the rand at times, necessitating 
considerable foreign borrowing.
GRAPH 8.2
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Source: s.A. Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin.
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In January 1985, the authorities responded to this disaster by 
taking two retrospective steps. Firstly, they stopped paying the 
full proceeds of gold sales in dollars to the mining houses. From 
the end of January the houses were paid half in dollars, half in 
rands. Secondly, the bank reintroduced, as an option, the practice 
of dealing directly in forward exchange with authorised dealers.
The second factor holding back the development of a sophisticated 
forward market has been the failure on the part of the authorities 
to allow domestic banks to set up adequate foreign exchange 
facilities offshore and to allow foreign banks to open up rand 
deposit facilities locally. It appears that the authorities 
anticipate that, following their withdrawal from the forward 
market, the necessary swap facilities will be provided within the 
domestic interbank market. However, the realities of the domestic 
forward exchange market render this most unlikely. For one thing 
the imbalance in the forward market is unlikely to be eliminated 
rapidly. Ihe bulk of South Africa's mineral exports are sold spot 
and She proceeds are only to a limited extent sold forward for 
rands. Many minerals producers believe that, in the long run, the 
rand and the gold price, for example, will move more or less in the 
same direction, thereby providing a natural hedge.
Secondly, the very eharp decline in the rand during 1984 caused a 
number of authorised dealers to reduce the scale of their 
transactions in the foreign exchange market or to withdraw 
altogether. This has severely limited the breadth and depth of the 
interbank market. Furthermore, banks impose limits on their swap, 
spot and forward transactions with other banks.47
Under these circumstances, the Bank is confronted with two 
choices. It must either continue to provide some minimum level of 
spot/swap facilities or it must allow the authorised dealers to 
take advantage of swap facilities in Eurocurrency markets.
Ihe authorities appear firmly opposed to the former choice. Hie 
latter choice would entail the easing or lifting of controls on the 
amounts of foreign currency domestic banks may hold and borrow 
offshore. Then, in circumstances where the demand for forward 
foreign exchange exceeds the supply, the banks would enter into 
swaps by borrowing rands, purchasing foreign exchange and investing 
the foreign exchange in the Eurocurrency market until the 
commitments on forward contracts become due. Such transactions 
could, of course, put downwsrd pressure on the rand exchange rate.
Should it reject one of other (or some combination) of these two 
choices, the Bank runs the risk of causing a contraction in the 
forward exchange market. Authorised dealers at times will simply 
be unable to meet all the demand for forward dollars. Excess 
demand for forward cover will put undue downward pressure on the 
forward rand exchange rate, leading to expectations of a decline in 
the spot rate. Importers will be encouraged to reduce their demand 
for foreign credit and switch to domestic sources, thereby putting 
pressure on the foreign exchange reserves and pushing up domestic 
interest rates.
In September 1984 the Bank did, in fact, reduce the swap quotas it 
makes available to authorised dealers in line with its phased 
withdrawal programme. However, it neglected to raise the limits on 
dealers to hold foreign exchange in offshore deposits. Currently, 
these limits total R6OO0 which is wholly inadequate. South 
Africa's total foreign transactions routed through the foreign 
exchange market, are estimated to total at least $30 billion (equal 
to around R60 billion at the time of writing)/8 Furthermore, 
the limits are determined in rands, implying a considerable 
contraction since mid-1984 owing to the fall in the exchange rate.
In summary, it appears that the economy has not gained from the 
cautious approach adopted by the authorities. Fundamentally, for 
the spot and forward markets to operate efficiently they need to be 
given depth and breadth. Currently there are too many controls 
which restrain the flows of foreign exchange, leaving the markets 
thin and brittle. The steps taken in January 1985 leave the South 
African foreign exchange markets somewhere between control and
laissez-faire with no certainty as to the future direction or the 
ultimate objective. In order to rectify these uncertainties, the 
authorities need to reconcile their provision of forward currency 
facilities with controls over domestic banks' foreign currency 
exposure.
Conclusion
1 e widespread adoption of floating exchange rates in the 1970a 
eventually led to recommendations for a similar system for the 
South African rand. An evolutionary process was set in motion in 
1979 for the establishment of competitive spot and forwarc markets 
for South Africa. By September 1986 this process was supposed to 
have been completed. However, early in 1985, several retrogressive 
steps were taken leaving the forward exchange market in a state of 
uncertainty. While extensive use is made of the Eurodollar market, 
the establishment of an active Eurorand market is not thought 
viable. A significant reduction in exchange controls has already 
occurred but further steps in this regard both for non-residents 
and residents are required.
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